There is no question that Iran now poses an unprecedented concern regarding the development of nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency recently reported that Iran has stockpiled near-weapons-grade enriched nuclear material sufficient to produce at least five warheads. U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials are also confident that if Iran decided to construct a nuclear warhead, it could do so in three to six months. Even the cautious European powers now support imposing new sanctions on Iran unless a solution is found in the near future. Another big problem is the absence of any credible inspection protocols regarding Iran’s nuclear program. It is also unclear to what degree Iran has advanced its nuclear weapons research, although it has long engaged in those efforts on a covert basis.

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This underscores why President Donald Trump is pursuing high-tempo diplomacy toward reaching a new agreement with Iran to replace the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear accord. Trump withdrew from that agreement in his first term, and Iran then suspended compliance with the JCPOA’s remaining parties.

However, not everyone supports Trump’s diplomacy-first agenda.

Some prominent commentators argue that Trump’s diplomacy won’t produce a good outcome and wastes a unique opportunity to destroy Iran’s nuclear program with military force. Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies think tank, argued on Sunday that “the Islamic Republic is weaker than ever — hated by most Iranians, hammered by the [Israeli military] and [the Israeli foreign intelligence service]. Its terror armies, air defenses, missile production capability are in ruins. Never a better time to dismantle its nuke program & finish off the regime. Will another POTUS blink?” Conservative commentator Mark Levin made a similar argument on his Fox News show last weekend. Several top Republicans on Capitol Hill share these sentiments.

Still, I’m skeptical of the contention that Iran’s military threat is manifestly reduced and that there has never been a better time to destroy its nuclear program. At a minimum, the significant loss of U.S. life in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — and the gradual transition of those conflicts from U.S. certainty of victory to a messy albeit democratic status quo (Iraq) and defeat (Afghanistan) — should give us pause about using military force where diplomatic options remain. And meaningful diplomacy is at least possible here.

Iran views Trump as far more unpredictable and risk-tolerant than former Presidents Joe Biden and Barack Obama. That means Trump’s dangled arrows in any negotiation are a potent companion to his olive branch offerings. Iran has good reason to fear that even if Trump has a strong preference for diplomatic compromise, he will be willing to use force if he doesn’t get an acceptable agreement.

In addition, because Trump is demanding only nuclear-related sacrifices from Iran, and not an end to Iran’s support for terrorist groups and its broader theological agenda, Iran may find it easier to get to a deal. Considering Tehran’s structural economic challenges and the great damage Israel has recently imposed upon its allies in Hezbollah and Hamas, it might view sanctions relief as a greater prize than the burden of a newly vigorous inspections regime that limits its nuclear activities.

Because of Israel’s interest in the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program and broader threat, it is unlikely to view a deal on the aforementioned lines favorably. That said, I believe such a deal would serve U.S. interests and that Israel could live with an arrangement that fundamentally limited Iran’s ability to effect a second Holocaust. Moreover, these messy diplomatic considerations represent only one side of the Iran nuclear issue. The military side is at least equally problematic.

And it’s very risky to believe that Iran has largely been neutered in terms of its ability to defend or retaliate against U.S. military strikes on its nuclear program. Even then, the sustainability of any new nuclear deal would rest on the highly uncertain prospect of Iran’s abandonment of its active and varied assassination campaigns targeting various American officials.

True, Israeli air strikes last October significantly damaged Iran’s air defense network and missile production capabilities. True, Iranian leaders were deeply shaken by the success and impunity with which Israel acted. But the damage Israel caused was not absolute. Iran retains air defense systems that would pose a threat to U.S. forces if they were ordered to attack Iran’s nuclear program. And that program is spread widely across Iran, including in hardened, underground facilities designed to defeat even the most powerful U.S. penetrating munitions.

This tactical environment cannot be taken for granted. It means that any U.S. or U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities would also demand multiple days of strikes against its air defense networks, missile and drone units, airfields, command and control headquarters, and other military targets. The United States would also have to deploy aircraft to defend Israel against likely unprecedented Iranian retaliation via missile and drone strikes. If Iran decided to use its navy in an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz energy chokepoint, the U.S. Navy would have to conduct a short but high-intensity conflict to reopen the strait. This would require a lot of munitions and capabilities.

On that point, while U.S. B-2 and F-35 stealth aircraft could carry out some of these strikes, Navy F-18s and Air Force F-15 and F-16 jets would also be required. And no serious military analyst could argue that U.S. air crews would not be at risk. Nor does any serious Iran analyst believe Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would sit quietly. After all, Khamenei views his nuclear program as the ultimate manifestation of the Islamic revolution’s ordained glory. He views it as his key prestige project of the present and the pathway to the Islamic Republic’s future glory. He also possesses more than 3,000 ballistic missiles, hundreds of aerial combat drones, and hundreds of cruise missiles.

Following U.S. military action, any of these combat systems not destroyed by the U.S. or Israel would almost certainly be employed against Israeli and U.S. targets across the region. Iranian intelligence officers and terrorists from Hezbollah and Iran-controlled Iraqi militias would very likely attempt to conduct terrorist attacks on U.S. interests at home and abroad. This is not a hypothetical concern: Intelligence officers serving at Iran’s U.N. Mission have been monitored by the FBI conducting targeting reconnaissance in New York City.

Nor does U.S. military action offer an assured silver bullet.

The Washington Examiner understands from military sources that Pentagon war planners are far from certain as to whether their GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator bombs and GBU-74 advanced penetrator bombs could fully destroy Iran’s underground nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow. That matters because the strategic intent of any U.S. military strikes would be to cause such significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program that it delays the regime’s ability to reconstitute that program by multiple years. Indeed, the intent would be to delay reconstitution to such a degree that the regime either gives up attempting reconstitution or is deposed by the time effective reconstitution occurs.

Considering the uncertainties of an air campaign, it is probable that decisive U.S. military action would require special operations forces, likely centered on the U.S. Army Rangers, to enter some Iranian facilities physically and destroy them from the inside out. Even assuming U.S. air dominance and an abundant provision of air-to-ground support, any ground combat inside Iran would be very risky and almost certain to entail casualties. This ground combat consideration is why Israel could not launch a highly effective military campaign against Iran’s nuclear program without direct U.S. support. It would necessitate too many aircraft of too many different types.

The key point here is that U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear program would be inherently risky. While an eventual U.S. victory would be almost certain, even in the best-case scenario, military action would cause a major regional conflagration, attacks on U.S. citizens and interests, and the depletion of finite forces and munitions. This is a major concern in the context of China’s growing threat to conquer Taiwan and seize control of the Pacific. The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Adm. Sam Paparo, issued a warning on this matter last year. As he put it, “Inherently, it imposes costs on the readiness of America to respond in the Indo-Pacific region, which is the most stressing theater for the quantity and quality of munitions because [China] is the most capable potential adversary in the world.”

Again, while a maximalist U.S.-Iran military showdown might be in Israel’s interest, I would argue that it plainly would not be in America’s interest.

TRUMP’S CHAOTIC EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING MESSAGING

That means the best current choice remains the diplomatic route. Yes, Trump will have to avoid being sucked into a deal that looks good on paper while delivering none of the verification controls and counter-weaponization safeguards any viable agreement requires.

But surely, diplomacy deserves an attempt before taking military action that risks highly unpredictable, deeply destabilizing, and deadly consequences. If diplomacy fails, the U.S. can still participate in an Israeli attack.