China has brokered an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Two nations will reopen their respective embassies within two months and pursue trust-building measures. The detente is unlikely to last long, however. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are simply too distrustful of one another to build a durable partnership.
Still, China has scored an unambiguous diplomatic victory. Facing escalating diplomatic pressure over his balloon adventures and quiet support for Russia's war in Ukraine, Xi Jinping needed a public relations win. This agreement delivers that. It will play particularly well in Europe, which values diplomatic accords that have more value in pretense than in practice.
For Saudi Arabia, however, this deal has as much to do with Washington as it does with Tehran.
THE IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA DEAL IS A COOLING AGENT, NOT A CURE
Mohammed bin Salman is seeking major U.S. concessions in return for establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel. By reaching this agreement via Beijing, with which Riyadh already has warm relations, the de facto Saudi ruler knows he will trigger alarm bells in Washington. Today's U.S. foreign policy priority, after all, is the alignment of partners against China. This accord allows bin Salman to not so subtly hint that the U.S. might want to be nicer to him or see Beijing become Riyadh's new primary patron. China notwithstanding, considering bin Salman's social and economic reform program, Saudi trade and energy engagement with the U.S., and the counterterrorism efficacy of the Saudi GIP intelligence service, the U.S. should boost relations with Riyadh. Albeit disgraceful, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi should no longer define U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia.
Regardless, Iran and Saudi Arabia aren't becoming true friends anytime soon. The fundamental strain on this relationship remains the oldest and deepest one. Namely, that the two regimes are defined by fundamentally divergent ideologies and ambitions.
For Iran, Saudi Arabia represents a historic nemesis characterized by arrogance and immorality. For the Iranian hardliners who generally drive Iran's foreign policy, the 7th century Battle of Karbala remains an enduring source of, and ideological requirement for, hate toward the Saudis. That battle saw the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali and his Shia followers at the hands of the Sunni Umayyad Caliphate. In the modern day, Iran's ambition for regional hegemony drives it to undermine Saudi interests and broader Sunni political Islamic movements. And evinced by incidents such as Iran's 2011 plot to blow up the then-Saudi ambassador at Washington, D.C.'s Cafe Milano restaurant, Khamenei will roll the dice to hurt the Saudis. Does this agreement mean Khamenei has now changed course?
Forget about it. The continued hawkishness of Iranian foreign policy is best evinced by Tehran's effort, exclusively reported on by the Washington Examiner, to assassinate former and senior U.S. government and military officials. What Iran is doing here is playing nice for its Chinese patron and buying breathing room amid escalating pressure from the West.
Other contentions in the Saudi-Iranian relationship underline the paper nature of this diplomacy. The two governments are active adversaries in the Yemeni civil war and the Lebanese political crisis. Tensions over Syria and Iraq also abound. And the Iranian nuclear program is seen by the Saudis in much the same way as it is seen by Israel: an existential threat of intolerable nature. If Iran continues enriching uranium to near weapons-grade purity levels, this diplomatic engagement may wither even before the embassies are up and running.
Top line: the Saudis and the Iranians are putting lipstick on their enduring political pig.