President-elect Donald Trump‘s victory has sparked alarm among some in the intelligence community. There exists a general fear that his deep suspicion of the IC will lead him to fire vast numbers of personnel and politicize IC operations. At the same time, a smaller but significant cadre is optimistic that Trump will provide them with a freer hand to take action against U.S. adversaries.
Trump has nominated two former members of the House to head up the sprawling 18-agency-strong IC. John Ratcliffe, who served as director of national intelligence in Trump’s first term, is set to become CIA director. Trump has chosen former Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard to take Ratcliffe’s former role as director of national intelligence. Ratcliffe, who performed well as director of national intelligence, is likely to sail through his Senate confirmation hearings. Gabbard faces a tougher nomination fight in light of her previously expressed sympathies for Syrian dictator Bashar Assad and Russian intelligence service fictions. Trump is also expected to nominate a top loyalist, such as former administration official Kash Patel, to lead the FBI.
That said, to the IC’s relief, Trump thus far appears satisfied to allow military officers and career civil servants to maintain their leadership of other IC agencies such as the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. However, what will Trump mean for the IC when he takes office on Jan. 20?
On the opportunity side of the ledger, some IC personnel see Trump’s unpredictability and disregard for bureaucracy as providing substantial opportunities.
Because Trump’s exact policy position at any one moment is hard to gauge, he introduces friction into the decision-making of foreign governments. In Trump’s first term, this friction allowed the IC to better assess the psychology and ideology of various foreign government officials and factions. In turn, these assessments allowed the IC to win favor with Trump by showing him what foreign governments were thinking, saying, and doing behind closed doors. Trump used these assessments to inform his negotiating strategies, such as his transition between threatening North Korea with annihilation and extending Pyongyang a diplomatic olive branch. Trump waited until North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un really thought the United States was about to attack and then, at the point of maximal leverage, offered him an escape exit.
Similarly, when it comes to bureaucracy, Trump’s disdain for slow-moving processes is highly valued by the IC’s more forward-leaning operational elements. This is especially true with the CIA and the NSA. Whether in terms of authorizing the raid against Osama bin Laden, operations inside Russia, or targeting China, former President Barack Obama demanded extensive IC analysis, National Security Council briefings, and counterbriefings before authorizing risky actions. However, this prudence carried a cost. Some members of the CIA and military’s Joint Special Operations Command believe, for example, that Obama’s caution cost priceless opportunities to rescue Western hostages, including Americans, who were later executed by ISIS.
In contrast, in his first term, Trump granted far more latitude to IC leaders to take action as and when opportunities arose. Ironically, considering the general narrative surrounding Trump’s attitude toward Russia, this included highly sensitive and still undisclosed operations inside Russia. Trump’s tolerance for risk-taking and high regard for certain allies also led him to authorize operations that other presidents likely would not have. For example, under Trump, the U.S. engaged in a highly classified but exceptionally valuable joint IC operation with a close ally.
On entering office, President Joe Biden reimposed IC operational restrictions to a greater degree than even Obama. This has set a tone. CIA Deputy Director David Cohen, for example, has ensured that “canary trap” efforts to catch Russian intelligence personnel with Havana Syndrome-related devices have been restricted to missions designed to fail.
In essence, then, where Trump embraced a far higher tolerance for risk both to U.S. personnel and others in his IC mission guidance, Obama and Biden prioritized caution and risk mitigation. If Trump returns to his prior approach in his second term, it will find strong support from certain IC quarters. Put simply, these IC elements want to ‘get after’ the mission.
However, this is only one side of the coin. On the other side is the fear that Trump will politicize the IC to the detriment of national security.
Trump’s heavy regard for personal loyalty and personal interest has many in the IC concerned that he will purge personnel who provide analysis that does not align with his viewpoints. There is a shared sense in the IC that former intelligence officials significantly damaged the IC’s reputation with Trump when they suggested without evidence that Hunter Biden’s laptop was the product of a Russian disinformation operation. Still, the vast majority of IC personnel at lower to middle-high ranks are patriotic professionals with little interest in political machinations.
This is not to say that reform of the IC isn’t required. The IC’s bloated management and assessment editing process is far too slow and burdensome. This degrades operational lines of effort, deters bold assessments, and leads to lost opportunities. The IC’s recent penchant for diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives is also widely and rightly derided by IC personnel. Yet, the general fear is that Trump will go hunting for ghostly enemies rather than ensure the IC works more effectively.
Another concern is that Trump’s sometimes ramshackle approach toward safeguarding classified information risks intelligence falling into the wrong hands. This correlates with an IC worry that allies will restrict their most sensitive intelligence with the U.S. under Trump in fear that doing otherwise may see it leak. Admittedly, this fear is likely exaggerated. The CIA’s 2013 era failure to safeguard its human agent communications system and scaled leaks such as those of Edward Snowden have already led close allies to restrict what they tell the U.S. about their agents and capabilities. While allies gain a great deal from U.S. intelligence reporting, Trump is not regarded in the intelligence business as someone who values the quiet retention of secrets.
Personality is another factor.
During his first term in office, Trump often showed a general inability to remain focused during intelligence briefings (Trump was also well-regarded by some for his questioning orthodox sentiment). This was perhaps best emphasized by Trump’s embarrassing visit to CIA headquarters early in his presidency. Speaking before the CIA’s memorial wall for fallen personnel, Trump engaged in a diatribe against media reporting on the crowd size at his inaugural address. It suggested Trump cared more about his ego than the sacrifice made by intelligence officers in the national interest.
This is Trump’s prerogative as president, of course. The presidency does not exist to serve the IC. The IC exists to inform the president. Still, some IC personnel worry that the incoming president will fail to grasp the seriousness of an urgent matter or the need to protect the sources and methods being employed to gather information.
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Trump’s unpredictability is the ultimate pivot point here. Having positioned loyalists at the top of the IC, Trump may well feel he can trust the intelligence assessments provided to him. However, for those serving inside the IC, the risks and opportunities Trump is seen to carry with him are significant.
As the CIA memorial wall attests, risks in this line of work can be deadly.