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
The new chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence is committed to uncovering the truth behind a mystery that has befuddled the U.S. intelligence community since 2016.
Rep. Rick Crawford (R-AR) is an Army veteran who recently replaced Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH) as chairman of the intelligence committee. He will now lead House oversight of the intelligence community and attend the most classified congressional briefings as a member of the so-called “Gang of Eight.” That group includes the Senate and House majority and minority leaders, as well as the chairs and vice chairs of the Senate and House intelligence committees. “Gang of Eight” briefings are reserved for classified matters deemed so sensitive they cannot be briefed to the full intelligence committee.
That access will help Crawford ascertain the reality of Havana Syndrome. This is good news for the intelligence community’s operations officers, other U.S. military and government personnel, and national security.
What the government refers to as “anomalous health incidents,” Havana Syndrome entails varied, otherwise unexplained ailments, such as loss of gait, severe headaches, auditory disturbances, and traumatic brain injuries. It was first reported by U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers serving at the newly reopened U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba, in 2016. Hundreds of U.S. government and military personnel have subsequently reported suffering AHIs in numerous locations across the globe.
However, while the majority of the 18-member intelligence community insists that it is “very unlikely” any AHIs are the result of foreign adversarial activity, that flawed assessment is beginning to break down. Crawford is key here.
As chairman of the House Intelligence Committee’s CIA subcommittee, Crawford released an interim report late last year, which stated it “is increasingly likely a foreign adversary is responsible for some portion of reported AHIs.” Crawford and other House members, such as Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX), have scrutinized the intelligence community’s response to Havana Syndrome/AHIs. These efforts have found support from House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA). Indeed, occasional resistance from Turner to Crawford and Pfluger’s AHI-related efforts was partly responsible for Johnson’s decision to replace Turner.
Regardless, the oversight work is paying off.
Earlier this month, two intelligence agencies shifted their position on Havana Syndrome. They now assess that there is a credible chance that a foreign actor has used a weapon to cause Havana Syndrome health effects. While the identity of these agencies hasn’t been publicly released, the Washington Examiner can report that they are the National Security Agency and the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command.
What’s really going on?
Put simply, this shifting assessment reflects an abundance of compelling and credible evidence to strongly indicate that some AHIs are the result of Russian and, to a lesser but still significant degree, Cuban intelligence service employment of directed energy microwave weapons. This evidence is supported by a swath of credible technical intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement/signals intelligence, and signals intelligence reporting. Moreover, its abundant quality begs a major question: Why, if intelligence reporting pointing to hostile activity by a foreign adversary is so strong, does the intelligence community continue to bury its head in the sand?
Crawford recently sat down with the Washington Examiner to discuss why that might be the case.
Lamenting the intelligence community’s “7th floor”/leadership effort to “delay” and “deny” effective investigations, he underlined why the many intelligence officers he has spoken to are so angry.
Describing these officers’ attitudes, Crawford said, “You get to the point where we’re beyond disappointment. Now we’re outraged. Now we’re upset. Because [intelligence community leaders] have come up from the ranks and should know that this is a serious problem and why are they not taking it seriously.” In a feat of understatement, Crawford noted that his work has “ruffled some feathers on the 7th floor.” I can personally attest to that reality. The few journalists who have covered Havana Syndrome with skepticism of the intelligence community’s “nothing to see here” narratives have learned that doing so is a sure way to lose access to briefings and engagement.
Yet Crawford clearly demonstrated that his cause is worthy. He explained, “My first concern is for the well-being of these individuals that we have stationed overseas, taking great risks to themselves, to their families … The very least we can do is make sure that we have their backs if and when there is a situation where they are attacked. Whatever the nature of that attack.”
The point was well made. We care about Americans who suffer terrorist attacks such as the 2011 Benghazi Embassy annex disaster. Why wouldn’t we care about highly damaging and sometimes even deadly attacks of a more complicated nature? Why wouldn’t we care when serving U.S. presidents and their delegations, which may well have been victims? Are we too simple-minded? I’d venture that the enemy is banking on just that understanding.
Crawford wants to address this concern on a bipartisan basis. However, he lamented that the intelligence community has all too often treated the intelligence committee as an obstacle to be skirted rather than a democratic authority that must, by law, be respected. As he put it, “It’s not like this [the intelligence committee is] the New York Times asking for information, we’re the overseeing authority for you, we fund you, but we want to know what’s going on. And when we ask these questions, and they respond either with no response, or with a delayed response, or an incomplete response, or a highly redacted response, or in many cases a fully redacted response as if we’re not entitled to that, we are absolutely entitled to that information. It’s our job.”
Crawford continued, “Where we’re requesting information, and we get delayed for weeks, months, and finally get a document, and it’s 100% redacted. Well, why would you redact that? ‘Well, we’re trying to protect the identity of the analyst.’ OK, well then, why did you redact the entire page if your only concern was to protect the identity of the analyst and protect their analytic integrity, then when would you leak the product blacked out?”
Again, however, Crawford emphasized that he didn’t want this matter to devolve into yet another partisan whipping horse. He explained, “I’m not trying to pin blame on an individual or an [particular presidential] administration. This problem spans multiple administrations. It’s not about assigning blame. It’s about getting to the bottom of the problem and then how do we address it going forward, in a way that not only addresses the underlying problem but sends a strong message in whatever workforce that whatever happens, we realize this is a thing, and we’re going to take care of it.”
Crawford is viewed with near-universal acclaim by Havana Syndrome victims in the intelligence community. The first U.S. government official to report being a victim of AHI in Cuba, “Adam,” lauded Crawford as “a phenomenal person,” for example.
What happens next?
Crawford is hopeful that the Trump administration and newly appointed intelligence community officials, such as incoming CIA Director John Ratcliffe, will address political pressure within the intelligence community that is designed to shape analysis in ways that dilute Havana Syndrome’s credibility. He emphasized, “I’m not interested in trying to attack an individual analyst. What I am interested in is: why would you go to your analyst and say, ‘Here’s a set of talking points that we need sort of filled in. Our ability to communicate a message nothing to see here and your analysis needs to reflect that.'”
He continued, “That does a disservice not only to the country from a decision-making perspective for those individuals who rely on good intelligence to make decisions, informed decisions, it also does a disservice to those analysts who are being asked, essentially, to compromise. That’s not what they’re trained for. That’s not how they’re supposed to deliver important information through their analytic review. So, analytic integrity is paramount to good products that inform good decisions. And if you’ve got middle managers going to these analysts and saying, ‘I need you to revise this, you need to revise that,’ that is tantamount to a propaganda campaign.”
Crawford is plain-eyed that while not all Havana Syndrome cases are equal, true victims deserve far better than how they have been treated by the government thus far. He noted, “Quite frankly, there were some folks who, I’ll say, in the field, who saw this as an opportunity — ‘I don’t really like my duty station’ — and took advantage of it. Both things can be true at the same time. This can be a legitimate issue and you can have people who are trying to exploit it for their own personal reasons. And we’ve found evidence in both cases. I will say this: I think the legitimate cases far outweigh the ones exploiting it for personal reasons. So I want the American people to know this isn’t some kind of dodge, this isn’t some kind of game — that we’re paying attention to it.”
While Crawford was careful throughout his interview not to divulge classified information, he did note that the target profile of Havana Syndrome victims “sort of points to maybe some, some understanding of who they’re going after and the message they’re trying to send here.”
Crawford’s responsibility to protect classified information means he cannot say as much, but the U.S. victim profile is manifestly centered on officers who have either upset Russia via their work, engaged in Russia-related assignments, or countered the Cuban DI intelligence service. Russian intelligence czar Nikolai Patrushev has, if cryptically, publicly proclaimed Russia’s success in forcing enemies out of the fight. Other evidence points to his mocking of the United States in certain previous Havana Syndrome events.
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The key now is that a new administration has taken office.
Ratcliffe and Tulsi Gabbard, President Donald Trump’s national intelligence director nominee, have an opportunity to do better than their predecessors on this most important matter. Americans are under attack and need more active defense. The innate psychology and anti-Americanism of the Russian intelligence service leadership mean these attacks will continue until Moscow faces a price for them. Individuals such as Patrushev deserve a harder reckoning.
However, if Ratcliffe and company succeed, history will remember them well for it.