A key responsibility of Congress is to hold the executive publicly accountable. Under Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX), the House Homeland Security Committee fulfilled that responsibility on Wednesday by confronting the so-called “Havana Syndrome” challenge.

Referred to by the U.S. government as “Anomalous Health Incidents,” Havana Syndrome has afflicted hundreds of U.S. personnel at home and abroad. As I’ve previously noted, “Symptoms include dizziness, extreme pressure in the head, and unsteady gait. Some suspected victims now suffer serious, lifelong ailments. Others have even died prematurely. And while a large number of Havana syndrome reportees are very likely suffering from prior-undiagnosed or unrelated medical ailments, there is very significant evidence of a hostile Russian connection to dozens of other reports.” Russia is very likely employing a nano-pulsed radio frequency/microwave weapon system to achieve Havana Syndrome health effects. This might sound like science fiction, but science shows and the Russians themselves admit they have this capability.

The intelligence community disagrees. It remains wedded to an assessment that it is “highly unlikely” that a foreign adversary is responsible for AHI incidents.

The problem for the intelligence community is that the public evidence of Russia’s culpability is growing. Following the Washington Examiner’s first reporting of the Russian GRU military intelligence service’s links to Havana Syndrome in October 2021, the Insider recently reported on the evidence linking a specific GRU unit to the syndrome. That made relevant this hearing’s inclusion, under oath, of the Insider’s lead reporter Cristo Grozev, AHI victim lawyer Mark Zaid, and former Defense Department lead AHI investigator Greg Edgreen.

Of key note was Edgreen’s stark assessment to Congress: “Give me 20 minutes in a [classified setting] and I’ll convince all of you. I know where the bodies are buried, I know the cabinets to look in, the questions to ask, and the people to subpoena. I will say this is a global campaign and it’s focused on attacking our people … the best of our people.” Asked how he believed the United States should respond to this challenge, Edgreen noted a dynamic that successfully defined U.S. action during the Cold War but apparently has since been forgotten. As he put it, “You have to fight back. When you’re hit in the shadows, you have to hit back twice as hard and tell your adversary why you did that.”

The need for robust action is particularly important for three reasons.

First, the abundant evidence pointing to Russian culpability, including a potential Havana Syndrome attack on then-President George W. Bush. Second, numerous sources who have told me the reason the intelligence community has no smoking gun is partly due to poor human intelligence reporting in Russian covert action space, and also that U.S. efforts to seize a Russian RF/MW device have been hamstrung by limits on the necessary speed, aggression, and scale of action necessary to catch responsible Russian operatives. Third, that known Russian intelligence compartmentalization structures would strongly suggest that the secretary of the Security Council of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev, is the controlling authority for AHI activities. Patrushev is an exceptionally smart and aggressive hard-liner who despises the U.S. He will not be deterred absent unmistakable confrontation.

Grozev offered his aspiration that the intelligence community would consider the content of the Insider’s reporting “on their substance and their merit.” The problem is that where it is confronted by evidence indicating Russian culpability, even where that evidence is highly compelling, the intelligence community simply doubles down on its original assessment without explaining how it withstands the countervailing indicators. It does so even at the classified level. At a minimum, this is shoddy analytical tradecraft. At worst, it might reasonably be described as a betrayal of public servants who have risked life, limb, and mind to serve it.

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That responsibility to serve likely underpins why it is military and intelligence operations personnel and military veterans such as Pfluger who are driving the inquiries on this matter. They take it personally. And while there is obviously a significant risk to allowing emotion to affect judgments, especially on complex matters such as this one, I am convinced that, in this situation, it is the evidence driving the emotion, not vice versa.

In turn, Congress must intensify its investigation of this matter. Intelligence community leaders must be called to testify in public. While they will likely hide behind classifications in order to avoid offering uncomfortable answers, their inability to answer basic questions supported by now-public reporting will catalyze Congress to take further action.