It’s interesting to watch how various European powers are preparing for former President Donald Trump’s likely return to the White House.
The European Union and most European governments are seeking a fresh start with Trump. By and large, they strongly dislike Trump, but they also need to work with him. At a minimum, they need to forge a compromise against Trump’s tariffs agenda. In turn, the EU and European embassies have sent large delegations to the Republican National Convention. The Europeans know a second Trump presidency will likely entail more hawkish U.S. policies toward China (albeit perhaps not as hawkish as some assume), complicating their security-counterproductive ability to prioritize economic relations with China without cost to the trans-Atlantic relationship. So even as many European powers continue to neglect Trump’s defense spending concern, they are focusing on policies that might earn Trump’s favor elsewhere.
Germany has adopted a different strategy, however.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz appears to believe that the best way to deal with Trump is to do as much as possible to catalyze his key grievances with Berlin. The contrast between Germany’s approach and that of other European powers is striking. Only EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager seems more determined to alienate Trump. Consider the alternate policy examples on offer.
Poland, now led by a center-left government, is best set for Trump’s return. Poland leads NATO in percentage of GDP defense spending and will surely revel in reminding Trump of that fact. Considering Trump’s popularity in Poland and Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s keen political instincts, don’t rule out Trump relocating existing U.S. military assets in Europe and perhaps even NATO components to Polish territory.
Hungary might seem in good shape with Trump at present, but if the former president ever wakes up to realize Prime Minister Viktor Orban is China’s pet and is playing him for a complete fool, that dynamic may change on a dime.
The United Kingdom, newly led by a center-left Labour Party government, is focusing on three lines of strategy. First, reliance on U.K. ambassador Karen Pierce’s successful effort to maintain good relationships with Trumpworld. This success was most obviously reflected in the dinner between Pierce and former U.K. Foreign Secretary David Cameron at Mar-a-Lago in April. Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has also maintained close contact with Trump, as has the ascendant Brexit architect Nigel Farage. Second, support for defense spending above 2% of GDP (albeit not at a level Trump would approve of) and a push for European nations to do more in Ukraine’s support. Third, current Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s establishment of a cordial relationship with conservatives, including Sen. J.D. Vance (R-OH), Republican vice presidential nominee.
Just across the English Channel, French President Emmanuel Macron has barely hidden his disdain for Trump since the latter’s January 2021 departure from office. French diplomats have also enforced relationships with Democrats and Democratic-leaning media and think tanks since then. This has left France with depleted personal influence on Trumpworld. Still, Macron has been clever in recent months. Recognizing Trump’s increasingly likely return, he has focused not on the Eiffel Tower/Jules Verne restaurant/Bastille Day parade pomp that defined his 2017 cultivation of Trump but rather on the matters that most animate Trump’s concern toward Europe.
Namely, defense spending and Ukraine. Even if belatedly, Macron has boosted defense spending, French support for Ukraine, and France’s strategic deterrence of Russia. In essence, Macron has set himself up to be able to call Trump on Jan. 20, 2025, and say something along the lines of “You may not like me anymore, but I’m making Europe do more for its own defense and thus exactly what you want from European leaders. Let’s try to find a constructive partnership.” Macron will hope this narrative might placate Trump’s anger over the French president’s personal disdain since 2021 and his continued dalliance with Communist China.
Then there’s Germany. It was announced last week that Germany would increase defense spending only marginally in 2025, putting Europe’s largest economy barely above NATO’s 2%-of-GDP target. The German defense minister wanted an 11% boost, and he got 2.3%. Now we’re learning that Germany will also halve its military aid provision to Ukraine in 2025.
As Reuters reports, Germany’s 2025 military aid to Ukraine will be reduced from $8.7 billion this year to $4.35 billion. This decision quite literally reflects the diametric opposite policy response that Vance politely suggested Germany take during a panel in Germany back in February. It will thus only reinforce Trumpworld’s skepticism of the trans-Atlantic partnership and, by association, its NATO crown jewel. Berlin has gone AWOL from reality. Because the reality is that European support for Ukraine is far less auspicious than the German government-funded (and media-favored) Kiel Institute purports it to be. Even more absurd, Scholz’s government is making these cuts even as he stimulates his love affair with Trump’s prime nemesis, China.
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Democratic governments are, of course, supposed to make decisions in the best interests of their people. It’s not up to Trump to set European policy, just as it shouldn’t be up to Europe to set U.S. policy. But it’s interesting to see how various governments are preparing for Trump’s return.
Scholz’s government has the right to pursue whatever policy it sees fit. It just shouldn’t bet on retaining those economically beneficial U.S. military bases.