Do adversaries make choices with regards to America‘s perceived strength and resolve? Absolutely. Are these perceptions their key motives for starting a war?
Negative.
This bears note in light of the oft-stated refrain that a U.S. action in relation to one conflict motivates an adversary’s decision in relation to another conflict. Former Vice President Mike Pence encapsulated this argument on Thursday. Speaking in Brussels, Pence suggested, “We don’t talk enough about that disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan that I think set the stage in ways that emboldened Russia to cross the border of Ukraine.” This perspective replicates similar arguments that Ukraine’s defeat to Russia would heavily encourage China to invade Taiwan.
Don’t misunderstand me. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was an epic disaster. As Jerry Dunleavy and James Hasson note in Kabul, this debacle was defined by grotesque U.S. government failures and avoidable human suffering. The basic reality is that President Joe Biden decided to surrender Afghanistan and its people to fanatical authoritarians and American enemies. Al Qaeda’s safe haven is restored, and ISIS is using Afghanistan as a launchpad for global attacks, such as with the recent concert hall massacre in Moscow. The Biden administration’s insistence it would retain a credible “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism capability was always false.
In contrast, the retention of a small (2,500-5,000) U.S. military force could have protected contractors, supported Afghan forces with intelligence and logistics, provided a reactive counterterrorism capacity, and ensured a political and military backstop against Taliban victory. The manner and action of Biden’s withdrawal suggested his incompetence as a leader and a lack of U.S. resolve to stomach a sustained fight. Still, as Daniel DePetris wryly observes, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ultimately had little to do with Afghanistan.
After all, Vladimir Putin has never believed that the United States would fight directly in Ukraine’s defense. Biden administration officials remain obsessed with reminding Putin that they won’t do so. Indeed, their pathetic calls on Ukraine not to target Russian forces and logistics nodes inside Russia (in stark contrast with Britain’s advice) suggest that they want Ukraine to fight only half-heartedly. Had the U.S. pledged prior to its Afghanistan withdrawal that it would actively defend Ukraine, that U.S. withdrawal may have encouraged Putin to disbelieve the Ukraine defense pledge. But this is only hypothetical because no such pledge was ever made.
The truth is that Putin invaded Ukraine not because of Afghanistan or any other conflict. He did so due to his imperialist belief that Ukraine and other states, such as Estonia, could exist only as colonies of mother Russia. And because Putin believed his “special military operation” would be quick and easy.
Much the same applies to how the war in Ukraine might affect Xi Jinping’s calculus regarding Taiwan. It is often argued that the U.S. must ensure Ukraine’s victory in order to prove to Xi that invading Taiwan would mean very heavy Chinese losses amid unified Western resistance. Again, don’t get me wrong. I believe Ukraine can win against Russia and that its victory is important to U.S. security and interests. That said, the outcome of the war in Ukraine won’t have much impact on Xi’s decisions on Taiwan.
That’s because, for Xi, Taiwan’s subjugation is the preeminent personal and political concern. Xi views Taiwan’s return to the Chinese nation and Chinese Communist Party authority as the defining question of his leadership. He views Taiwan’s return as the necessary, unavoidable step toward China’s assumption of global supremacy. But he also views the status quo as a stain on the credibility and honor of the Communist Party. He sees Taiwan’s territory and people as a limb far too long dissected from the body and overdue for surgical reunification. He sees Taiwan’s democracy as a parasite that threatens to infect the Chinese mainland with potentially existential consequences. This intersection of politics and emotion is why Xi is almost certain to use force to seize Taiwan. Seizing Taiwan is why China has invested so heavily in exactly the military capabilities best suited to securing the island and preventing U.S. efforts to defend it.
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Ukraine’s fate is ultimately irrelevant as to whether or not Xi will invade Taiwan. What actually matters is twofold. First, the point at which Xi becomes confident the People’s Liberation Army is ready to win. (The only thing Xi fears more than he desires Taiwan’s reunification is a failed military operation to secure that reunification.) Second, the point at which Xi believes peaceful reunification is no longer feasible. Xi does not fear the prospect of Western sanctions such as those imposed on Russia. As shown by Olaf Scholz’s overt submission in Beijing and Emmanuel Macron’s frequent theatrics in Xi’s service, the Chinese leader believes Europe will be too deep in his pocket to ever truly “de-risk” its way out.
Put simply, if they care about continuing to exist, Taiwanese officials should put far less emphasis on Ukraine’s victory and far more emphasis on boosting their woefully inadequate defense spending. And foreign policy commentators should judge the individual circumstances of each conflict before assessing them in concert.