The CIA is like an aircraft carrier — it moves, but slowly. Yet congressional oversight can be a powerful tug that nudges the organization in the right direction. As the 118th Congress takes shape, I hope that the intelligence oversight committees in the House and the Senate will laser-focus their sights on the mission, structure, and people at the CIA , an organization where I served for 26 years.

I recently polled several of my former colleagues on this issue. All retired at the Senior Intelligence Service level, the intelligence community's equivalent of a military general officer rank. All have many decades of experience at the CIA in operational and analytic assignments. Ultimately, five key questions emerged that oversight must ask the current CIA leadership. Quite telling? None of these questions are new or haven’t been previously asked by Congress. It feels like Groundhog Day. The fact that these questions remain valid, which indicates that problems persist, means that these challenges deserve attention from Capitol Hill.

1) What is the CIA's core function?

The CIA is tasked to undertake three key objectives: human intelligence collection, covert action, and analysis. Recruiting and handling agents has always been the gold standard for the CIA and, in fact, is a critical input to the other two objectives. CIA Director William Burns, during his confirmation hearings two years ago, stated unequivocally that the core function of the CIA is to steal secrets. He was spot on. Policymakers need that "golden nugget" from an agent close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, or a penetration of the Iranian nuclear program. Human intelligence collection is foundational to the CIA. But with the explosion of open-source intelligence, that which can be found by online searches or civilian research, the raison d’etre of the CIA, our value added, must be to collect that last niche piece that is not available in the open-source world. The question, two years into the Biden administration, is whether Burns's previously stated priority on HUMINT remains valid.

2) Is the CIA organized properly for 2023 forward?

If HUMINT is indeed fundamental to our mission, then oversight must ask about the organization of the agency. Then-Director John Brennan's 2015 reorganization of the CIA, which many in the operational world consider to be highly flawed, has never been properly addressed. It remains a mystery why oversight has never really called the agency to task for the "defanging" of the Directorate of Operations. The key question remains: Does the current "Mission Center" concept, where analysts and operators mingle under a matrixed organizational structure with confusing chains of command, actually promote the core mission at the CIA of stealing secrets?

What has been the impact on the DO of seven-plus years of being cast, as some of my colleagues charge, as second-class citizens? Why does the deputy director of operations, the agency’s "chief spy," remain marginalized while Mission Center chiefs rule the roost? Top line: Is this somewhat-neutered DO prepared to contest with the highly capable intelligence services of China, Russia, and Iran?

Similarly, on the analytic side, has the 2015 reorganization promoted analytic objectivity? Are analysts, in fact, too close to the operators? None of my former colleagues are satisfied with the 2015 reorganization. Why, then, have successive directors not made any required changes, and why has Congress not pressed harder on this topic? Republicans and Democrats should work together to get some much-needed answers.

3) Does the CIA train officers correctly on language and tradecraft?

When I speak to college students across the country, I emphasize proficiency in a hard target language as the key to success against our adversaries. But is the CIA focusing enough on language training? Do we have enough Chinese and Russian speakers who, by learning a language, also learn about the culture and history of those that we must recruit as our future agents? Regarding operational tradecraft, with added challenges of a digital environment (what the CIA calls "ubiquitous technical surveillance"), is the CIA properly focused on upholding the mantra "there is no area we cannot handle or meet an agent?" There has been a great deal of thought and effort put into these questions by the CIA. Nevertheless, Congress must hold the agency to account, given the gravity of these challenges ahead.

4) Is the CIA hiring the right officers?

We need a diverse CIA to win. The most successful operations officers I found in the Middle East were female officers who, because of the misogyny of the region, could operate clandestinely far better than their male colleagues. So, diversity means putting the most capable officers in the field, the "best athlete" approach for every operation. Congress must ask if the CIA is doing just this.

In addition, has the agency made progress on the timeline in which to hire an officer-candidate? Much has been promised on a reduction in the laborious security processing timeline, which dissuades many young patriots from joining the agency. We can’t sacrifice security, but clearly, we can do better in our processes so that a 23-year-old does not spend up to a year waiting for a clearance. Everyone I spoke with suggests that we have not gotten this right.

5) Is the CIA serious about wellness and resiliency?

The Rand Corporation recently published a study on mental health in the intelligence community. I know from experience that the CIA has been abysmal on this issue. Yet times have changed, and Burns deserves some credit for the overhaul of the Office of Medical Services, naming a senior officer to oversee "wellness," and for the building of a modern gym at the CIA's headquarters. I spent time at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for traumatic brain injury treatment. What I learned from the staff and from my fellow patients in the special operations world is that adherence to wellness programs early on in a career can actually extend the career of an operator. Who can be against that?! Congress should ensure that the agency adheres to a commitment to its people.

Conclusion

Years ago, after hosting a delegation of congressional oversight staff, I realized that many of the committee staffers had been in their positions longer than my station’s officers. Meaning? Well, they actually knew a hell of a lot. They had seen the agency try and tackle the aforementioned questions, rarely with success. Oversight members are partners of the CIA. Yet they must also be bold and highly effective change agents. Their mantra should be to drive improvement and stay out of the political fray.

Let’s hope that the House and Senate intelligence committees in this new Congress can proactively steer the CIA to get these critical issues right.

The security of America depends on it.

Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. A former CIA senior operations officer, he retired in 2019 after a 26-year career serving in the Near East and South Asia. His book, Clarity in Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the CIA, was published in June 2021 by Harper Collins.