On the morning of October 7, 2023, more than 100 Hamas terrorists stumbled upon the Supernova music festival, an outdoor rave taking place near the Gaza border community of Re’im, where they brutally massacred and abducted partygoers, in what became the single deadliest terror attack to have taken place in Israel’s history.

More than 3,000 partygoers were attending the overnight rave, along with some 400 staff and 75 unarmed security guards.

In all, 344 civilians who attended the Nova party and 34 security personnel were murdered or killed amid the attack, which, according to testimonies, included sexual crimes and other brutal acts. The terrorists abducted another 44 to the Gaza Strip.

As far as is known, Hamas had no prior knowledge of the party when they launched the attack and happened upon the large festival. And while some in the Israel Defense Force’s chain of command were aware that it was taking place, that information was not relayed to troops stationed nearby until it was too late, according to a military probe published Thursday that identified a number of missteps that left those at the rave virtually defenseless.

The investigation into the massacre and fighting that took place at the Nova festival is the latest of a series of detailed investigations the IDF is carrying out into some 40 battles that took place during Hamas’s October 7 attack, when some 5,600 terrorists stormed across the border, massacred some 1,200 people and took 251 hostages to Gaza.

The probe, carried out by Brig. Gen. (res.) Ido Mizrahi, focused on the military’s preparations for the party; the process by which the party was approved by authorities despite its proximity to the Gaza border; the chain of events during the attack on October 7; and the conduct of troops in the area of the party.

The investigation team only looked into the attack in the area of the party, known as the Re’im parking lot, and a small section of the Route 232 highway adjacent to the festival.

The probe did not look into the murders of partygoers by Hamas terrorists in other areas of the Gaza border that day, including at several bomb shelters where the revelers had sought shelter, as they were being covered in other IDF investigations.

The findings were presented to families of victims on Wednesday, with many of them angrily rejecting the probe as unserious or accusing the army of hiding details and trying to cover up the extent of its failures, according to Hebrew media reports.

The October Council, representing families of those killed on October 7 who are advocating a state commission of inquiry into the events of that day, described the findings as “at best imprecise, and at worst — lies.â€�

According to the probe, only 31 armed police officers were present at the party when the onslaught began, with the army — stunned by the shock attack on dozens of nearby communities and bases and in utter disarray — failing to come to the rescue.

Among the 34 security personnel killed during the rave were 16 soldiers, 12 of whom were off-duty and attending the rave, and four who were killed while fighting the terrorists; 16 police officers, 15 of whom were killed fighting the terrorists; and two Shin Bet agents, one of whom was attending the party.

Of the 44 hostages, 17 are still in captivity, including 11 living and six declared dead. The other 27 have since returned to Israel, including 14 living hostages and 13 bodies. Some of the dead hostages were murdered during the onslaught, and others were killed in captivity.

In the area of the party and an adjacent section of the highway alone, 171 were murdered and a further 16 were abducted by the terrorists. The other partygoers were killed across nearly the entire Gaza border, an area spanning some 52 kilometers, as they tried to flee the terrorists.

Some 60 were murdered and 10 were abducted at the Mefalsim bend of Route 232; another 59 were murdered and nine were abducted on Route 234 near Re’im; 32 were murdered and four were abducted at the Gama Junction; 15 were murdered and two were abducted outside Kibbutz Alumim; 18 were murdered and two were abducted at Be’eri; 12 were murdered on a road between Re’im and Nir Yitzhak; and another four were murdered and one taken hostage between Be’eri and Re’im.

Hundreds more were wounded.

The probe did not investigate the individual murders of partygoers at the festival, which are being covered by a top-tier police investigation. The IDF investigation team did, however, cooperate with the police’s Lahav 433 major crimes unit to understand the chain of events of the attack at the party.

Mizrahi and his team spent hundreds of hours investigating the massacre and fighting at the Nova party, reviewing what the IDF said was every possible source of information — the IDF’s radio communications, surveillance cameras, dashcams, footage taken by the Hamas terrorists, interrogations of captured terrorists and testimonies of survivors.

The probe was aimed at drawing specific operational conclusions for the military. It did not examine the wider picture of the military’s perception of Gaza and Hamas in recent years, which was covered in separate, larger investigations into the IDF’s intelligence and defenses.

The investigation team stated that “the IDF failed” to defend the partygoers at the Nova festival, which became “the single most deadly terror attack in Israel’s history.”

The investigation found that the IDF did not make any adjustments to its defenses for the party; did not deploy loudspeaker warning systems to alert partygoers of rocket fire; and did not hold any assessment that specifically dealt with the large civilian event near the Gaza border.

On the eve of the onslaught, after the IDF identified suspicious signs of Hamas activity, the Nova festival was not mentioned during any military assessments.

Additionally, ground troops deployed on the Gaza border on the morning of the Hamas attack were unaware of the existence of the party, the investigation stated.

The IDF also did not place a military representative at the party to be in contact with police officers there, who were securing the event. Nor did the IDF place a military force near the party to secure it, in addition to the police force. Both should have been done, the probe stated.

The massacre at the Nova festival was enabled by the fact that the military was entirely unprepared for such an event — a widescale attack on numerous towns and army bases simultaneously by thousands of terrorists, according to the probe. The troops defending the border were defeated at an early stage in the fighting, and the chain of command was broken.

The probe also found that because the Hamas terrorists managed to capture main junctions near the Gaza border that morning, partygoers were unable to flee and troops had difficulty in reaching the area.

According to the investigation, the Nova festival was not a predetermined target by Hamas, and the 100 terrorists who reached the area and carried out the massacre were actually planning on reaching the southern city of Netivot, located further northeast. The terrorists had no prior knowledge of the party and decided then and there to carry out the massacre, after going the wrong way, the probe stated.

Information on the massacre taking place at the Nova party did not reach the regional IDF forces, as well as the Southern Command and Operations Directorate, at the relevant time; the IDF was unable to put together an accurate picture of what was happening, and wrongly thought that the party had been fully evacuated at a much earlier stage when hundreds were actually still there; and there was little to no coordination between the military and police during the onslaught in that area, the investigation found.

The probe also found that there were no armed forces present in the area of the party when the terrorists entered the compound and carried out the massacre. Armed police officers at that point were fighting terrorists on an adjacent highway.

The party had been approved by the military according to protocol, although the request was handled by mid-level officers, and senior commanders were mostly not consulted with.

The probe also pointed to gaps in the coordination between the IDF and police during the approval stages of the party.

The investigation team recommended putting together an official military protocol for handling civilian events near the borders or other areas under threats, saying it should include requiring the army to hold an assessment of the event; require the approval of more senior officers depending on the event; and have better coordination with the police during the approval stage and the event itself.

The investigators also highlighted the bravery and quick thinking of the police officers who fought that day, including a decision by a senior officer to shut down the party five minutes after Hamas started firing rockets, saving the lives of hundreds; and a decision by officers to block a highway where terrorists were firing on fleeing partygoers and instead open a dirt road for them to escape.

In all, the probe found that some 20 terrorists were killed by security forces in the area of the party.

The Israeli military is required to approve large-scale civilian events taking place near the country’s borders, which include the Gaza Strip. This is to ensure that the IDF can defend a large concentration of civilians, especially in areas that are under threat of rocket fire. The Israel Police is also required to authorize such events, but from a safety standpoint, rather than a security one.

On September 6, a production company behind the Nova festival sent a request to the police to hold an event, a party called Unity, at the Re’im parking lot, between Thursday, October 5, and Friday, October 6.

Police authorized the event on September 20, but without consulting the military initially. The Gaza Division’s Northern Brigade — responsible for the Re’im area — received a request the following day. The request was handled by the Home Front Command officer at the brigade.

On September 29, the brigade commander, Col. Haim Cohen, approved the Unity party to take place, based on the deployment of the IDF’s air defenses, which could adequately protect the party area, located outside of urban areas.

On October 2, the Home Front Command officer and an assistant to the head of the production company’s security team toured the area of the party. During the tour, a request was made to extend the party by another 24 hours in order to allow the Nova festival to take place using all the same equipment and infrastructure.

Initially, officials at the Gaza Division and its Northern Brigade were against allowing the party to continue for another 24 hours, citing the fact that far fewer troops were deployed there over the holiday weekend. (The IDF’s investigations into the onslaught revealed that just 767 troops were on the border that morning, facing over 5,000 terrorists.)

On October 4, further discussions were held in the IDF between officials at the Northern Brigade, Gaza Division and Southern Command, regarding extending the party. Ultimately, a decision was made to approve the Nova festival, set to take place from late October 6 to the afternoon of October 7.

A letter saying the party had been approved by the Northern Brigade commander was sent by the Home Front Command officer the next day to the police, though Cohen did not physically sign the document. He did, however, give his approval, according to the investigation.

On October 5 at 12:00 p.m., the party was mentioned by the chief of operations at Northern Brigade during a discussion at the brigade. The deputy commander of the Golani Brigade’s 13th Battalion — the unit responsible for defenses in the area at the time — was present at the meeting, although he did not pass on this information down to the troops on the ground.

The Home Front Officer carried out another tour of the area as the Unity party began that night at 10 p.m. on October 5.

The Unity party ended at 1 p.m. the following day, and the Home Front Command officer, along with the chief of operations at the Northern Brigade, carried out another tour of the site.

At 10 p.m. on October 6, the Nova festival began.

The process by which the party was approved was done correctly, and per the assessments at the time, there was no security risk in the event taking place, according to the probe. The investigation also pointed to gaps in the discussions, or lack of, between the IDF and police.

The investigation found that no assessment was held in the IDF specifically for the party, and no adjustments were made to the military’s defenses in the area in light of the party taking place.

The probe also found that soldiers deployed to the Gaza border on the morning of October 7, were unaware that more than 3,500 people were gathered at the rave near Re’im.

Additionally, the IDF did not have a military representative physically at the party who would have been able to coordinate matters with police, rescue authorities and the production company.

During the night between October 6 and 7, the IDF identified several signs of Hamas activity but misinterpreted them as not being an immediate threat. Regardless, the probe found that the Nova party was not brought up at all during the overnight discussions in the IDF, and no decisions were made concerning the festival, taking place around 5 kilometers from the Gaza border.

Amid an initial barrage of over 1,000 rockets fired at Israel at 6:29 a.m., some 1,200 Hamas terrorists broke through Israel’s barrier with the Gaza Strip at 114 locations and headed for Israeli military bases and communities located near the border.

At 6:35 a.m., the commander of the Ofakim police station, Chief Superintendent Nivi Ohana, who was the senior officer on duty at the party that morning, decided to shut down the event. He called over the loudspeakers and members of the production team did too, ordering the partygoers to begin to disperse.

Dozens of partygoers began to flee at this stage, but the terrorists had already started taking major junctions along Route 232.

At 7:13 a.m., the Home Front Command officer at the Northern Brigade received an update that some 90% of the partygoers had evacuated the area. She updated her counterpart at the Gaza Division on the information, which in retrospect was not accurate, as well as that there were reports of gunfire in the area. The division at this stage wrongly understood that the party had largely dispersed.

Police officers were still directing traffic out of the party when they began to see that many partygoers were returning in their cars after heading north. The terrorists had opened fire on those trying to flee, outside Alumim, Be’eri and Sa’ad.

Some partygoers then tried to flee south and came under fire again there by terrorists who had captured major junctions along Route 232.

Police at that stage blocked traffic heading north from the Nova party to prevent anyone from coming under fire from the terrorists. At the same time, the officers opened up a dirt path leading east, allowing thousands to escape via agricultural fields toward the community of Patish, some on foot and some in their cars.

Meanwhile, Hamas terrorists were attacking the nearby community of Re’im at 7:50 a.m., as well as murdering partygoers along the highway and at several roadside bomb shelters.

By 8 a.m., around 90% of the partygoers had evacuated the area of the rave, with only the event staff and some of the police officers staying behind, along with some of the revelers who thought it would be safer than the roads.

At the same time, over 100 Hamas terrorists on 14 pickup trucks and two motorcycles infiltrated Israel and passed by the Gaza border community of Be’eri. A different Hamas company was already in the kibbutz, and this force was intended to reach Netivot.

A terrorist outside the kibbutz signaled to the large Hamas force to continue on the Route 232 highway. But instead of heading north to reach the Sa’ad Junction and from there heading east to Netivot, the terrorist drove south, toward the Nova party.

En route, the terrorists stopped by a bomb shelter outside Be’eri, where they murdered several people hiding there, including partygoers who fled Nova.

Route 232 heading south from Be’eri was almost entirely empty, as police had earlier stopped the traffic from the area of the party. Dozens of vehicles were abandoned by the fleeing partygoers along that section of the highway and in the area of the party.

At 8:12 a.m., the terrorists spotted the police roadblock from around 500 meters away and began to open fire. The officers, only armed with their pistols and limited ammunition, made a stand as the terrorists continued to advance toward them.

At 8:14 a.m., the terrorists fired an RPG at the roadblock, hitting one of the vehicles abandoned there, and wounding several partygoers and officers in the vicinity.

Dozens of partygoers, who had been waiting around the police officers on the highway, began to flee back into the area of the party. Others fled east through the fields.

The partygoers who fled into the party area looked for shelters as the terrorists closed in. Some hid in bushes, others inside portable toilets and trash dumpsters, and members of the staff hid underneath the drink bars.

An ambulance that was designated for the event drove from its position at the entrance to the party, heading into the camping area, as the terrorists advanced on the highway.

At 8:20 a.m., an IDF tank of the 7th Armored Brigade’s 77th Battalion that had been stationed at the so-called Paga military post — located just across Be’eri —  arrived at the Nova party area after sustaining heavy fire on the border.

The tank team included soldiers Staff Sgt. Shay Levinson, Sgt. Ariel Eliyahu, Sgt. Ofir Testa, and Cpl. Ido Somech.

Levinson and Eliyahu had been killed as they battled numerous Hamas invaders near the border, while Testa was seriously wounded. Levinson’s body was also abducted amid the fighting. Only the driver, Somech, was able to keep fighting.

Somech kept driving and came across the site of the festival, where a major battle between the terrorists and police was going on. Upon seeing the tank, the terrorists halted their advance on the Nova party. They then opened fire on the tank with RPGs and gunfire.

Testa, who was already seriously wounded, got out of the tank and with his final strength, gave his assault rifle to a festival guard who was fighting the terrorists unarmed. He turned to head back to the tank and was shot dead.

The terrorists then tried to climb onto the tank, while Somech fired back, killing one of them. They also tried to hurl grenades into the tank but failed to do so.

Somech then drove the tank out of the party area, running over several abandoned vehicles in the process, and stationing himself next to the highway. Some of the fleeing partygoers and police officers used the tank as cover as they withdrew further south down Route 232. Joining them were rave attendees, and brothers, Daniel and Neria Sharabi, who collected weapons from the dead tank crew members and defended some 30 partygoers.

The terrorists continued to advance down the highway, as they set fire to the abandoned cars on the highway. The tank and those using it as cover continued to flee further south, away from the party area.

At 8:50 a.m., the terrorists spotted partygoers fleeing on the dirt path heading east, and opened fire on them. Between 9 and 9:10 a.m., the terrorists abducted seven hostages, who had been hiding on the sides of Route 232 outside the party and did not manage to flee.

At 9:15 a.m., Maj. Avraham “Avi� Hovelashvili, the deputy commander of the Caracal Battalion, was killed fighting terrorists outside the party.

At the start of the attack, Hovelashvili was home in Ashdod. When he started to hear reports of a Hamas invasion near Kibbutz Sufa, where his Caracal comrades were operating, Avi jumped into uniform and set off to join them. On his way, he encountered a cell of terrorists at the Sa’ad Junction, and together with two police officers, they engaged in a firefight, killing several of them. He continued southward to meet up with his comrades, but en route encountered another group of terrorists, not far from Re’im, and got out of his car to fight against them and was killed.

Shortly after, the commander of the terrorists instructed his forces to enter the party area, where hundreds of partygoers and staff members were hiding.

Dozens of terrorists raided the party area shortly after 9:15 a.m., murdering nearly every person they spotted while taking the other hostages.

The terrorists fired an RPG at the ambulance that had moved to the camping area, killing 18 people who were hiding in and around it. Only two survived that incident.

By 9:50 a.m., the terrorists left the party area and returned to the highway. They were instructed by their commanders in Gaza to head for Be’eri.

At 10:20 a.m., dozens of unaffiliated Palestinians, some of them armed, reached the Nova party area and began to loot the bodies of those killed.

At the same time, further south on Route 232, fighting continued around the IDF tank. A senior reserves officer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon, who was fighting there, reported to his superiors that there were numerous terrorists in the area, although he was unaware of the massacre that had taken place at the party.

The Northern Brigade commander, who understood there was fighting near the Nova party, decided to send the elite Multidomain Unit to the area. The troops never reached Nova, as they got caught up fighting in Re’im at around 11:20 a.m.. The commander of the unit, Col. Roi Yosef Levy, was killed there.

At 10:25 a.m., an Israeli Air Force attack helicopter flew by the Nova party area after it was instructed to reach Re’im, and spotted a convoy of pickup trucks driving on Route 232 — the same terrorists who just murdered dozens at the party.

The helicopter crew, however, was unaware of the party’s existence and had no contact with ground troops there. They decided not to open fire on the Hamas convoy.

The first IDF troops arrived at the Nova party at 11:35 a.m. Soldiers of the Givati Brigade’s Shaked Battalion were sent there from the West Bank by the commander of the Ephraim Regional Brigade. One of the partygoers was an off-duty soldier with the Ephraim Brigade, and had called in for help earlier in the morning.

The Shaked soldiers, part of the battalion chief’s forward command team, advanced into the party compound at 11:50 a.m., where they killed two terrorists.

Over the following hour, the soldiers, joined by members of the Israel Prison Service’s elite Metzada Unit, killed some 15 terrorists in the Nova party area. Some were the Hamas invaders who stayed behind, while others were part of the second wave of infiltrators. Several terrorists were also captured by the troops.

Additional troops reached the party area after 1 p.m., though no fighting was taking place at this stage. The forces rescued those who survived the massacre and treated those wounded.

At 3 p.m., the party area was declared cleared of terrorists.

By 8 a.m. the following day, on October 8, the bodies of the victims were removed from the party area.