Former Israel Defense Forces chief Herzi Halevi, who stepped down over the devastating October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on southern Israel, told bereaved families that the army could have been better prepared to face the devastating assault had it properly assessed intelligence information.

In a recording of the undated conversation aired by Channel 12 news on Tuesday, Halevi was heard responding to allegations that intelligence had, years earlier, pointed to the possibility of a major Hamas attack.

Speaking with families of soldiers killed at the Kissufim military post, Halevi insisted that there was no clear alert of a major assault on the night before the attack and said the IDF had been caught by surprise.

Halevi, who resigned on March 6, continued to openly take responsibility for failings to stop the attack.

“The IDF failed, and I, as its commander, failed,” he said.

“There are places where we know that we could have been better, but I want you to know: We aren’t trying to deceive you or whitewash things; we are saying the painful truth,” Halevi told the families regarding IDF internal probes into the disaster.

On October 7, Hamas led over 5,000 attackers to burst through the border from the Gaza Strip and invade southern Israel, killing 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and taking 251 hostages to Gaza. The attack started the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip.

One of the parents accused the military leadership of being disconnected from the rank and file, referring to reports that surveillance soldiers had for months raised concerns over Hamas movements and exercises along the border but their warnings were dismissed.

“We aren’t disconnected,” Halevi responded and described the Hamas assault as “a broad surprise attack.”

The parent objected, arguing that it was not a surprise, in an apparent reference to prior intelligence assessments that had discussed a possible assault very similar to the one that eventually unfolded.

“There were things that could have been uncovered,” Halevi conceded and noted that the army forces along the border were prepared for a worst-case scenario that was far more limited than what eventually occurred. “That leads to a gap in the forces, how much the air force keeps on standby, and many other things that could help here,” he said. “Yes, there was a surprise. Hamas’s deception added to things.”

Halevi spoke of “suspicious signs” of activity in Gaza during the night before the attack.

But checks into those signs were reassuring, he said, and overall, things looked normal. The conclusion that analysts came to was that there was nothing coming in the “immediate timeframe.”

“In retrospect, when we looked into things, it was possible, in hindsight, to do it more thoroughly and perhaps reach a different result,” he said.

Halevi also noted an incident in which a veteran soldier in the 8200 intelligence gathering unit warned of a planned Hamas invasion into Israel and reported it to her direct commander. The officer passed the information on to the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, who dismissed the notion and did not take it any further.

“Also there, when we checked, in retrospect, things could have been done better. It was another dot on the page that was not joined up into a line,” Halevi said, and said that lessons have been learned.

He said he had spoken several times with the soldier who initiated the report, describing her as “very professional, very assertive, not easy to silence.”

“Even she, to my regret, did not say to us: There will be a war tomorrow, or next week.”

The former commander also discussed the “Walls of Jericho” document, a report presented by the 8200 unit in April 2022, setting out Hamas’s plans for what would eventually be realized in the October 7 invasion and massacre in southern Israel.

Halevi said information about such an attack reached Israel at two different points years earlier. He said that all those who examined the information came to the conclusion that it was an ideological goal of Hamas, something the terror group was only dreaming of doing.

One of the parents claimed that the Shin Bet security agency chief, Ronen Bar, had told him in a private conversation that at 1:30 a.m. on October 7, he had warned all relevant entities that there was going to be a significant attack from Gaza.

“I am telling you, very clearly and simply, I do not know what Ronen means, but no warning of a significant attack was received,” Halevi said. “Absolutely not.”

Bar has submitted his resignation, effective June 15, as head of the Shin Bet in response to his agency’s failures surrounding the October 7 Hamas attack,

The IDF said in response to the Channel 12 report that it is conducting “thorough and decisive” investigations into October 7 and “is diligent in presenting them to the bereaved families and the border communities.”

“Those are painful and complicated meetings, and they have very great importance to all those present,” it said, adding that the probes are carried out as “a duty to bereaved families, the hostages, and the entire public.”