Israeli diplomacy in the Middle East is in crisis. Saudi Arabia, until recently thought to be on the cusp of establishing ties with Israel, has now dusted off the Arab Peace Initiative of 20 years ago, which offers normalization on the condition of a solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The United Arab Emirates has told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to go ask Russian President Vladimir Putin to support laid-off Palestinian workers — and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi isn’t answering the phone.
Netanyahu — who dreamed of beginning his term with a visit to Abu Dhabi, as befits the man who signed Abraham Accords agreements with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco — is now seen by these same governments as a threat not only to the Palestinians but also to Arab nations’ governmental stability.
The voices of protest against Israel are not as loud in the Arab nations as they are in the West, since the regimes are trying to shut down pro-Gaza, anti-Israel protests and marches. But the public sentiment on the Arab streets is crystal clear: A restaurant named October 7 opened in Jordan in celebration of Hamas’s unprecedented attack on Israel in which some 1,200 people were murdered, mostly civilians, and 253 were taken hostage. (It has since been renamed.)
Other signs of popular support include songs about Hamas spokesman Abu Obaida being played at Egyptian weddings, and some 91% of Saudis see the war in Gaza as a victory for the Arab world and the Palestinians.
Meanwhile, the Arab rulers who continue to support normalization with Israel (Tel Aviv-Dubai haven’t stopped, Israeli gas is flowing to Egypt, and Saudi Arabia has said publicly that it is interested in normalization) are worried that Israeli diplomatic missteps, together with heavy fighting in the south of Gaza, will cause another wave of protests and resistance in their countries.
Because Netanyahu refuses to discuss plans for Gaza after the war, these leaders are seen as weak — and no self-respecting authoritarian regime can accept that.
Foreign Policy magazine revealed last week that US President Joe Biden’s administration is considering extracting American troops from Syria. The magazine quoted four sources in Washington who confirmed that there had been discussions on this strategic issue, though a final decision has not been made.
In the opinion of the article’s writer, Charles Lister, who is a senior fellow and director of the Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs at the Middle East Institute, such a move could counteract all the successes gained in the war against ISIS because the American troops in Syria are the final obstacle restraining the murderous terrorist organization.
But there is another problem with this withdrawal. If the US removes its forces from Syria, which it didn’t want to enter in the first place and has tried to withdraw from in the past, Iran and Russia will be free to take over the area and those suffering the heaviest losses will be the US’s allies, the Kurds.
The American bases in Syria and Iraq had been under heavy attacks from pro-Iranian forces for months, before October 7. Since then, these bases have been attacked with missiles and drones every few days, and the Americans are suffering losses, including the death of three US soldiers over the weekend.
It’s obvious that in an election year, the US should not be expanding its military presence in a region the country has no business being in. The problem is that if it removes its troops from Syria, the entire Middle Eastern house of cards will be damaged. The US’s allies will be weakened, its own image will be harmed, and the forces it’s trying to restrain will celebrate.
The Kurds, who already suffered a heavy blow when the US removed some of its forces from Syria, can expect no less than a massacre and mass expulsion. The US’s enemies will conclude only one thing — their patience is being rewarded, and the US is getting out of the Middle East.
At the beginning of January, Egypt officially joined the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRICS) group, becoming an economic ally of those four countries as well as others in the group.
Last week, Putin joined, via video conference, the cornerstone laying ceremony for the fourth and last nuclear power plant in El-Dabaa, Egypt, a project of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom.
In the last few months, Egypt has become the largest importer of wheat from Russia after the two nations reached an agreement on a price cap. During a video call between Putin and Sissi, the Russian president mentioned the establishment of Aswan Dam, the former Soviet Union’s large contribution to energy development in Egypt, and the Egyptian president responded by calling Putin a brother.
On the surface, the two nations, who have been warming to each other since Sissi rose to power in 2013, are signaling that they are getting closer to full cooperation. Still, it seems that on Egypt’s end, its close ties with Russia won’t come between it and the US.
About two years ago, Egypt turned down Russian SU-13 warplanes and then received a promise of F-15s from the US. The relations between Egypt and the US, which have cooled since the beginning of Biden’s presidential term, have rewarmed as a result of the war in Gaza, and the two nations are working closely together in an attempt to find a solution to stabilize the region.
Despite pressure from the House of Representatives, the Biden administration approved supplying Egypt with military aid. Having suffered one of its worst economic crises since the 70s, Egypt needs the US to help it through.
As far as Egypt is concerned, it’s just dividing its eggs between different baskets.
As long as there isn’t a significant conflict of interest in Egypt’s relations with Russia and the US, Egypt has no dilemma. Its concerns on what to do in the case of such a conflict can be left for tomorrow.
The writer, a former member of Knesset, is a senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council and executive director of ROPES.