When an array of Syrian opposition groups went on the offensive on November 27, ultimately capturing Damascus on December 8 and bringing an end to Syrian strongman Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal, 24-year rule, events obviously revealed profound weaknesses in Syria’s military. The regime’s air force went down fighting, but the army just … melted away. 

The swift and decisive offensive also underscored a little-appreciated weakness in Russia’s capabilities. Russian forces were instrumental in propping up Al-Assad’s regime. By the same token, they were instrumental in the regime’s collapse – by virtue of what they didn’t do. They didn’t meaningfully intervene as opposition forces liberated city after city.

For Russian president Vladimir Putin, it wasn’t really a choice. He had bet on the Wagner Group, a notorious and now defunct mercenary force, to project meaningful ground combat power into Syria. But in empowering the Wagner Group, Putin doomed it – and also doomed Al-Assad’s regime.

Let this be a lesson to governments everywhere: mercenaries aren’t reliable instruments of national power.