Sir Keir Starmer’s decision to increase defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP, while undoubtedly welcome, has been met with scepticism among many military chiefs, who fear that the increase from 2.3 per cent will not “touch the sides”. “It’s 3 per cent minimum we need, but probably 3.5 per cent really,” says one senior Army officer.

Events of the last fortnight have brought into sharp focus why what amounts to a boost of about £6 billion is considered insufficient by the Armed Forces.

On February 16, Starmer pledged to put British troops in Ukraine, to form part of a peacekeeping force, in the event that Donald Trump negotiates a deal between Moscow and Kyiv.

Trump has also made clear that the US couldn’t be relied on in the event of a direct conflict with Russia and, as Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting, described it, he “does not care much about the fate of Europe”. There was no greater wake-up call for Europe than the US President’s public shouting match with Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office on Friday, when Trump told the Ukrainian president he was “gambling with World War Three”.

The moment Starmer committed Britain to helping to police a Ukraine peace deal, the resounding question was: how?

How can the British military afford to put troops in harm’s way when the numbers of personnel are dwindling, there isn’t enough kit to go around and the Armed Forces are struggling with recruitment and retention because not enough people want to serve King and country anymore.

So what would it take, in terms of spending, equipment and manpower, for Britain to be ready to enter Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force?

And, to go one step farther, what would be required to get Britain’s Armed Forces ready for a potential conflict with Russia?