Ukraine’s struggle against Russia has not fundamentally changed the principles of war. But when it comes to how we fight and how we prosecute violence on the battlefield, it most certainly has.
The requirements for success are the same in general terms. We need actionable intelligence on enemy dispositions and intentions, the ability to strike and defeat the enemy, and the ability to hold ground. This latter and most important element still requires soldiers. The trench warfare today in the Donbas is no different to the trench warfare at Ypres in 1915. Necessity is the mother of innovation on today’s battlefield as much as it was during WWI, and trained manpower is still essential to develop and exploit any sort of success.
For most casual observers on the war in Ukraine, it is the drone which has changed the nature of conflict, but I suggest that is a false assumption. It is the changing way drones are used, not their inherent characteristics which have changed the fight. My last post in the British Army was in an intelligence role to help bring the Watchkeeper drone into service. This was a multi-million-pound surveillance platform. If you lose one such vehicle, you lose a huge amount of your capability. Today for the same price you can buy 10,000 drones off the shelf which can do much the same job. You can lose quite large numbers of these and your fighting capability is barely affected.
What is key today is the electromagnetic spectrum – he who controls this, controls the battle space. This means that fighting is not now about men and women being robust and able to shoot straight: there is an increasing role for the gamer and the hacker to affect the outcome of the battle from a “room in-the-rear”. Most of the soldiers killed in today’s war are killed by drones, potentially operated by someone far off: most of the drones, however, are relatively short ranging, meaning that the drone which kills a soldier probably took off from somewhere not that far away. There is thus still a need for tough, brave troops able to operate close to the enemy lines.
At the beginning of the war, we were training the Ukrainian army how to fight, but it is now them who are showing us the way to operate on the contemporary battlefield and I hope we are listening. We must also acknowledge, with the evolution of technology accelerating at such a pace, that where possible, we must buy drones etc off-the-shelf, modified if required. If we try to produce everything ourselves it will be well out of date well before it hits the front. Where we have the advantage, as perhaps in laser anti-drone technology, we should lead, but for most other capabilities we should follow our allies.
The much-discussed Strategic Defence Review is about to hit the streets with the plans for the British military over the next decade or so. With the current pace of change, it is no small wonder it is delayed and shrouded in secrecy. The team producing it are no doubt nervous about backing the wrong horse, tank or drone. The old saw “there is nothing new, just stuff we forgot” has some resonance here. What has certainly not changed is the general principles of war, or as General Bill Slim put it “hit the other fellow as fast as you can, as hard as you can, when he ain’t looking and where it hurts him most”.
The principles of war have not changed at all, but the pace of innovation and technology has never been faster. Agility and flexibility are key. Well trained, motivated and well led soldiers are still essential, but control of the electromagnetic spectrum is the single most significant element for the successful prosecution of violence on the battlefield today and likely into the future.
The Review must produce a fighting force fit for the current and future battlefield – not the “status quo ante” which Reviews have been wont to do in the past.
Ukraine’s struggle against Russia has not fundamentally changed the principles of war. But when it comes to how we fight and how we prosecute violence on the battlefield, it most certainly has.
The requirements for success are the same in general terms. We need actionable intelligence on enemy dispositions and intentions, the ability to strike and defeat the enemy, and the ability to hold ground. This latter and most important element still requires soldiers. The trench warfare today in the Donbas is no different to the trench warfare at Ypres in 1915. Necessity is the mother of innovation on today’s battlefield as much as it was during WWI, and trained manpower is still essential to develop and exploit any sort of success.
For most casual observers on the war in Ukraine, it is the drone which has changed the nature of conflict, but I suggest that is a false assumption. It is the changing way drones are used, not their inherent characteristics which have changed the fight. My last post in the British Army was in an intelligence role to help bring the Watchkeeper drone into service. This was a multi-million-pound surveillance platform. If you lose one such vehicle, you lose a huge amount of your capability. Today for the same price you can buy 10,000 drones off the shelf which can do much the same job. You can lose quite large numbers of these and your fighting capability is barely affected.
What is key today is the electromagnetic spectrum – he who controls this, controls the battle space. This means that fighting is not now about men and women being robust and able to shoot straight: there is an increasing role for the gamer and the hacker to affect the outcome of the battle from a “room in-the-rear”. Most of the soldiers killed in today’s war are killed by drones, potentially operated by someone far off: most of the drones, however, are relatively short ranging, meaning that the drone which kills a soldier probably took off from somewhere not that far away. There is thus still a need for tough, brave troops able to operate close to the enemy lines.
At the beginning of the war, we were training the Ukrainian army how to fight, but it is now them who are showing us the way to operate on the contemporary battlefield and I hope we are listening. We must also acknowledge, with the evolution of technology accelerating at such a pace, that where possible, we must buy drones etc off-the-shelf, modified if required. If we try to produce everything ourselves it will be well out of date well before it hits the front. Where we have the advantage, as perhaps in laser anti-drone technology, we should lead, but for most other capabilities we should follow our allies.
The much-discussed Strategic Defence Review is about to hit the streets with the plans for the British military over the next decade or so. With the current pace of change, it is no small wonder it is delayed and shrouded in secrecy. The team producing it are no doubt nervous about backing the wrong horse, tank or drone. The old saw “there is nothing new, just stuff we forgot” has some resonance here. What has certainly not changed is the general principles of war, or as General Bill Slim put it “hit the other fellow as fast as you can, as hard as you can, when he ain’t looking and where it hurts him most”.
The principles of war have not changed at all, but the pace of innovation and technology has never been faster. Agility and flexibility are key. Well trained, motivated and well led soldiers are still essential, but control of the electromagnetic spectrum is the single most significant element for the successful prosecution of violence on the battlefield today and likely into the future.
The Review must produce a fighting force fit for the current and future battlefield – not the “status quo ante” which Reviews have been wont to do in the past.