In the final working week before Christmas, EU leaders gathered for a meeting that might prove historic – but not for the reasons they hoped.
Led by Kaja Kallas – the former Estonian PM and now the hawkish head of the EU’s Foreign Policy and Security – the leaders reaffirmed their support for Kyiv. Council President António Costa declared that “Ukraine alone can determine peace terms,” while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised the need to back President Zelensky, hinting at progress in Ukraine’s EU accession bid.
Yet what made the summit historic wasn’t the unity expressed – it was the cracks that quickly followed.
“Within the EU, you don’t have a consensus, and if you don’t have a consensus, you cannot act in the name of the European Council,” thundered Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, long a thorn in the side of attempts to forge a coherent European stance on Russia.
Adding to the unease, von der Leyen admitted, “We also need to know more regarding the plans of the next US administration at the EU’s level.”
And here lies the crux of the matter. Despite over a year of warnings that a Trump presidency was a real possibility, Europe has failed to craft a robust, independent strategy in 2024 less reliant on the US. Now, Europe’s fate – and that of Ukraine – remains tied to the goodwill of an ally that may soon prove unreliable.
Historians may well look back on this meeting, therefore, as Europe’s admission that it’s left itself no choice but to seek a festive miracle from across the Atlantic, hoping that Donald Trump will soon carve out a favourable peace deal with Vladimir Putin.
But all of this is predicated on one massive assumption – that Russia will meaningfully come to the negotiating table in early 2025. What no one seems to be asking is: what if they don’t?
Given the battlefield dynamics and Moscow’s objectives, many convincingly argue that Putin will continue waging war for as long as his economy allows him to. The Kremlin may posture as conciliatory in January, claiming openness to meaningful talks, but what if its proposals are unacceptable to Ukraine and its allies?
This is a crucial question that seems to be almost entirely ignored in Europe. For America, the choice might be easy: pull out. What then for a Europe which has failed to prepare adequately for that scenario, and yet cannot let Kyiv fall?
In the final working week before Christmas, EU leaders gathered for a meeting that might prove historic – but not for the reasons they hoped.
Led by Kaja Kallas – the former Estonian PM and now the hawkish head of the EU’s Foreign Policy and Security – the leaders reaffirmed their support for Kyiv. Council President António Costa declared that “Ukraine alone can determine peace terms,” while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised the need to back President Zelensky, hinting at progress in Ukraine’s EU accession bid.
Yet what made the summit historic wasn’t the unity expressed – it was the cracks that quickly followed.
“Within the EU, you don’t have a consensus, and if you don’t have a consensus, you cannot act in the name of the European Council,” thundered Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, long a thorn in the side of attempts to forge a coherent European stance on Russia.
Adding to the unease, von der Leyen admitted, “We also need to know more regarding the plans of the next US administration at the EU’s level.”
And here lies the crux of the matter. Despite over a year of warnings that a Trump presidency was a real possibility, Europe has failed to craft a robust, independent strategy in 2024 less reliant on the US. Now, Europe’s fate – and that of Ukraine – remains tied to the goodwill of an ally that may soon prove unreliable.
Historians may well look back on this meeting, therefore, as Europe’s admission that it’s left itself no choice but to seek a festive miracle from across the Atlantic, hoping that Donald Trump will soon carve out a favourable peace deal with Vladimir Putin.
But all of this is predicated on one massive assumption – that Russia will meaningfully come to the negotiating table in early 2025. What no one seems to be asking is: what if they don’t?
Given the battlefield dynamics and Moscow’s objectives, many convincingly argue that Putin will continue waging war for as long as his economy allows him to. The Kremlin may posture as conciliatory in January, claiming openness to meaningful talks, but what if its proposals are unacceptable to Ukraine and its allies?
This is a crucial question that seems to be almost entirely ignored in Europe. For America, the choice might be easy: pull out. What then for a Europe which has failed to prepare adequately for that scenario, and yet cannot let Kyiv fall?