For many decades, the Royal Navy’s thinking and therefore its shipbuilding has remained unchanged. We have had capital ships: aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers and amphibious platforms. We’ve also had frigates and destroyers (the backbone) to hunt submarines and provide area air defence – but more often than not to look like a warship and do warship type influence operations. Then there were an array of smaller ships for charting and patrolling the oceans and hunting both mines and maritime crooks such as fish thieves. Finally there are two types of nuclear powered submarines: attack boats and the strategic deterrent.
But when you look at what we want from our navy now and the resources that are available to do it, no matter how much of a traditionalist you are, it is impossible to see how this model is sustainable. For navies to function across the huge range of tasks they need to undertake they need both balance and mass. The current Royal Navy has good balance from diplomacy to fighting but is woefully short on mass. You don’t need to be a maritime historian to know how that ends when the shooting starts. I will leave the Royal Fleet Auxiliary out of it for this article as I’ve written about them recently.
Focusing on surface vessels, there are three broad types of ships that we now need to consider adding to the traditional mix outlined above. Actually, we don’t need to consider it, we need to do it. These are ships taken up from trade, medium sized low- or un-crewed vessels and autonomous small craft and weapons.
Ships taken up from trade include vessels like HMS Stirling Castle (mine warfare), RFA Proteus and HMS Scott (surveillance) and HMS Protector (ice patrol). These are ships built to a commercial specification that the Navy then leases or buys for use on operations. They are not fighting ships; their lack of self-defence systems, watertight integrity and machinery plants do not permit it, but that doesn’t mean they don’t have tremendous utility. It’s a truism of navies that they spend more of their time setting the conditions to avoid fighting than actually fighting – this is where these ships sit. And given how hard it is to fund and sustain the high end stuff, we need to get better at buying and running them.
For many decades, the Royal Navy’s thinking and therefore its shipbuilding has remained unchanged. We have had capital ships: aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers and amphibious platforms. We’ve also had frigates and destroyers (the backbone) to hunt submarines and provide area air defence – but more often than not to look like a warship and do warship type influence operations. Then there were an array of smaller ships for charting and patrolling the oceans and hunting both mines and maritime crooks such as fish thieves. Finally there are two types of nuclear powered submarines: attack boats and the strategic deterrent.
But when you look at what we want from our navy now and the resources that are available to do it, no matter how much of a traditionalist you are, it is impossible to see how this model is sustainable. For navies to function across the huge range of tasks they need to undertake they need both balance and mass. The current Royal Navy has good balance from diplomacy to fighting but is woefully short on mass. You don’t need to be a maritime historian to know how that ends when the shooting starts. I will leave the Royal Fleet Auxiliary out of it for this article as I’ve written about them recently.
Focusing on surface vessels, there are three broad types of ships that we now need to consider adding to the traditional mix outlined above. Actually, we don’t need to consider it, we need to do it. These are ships taken up from trade, medium sized low- or un-crewed vessels and autonomous small craft and weapons.
Ships taken up from trade include vessels like HMS Stirling Castle (mine warfare), RFA Proteus and HMS Scott (surveillance) and HMS Protector (ice patrol). These are ships built to a commercial specification that the Navy then leases or buys for use on operations. They are not fighting ships; their lack of self-defence systems, watertight integrity and machinery plants do not permit it, but that doesn’t mean they don’t have tremendous utility. It’s a truism of navies that they spend more of their time setting the conditions to avoid fighting than actually fighting – this is where these ships sit. And given how hard it is to fund and sustain the high end stuff, we need to get better at buying and running them.