Several years ago, I stood at the northernmost tip of Israel, just behind the border with Lebanon. A pale-grey concrete wall divided the two countries. Just a few yards away, on the other side, a road snaked into the distance. It turned sharp right, then left, a physical manifestation of the absurdity of the arbitrary lines drawn across the dun-coloured scrubland.
A blue road sign was clearly visible, indicating the way to Beirut, and a stream of cars headed up the Lebanese coast. Behind us, in Israel, were the green fields of a border kibbutz. On the other side, the hills were dotted with large, multi-storey villas, shimmering in the heat.
For a moment, I imagined that the frontier was open, that it was possible to drive north from Tel Aviv to Tyre, Sidon and then Beirut. Back in the 1960s, the Lebanese capital was a smart, sophisticated city, renowned for its glamorous nightlife and known as the Paris of the Middle East.
It’s still one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the Levant, and would be a natural tourism partner for Tel Aviv. A few yards behind us was one key reason that has not happened yet. Operatives for Hezbollah, the Shi’ite terrorist organisation that controls much of southern Lebanon, had dug a tunnel under the fence.
The tunnel had been discovered a few yards inside Israeli territory and blocked up. There was little doubt that had the Hezbollah operatives succeeded in infiltrating, they would have carried out atrocities such as those committed by Hamas on October 7.
Hamas documents captured during the Gaza war, published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, in Israel, outline a plan for a joint Hamas-Hezbollah onslaught on Israel, together with militias from other Arab states, co-ordinated with Iran.
For now, at least, such an attack is much less likely. America’s bunker-buster bombs not only destroyed – or severely damaged – Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but also its power as regional hegemon. Hezbollah, Iran’s client terrorist militia in southern Lebanon, had already been crippled by Israel’s audacious “beeper” operation, which killed or wounded thousands of operatives.
Hamas, also a client of Tehran, is still killing Israeli soldiers in Gaza, but will soon be written out of any future peace settlement, its leaders likely exiled and living in hiding for the rest of their lives. As the dust settles over Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz, Iran’s nuclear sites, the contours of a new Middle East can be glimpsed. Far in the distance, perhaps, but visible none the less.
Much of the Middle East’s current woes can be traced back to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved up the dying Ottoman empire into areas of British and French control. The British zone, for example, included much of Mesopotamia in modern-day Iraq, while France was granted what became Syria and Lebanon.
After the Second World War, when the Western powers retreated, unitary nation-states were imposed on multi-ethnic societies with little sense of national identity. Minorities, fearful for their future, took control and instituted reigns of terror. The Assad dynasty in Syria was Alawite. Saddam Hussein in Iraq was a Sunni Muslim. The Kurds, spread across the region, were denied any kind of state.
Yet even if the borders of the Arab states are not redrawn, Sykes-Picot and its legacy are not immutable. An autonomous de facto Kurdistan exists in part of north-eastern Iraq, with its own elected parliament and government. Shimon Peres, the late veteran Israeli statesman, once proposed a “Jordanian option”, where Israel, a Palestinian entity and Jordan would form a confederation, with open borders, free movement internally and shared institutions.
The European Union, where open borders and free trade have largely rendered old territorial disputes irrelevant, could offer a model for a new Middle East.
The Abraham Accords, between Israel and several Arab countries, most notably the United Arab Emirates, provide a foundation for a future regional settlement. The UAE is reportedly already mediating secret talks between Syria and Israel. The way is clearing for a gradual opening of diplomatic and economic relations.
Where Syria goes, Lebanon will soon follow. Saudi Arabia’s accession to the accords is regarded in Jerusalem as the greatest prize. Normalisation with Israel’s immediate neighbours would bring rapid economic benefits for all parties. Shared tourism could bring substantial investment to Jerusalem, Damascus and Beirut.
Such a vision, of a Middle East with open borders and modern transport links, where Israel and its neighbours trade freely, may still seem remote. There remains widespread anger in Arab countries about the devastation in Gaza. Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, resolutely opposed to any normalisation with the Jewish state, remain influential.
In public, Arab leaders have condemned Israel’s attack on Iran, even though the theocracy also menaced its neighbours, such as Saudi Arabia. But in private, there is widespread relief that the ayatollahs have been severely weakened, and their client terrorist movements disabled.
Before the 1948 war, after Israel declared independence, taxis would go back and forth from Clock Tower Square in Jaffa to Beirut. Nowadays, such a journey still seems fanciful – but less so by the day. The potential rewards of normalisation for Israel and its neighbours are enormous. As Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern political Zionism, wrote of his own plan for a Jewish state: “If you will it, it is no dream.”
Adam LeBor is currently writing ‘The Promised Land: A New History of Israel’
Several years ago, I stood at the northernmost tip of Israel, just behind the border with Lebanon. A pale-grey concrete wall divided the two countries. Just a few yards away, on the other side, a road snaked into the distance. It turned sharp right, then left, a physical manifestation of the absurdity of the arbitrary lines drawn across the dun-coloured scrubland.
A blue road sign was clearly visible, indicating the way to Beirut, and a stream of cars headed up the Lebanese coast. Behind us, in Israel, were the green fields of a border kibbutz. On the other side, the hills were dotted with large, multi-storey villas, shimmering in the heat.
For a moment, I imagined that the frontier was open, that it was possible to drive north from Tel Aviv to Tyre, Sidon and then Beirut. Back in the 1960s, the Lebanese capital was a smart, sophisticated city, renowned for its glamorous nightlife and known as the Paris of the Middle East.
It’s still one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the Levant, and would be a natural tourism partner for Tel Aviv. A few yards behind us was one key reason that has not happened yet. Operatives for Hezbollah, the Shi’ite terrorist organisation that controls much of southern Lebanon, had dug a tunnel under the fence.
The tunnel had been discovered a few yards inside Israeli territory and blocked up. There was little doubt that had the Hezbollah operatives succeeded in infiltrating, they would have carried out atrocities such as those committed by Hamas on October 7.
Hamas documents captured during the Gaza war, published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, in Israel, outline a plan for a joint Hamas-Hezbollah onslaught on Israel, together with militias from other Arab states, co-ordinated with Iran.
For now, at least, such an attack is much less likely. America’s bunker-buster bombs not only destroyed – or severely damaged – Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but also its power as regional hegemon. Hezbollah, Iran’s client terrorist militia in southern Lebanon, had already been crippled by Israel’s audacious “beeper” operation, which killed or wounded thousands of operatives.
Hamas, also a client of Tehran, is still killing Israeli soldiers in Gaza, but will soon be written out of any future peace settlement, its leaders likely exiled and living in hiding for the rest of their lives. As the dust settles over Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz, Iran’s nuclear sites, the contours of a new Middle East can be glimpsed. Far in the distance, perhaps, but visible none the less.
Much of the Middle East’s current woes can be traced back to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved up the dying Ottoman empire into areas of British and French control. The British zone, for example, included much of Mesopotamia in modern-day Iraq, while France was granted what became Syria and Lebanon.
After the Second World War, when the Western powers retreated, unitary nation-states were imposed on multi-ethnic societies with little sense of national identity. Minorities, fearful for their future, took control and instituted reigns of terror. The Assad dynasty in Syria was Alawite. Saddam Hussein in Iraq was a Sunni Muslim. The Kurds, spread across the region, were denied any kind of state.
Yet even if the borders of the Arab states are not redrawn, Sykes-Picot and its legacy are not immutable. An autonomous de facto Kurdistan exists in part of north-eastern Iraq, with its own elected parliament and government. Shimon Peres, the late veteran Israeli statesman, once proposed a “Jordanian option”, where Israel, a Palestinian entity and Jordan would form a confederation, with open borders, free movement internally and shared institutions.
The European Union, where open borders and free trade have largely rendered old territorial disputes irrelevant, could offer a model for a new Middle East.
The Abraham Accords, between Israel and several Arab countries, most notably the United Arab Emirates, provide a foundation for a future regional settlement. The UAE is reportedly already mediating secret talks between Syria and Israel. The way is clearing for a gradual opening of diplomatic and economic relations.
Where Syria goes, Lebanon will soon follow. Saudi Arabia’s accession to the accords is regarded in Jerusalem as the greatest prize. Normalisation with Israel’s immediate neighbours would bring rapid economic benefits for all parties. Shared tourism could bring substantial investment to Jerusalem, Damascus and Beirut.
Such a vision, of a Middle East with open borders and modern transport links, where Israel and its neighbours trade freely, may still seem remote. There remains widespread anger in Arab countries about the devastation in Gaza. Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, resolutely opposed to any normalisation with the Jewish state, remain influential.
In public, Arab leaders have condemned Israel’s attack on Iran, even though the theocracy also menaced its neighbours, such as Saudi Arabia. But in private, there is widespread relief that the ayatollahs have been severely weakened, and their client terrorist movements disabled.
Before the 1948 war, after Israel declared independence, taxis would go back and forth from Clock Tower Square in Jaffa to Beirut. Nowadays, such a journey still seems fanciful – but less so by the day. The potential rewards of normalisation for Israel and its neighbours are enormous. As Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern political Zionism, wrote of his own plan for a Jewish state: “If you will it, it is no dream.”
Adam LeBor is currently writing ‘The Promised Land: A New History of Israel’