If one is spending 2.3 per cent of GDP on Defence and it is universally recognised that’s not enough, one would imagine that an announcement declaring this will increase to 5 per cent would be met with universal praise. Sadly, this is not the case.
In outline the National Security Strategy (NSS) announced today pledges that “With the new 5 per cent commitment on national security, the UK expects a projected split of 3.5 per cent (core defence) and 1.5 per cent (resilience and security) to be agreed at the NATO summit, with a target date of 2035.”
There are three problems with this.
First, the 2.3 per cent we are supposedly currently spending is itself based on some dishonest accounting last time President Trump was in office. Pensions were brought into the defence budget to see us over his 2 per cent demand. Take that back out and the nuclear enterprise and we are currently actually spending around 1.6 per cent of our economy on the conventional security of this country. This is not even vaguely close to enough.
Secondly there is little detail on what will belong in each of the two pots. What goes in the 3.5 pot and what in the 1.5? Until this detail is provided, and there will need to be a lot, it’s not at all clear if the 3.5/1.5 split is a genuine attempt to make Nato allies achieve real defence spending of 3.5 per cent with the existence of the 1.5 acting to stop them using creative accounting as we Brits have previously done. It might instead be a ploy to allow a bogus “increase” of 1.5 per cent to be rapidly added to nations’ headline total by reclassifying existing civilian spending. Keir Starmer’s announcement suggests the latter: he claims “4.1 per cent” total spending by 2027 – in other words 2.6 for core Defence. And then finally 3.5/1.5 by 2035. And it seems that lots of things are about to become “core defence” such as aid and even roadworks.
Third is the timescale. Politically and strategically “by 2035” is so far away that the promise is meaningless. It’s two elections away. It feels like someone saying in 1938 “we’ll increase spending to meet the threat and aim to be there by 1948” or “I promise to behave really well in my next life”. If you look at what’s on the table right now, we actually have two years’ worth of in-year savings to go before the new 2027 target – the sort of hockey stick graph that makes growth nearly impossible to plan or achieve.
If one is spending 2.3 per cent of GDP on Defence and it is universally recognised that’s not enough, one would imagine that an announcement declaring this will increase to 5 per cent would be met with universal praise. Sadly, this is not the case.
In outline the National Security Strategy (NSS) announced today pledges that “With the new 5 per cent commitment on national security, the UK expects a projected split of 3.5 per cent (core defence) and 1.5 per cent (resilience and security) to be agreed at the NATO summit, with a target date of 2035.”
There are three problems with this.
First, the 2.3 per cent we are supposedly currently spending is itself based on some dishonest accounting last time President Trump was in office. Pensions were brought into the defence budget to see us over his 2 per cent demand. Take that back out and the nuclear enterprise and we are currently actually spending around 1.6 per cent of our economy on the conventional security of this country. This is not even vaguely close to enough.
Secondly there is little detail on what will belong in each of the two pots. What goes in the 3.5 pot and what in the 1.5? Until this detail is provided, and there will need to be a lot, it’s not at all clear if the 3.5/1.5 split is a genuine attempt to make Nato allies achieve real defence spending of 3.5 per cent with the existence of the 1.5 acting to stop them using creative accounting as we Brits have previously done. It might instead be a ploy to allow a bogus “increase” of 1.5 per cent to be rapidly added to nations’ headline total by reclassifying existing civilian spending. Keir Starmer’s announcement suggests the latter: he claims “4.1 per cent” total spending by 2027 – in other words 2.6 for core Defence. And then finally 3.5/1.5 by 2035. And it seems that lots of things are about to become “core defence” such as aid and even roadworks.
Third is the timescale. Politically and strategically “by 2035” is so far away that the promise is meaningless. It’s two elections away. It feels like someone saying in 1938 “we’ll increase spending to meet the threat and aim to be there by 1948” or “I promise to behave really well in my next life”. If you look at what’s on the table right now, we actually have two years’ worth of in-year savings to go before the new 2027 target – the sort of hockey stick graph that makes growth nearly impossible to plan or achieve.