Sir Keir Starmer has pledged to send British troops to Ukraine as part of a European “reassurance force” if and when the guns finally fall silent. According to the Defence Secretary, the military is “ready to go, they’re ready to act from day one”.
Yet the hollowed-out state of Britain’s armed forces paints a different picture. Britain is unlikely to be able to deploy troops in significant numbers, and it is far from clear that they would survive – let alone fight and win – should things get messy.
The priority of this year’s Strategic Defence Review was to get the armed forces ready to fight a war against Russia. But that will take time. Putting boots on the ground in Ukraine could jeopardise this ambition, as well as weaken our commitment to Nato.
There are three principal reasons for this.
First, numbers. Politicians will likely want to get away with deploying a single battle-group (1,500 troops) alongside a lion’s share of the command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and logistics enablers.
However, if Britain wants to lead the mission and provide a credible deterrent to Russia that other European nations can plug into, then the minimum contribution for the UK would be a brigade (5,000).
This commitment would require 15,000 troops to sustain indefinitely (one in theatre, one recovering and one training), which amounts to 20 per cent of the total British Army on paper strength, or 27 per cent when considering that only 77 per cent of the army’s soldiers (54,695 troops) are currently considered medically deployable.
Committing this force to an open-ended operation would effectively be permanently removing these troops from the British Army order of battle. This would come after committing two divisions (likely over 25,000 troops) to be Nato’s Strategic Reserve. Britain could just about do this, but it could not do anything else.
Second, capabilities. The “reassurance force” will not be a neutral peacekeeping one. It will need to have access to the full heavy suite of military capabilities – on the land, sea and in the air and space – to deter further Russian attacks.
In extremis, this force would need to fight and fix Russian forces within Ukraine if a wider war between Nato and Russia broke out, whether it be in Ukraine, or somewhere else in the Euro-Atlantic.
The British Army is modernising, but it simply lacks the drones, tanks, armoured infantry and heavy artillery to provide a credible fighting force that would concern Moscow. The army also needs time to bring in equipment, train and integrate new doctrine for a battlefield that has been revolutionised by drone warfare.
This “reassurance force” would essentially be a few thousand European troops with old and outdated gear. Should fighting break out, it is more likely that the Ukrainian armed forces – the largest in Europe, battle-hardened and up to date with the latest innovations – would be doing the reassuring.
Third, track record. British soldiers trained the Afghan National Security Forces for two decades, who were swept aside by the Taliban in a single summer offensive.
Similarly, US and British-trained Iraqi Security Forces crumbled under the 2014 summer Isis advance. Most concerning, the 2011 Nato-led Operation Unified Protector over Libya limited the violence but did not produce a strategic victory.
In short, Europeans have a poor track record of post-Cold War military success, even when the US has been heavily involved.
These recent operations were all discretionary, whereas a mission to Ukraine cannot fail, otherwise it would be fatal for European military credibility and therefore broader European security.
With reports that British troops might be sent to Ukraine within weeks of a ceasefire, there is not much time for defence planners to design an operation maximised for success.
Furthermore, Putin could test the reassurance force early, in the hope of unsettling the Europeans and preventing further Nato members contributing to it in the future.
For this reason the operation is incredibly risky. Without concrete US guarantees – not just to Ukraine but also European allies – a European-led deployment would be incredibly vulnerable and provide Putin with an opportunity, rather than a deterrent, to continue his aggression.
Sir Keir Starmer has pledged to send British troops to Ukraine as part of a European “reassurance force” if and when the guns finally fall silent. According to the Defence Secretary, the military is “ready to go, they’re ready to act from day one”.
Yet the hollowed-out state of Britain’s armed forces paints a different picture. Britain is unlikely to be able to deploy troops in significant numbers, and it is far from clear that they would survive – let alone fight and win – should things get messy.
The priority of this year’s Strategic Defence Review was to get the armed forces ready to fight a war against Russia. But that will take time. Putting boots on the ground in Ukraine could jeopardise this ambition, as well as weaken our commitment to Nato.
There are three principal reasons for this.
First, numbers. Politicians will likely want to get away with deploying a single battle-group (1,500 troops) alongside a lion’s share of the command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and logistics enablers.
However, if Britain wants to lead the mission and provide a credible deterrent to Russia that other European nations can plug into, then the minimum contribution for the UK would be a brigade (5,000).
This commitment would require 15,000 troops to sustain indefinitely (one in theatre, one recovering and one training), which amounts to 20 per cent of the total British Army on paper strength, or 27 per cent when considering that only 77 per cent of the army’s soldiers (54,695 troops) are currently considered medically deployable.
Committing this force to an open-ended operation would effectively be permanently removing these troops from the British Army order of battle. This would come after committing two divisions (likely over 25,000 troops) to be Nato’s Strategic Reserve. Britain could just about do this, but it could not do anything else.
Second, capabilities. The “reassurance force” will not be a neutral peacekeeping one. It will need to have access to the full heavy suite of military capabilities – on the land, sea and in the air and space – to deter further Russian attacks.
In extremis, this force would need to fight and fix Russian forces within Ukraine if a wider war between Nato and Russia broke out, whether it be in Ukraine, or somewhere else in the Euro-Atlantic.
The British Army is modernising, but it simply lacks the drones, tanks, armoured infantry and heavy artillery to provide a credible fighting force that would concern Moscow. The army also needs time to bring in equipment, train and integrate new doctrine for a battlefield that has been revolutionised by drone warfare.
This “reassurance force” would essentially be a few thousand European troops with old and outdated gear. Should fighting break out, it is more likely that the Ukrainian armed forces – the largest in Europe, battle-hardened and up to date with the latest innovations – would be doing the reassuring.
Third, track record. British soldiers trained the Afghan National Security Forces for two decades, who were swept aside by the Taliban in a single summer offensive.
Similarly, US and British-trained Iraqi Security Forces crumbled under the 2014 summer Isis advance. Most concerning, the 2011 Nato-led Operation Unified Protector over Libya limited the violence but did not produce a strategic victory.
In short, Europeans have a poor track record of post-Cold War military success, even when the US has been heavily involved.
These recent operations were all discretionary, whereas a mission to Ukraine cannot fail, otherwise it would be fatal for European military credibility and therefore broader European security.
With reports that British troops might be sent to Ukraine within weeks of a ceasefire, there is not much time for defence planners to design an operation maximised for success.
Furthermore, Putin could test the reassurance force early, in the hope of unsettling the Europeans and preventing further Nato members contributing to it in the future.
For this reason the operation is incredibly risky. Without concrete US guarantees – not just to Ukraine but also European allies – a European-led deployment would be incredibly vulnerable and provide Putin with an opportunity, rather than a deterrent, to continue his aggression.