As 2025 begins, pessimism about Ukraine’s fate hangs in the air and the stench of appeasement on the wind. I find myself confused as to why, for it should be clear that the conflict has so far been an ignominious failure for President Vladimir Putin.
Unable to achieve the objective of subjugating his far smaller neighbour, he has instead inflicted enormous suffering on his own country and devastated its economy while undermining Russian prestige and strategic influence around the world.
Lest we forget that what was planned as a three-day “special operation” has turned into a three-year nightmare. Russia has made only limited territorial gains and has been incapable of capturing even the whole of Donetsk Oblast in the east. Last year’s grand offensive to establish a buffer zone at Kharkiv to protect Russian territory only seized a few kilometres along the border. Missile attacks aimed at plunging Ukraine into near-constant cold and darkness have clearly failed.
Meanwhile Putin has lost control of parts of Kursk Oblast to Ukrainian forces in the first invasion of Russian territory since the Second World War, failing to retake it despite enlisting North Korea as an ally in the conflict. Putin’s much-vaunted air defences have proven unable to halt Ukrainian strikes on airfields, oil depots and ammunition warehouses inside Russia. Even the capital, Moscow, has been penetrated by locally-produced Ukrainian explosive drones. The Russian navy has been humiliated, losing control of the Black Sea and unable to strangle Ukraine’s grain exports. Upwards of 15 of its ships have been sunk by sea drones with many more damaged and the remainder of the fleet forced to retreat from the Crimean peninsula and the shores of Ukraine.
The human toll from Putin’s sclerotic campaign has also been immense. Ukraine estimates that Russian forces sustained 427,000 casualties in 2024 alone. The Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank, assesses that during the same period Russia seized 4,168 square kilometres; that means each square kilometre captured has cost more than 100 casualties.
The financial outlay on those casualties, with 6 per cent of the entire federal budget promised to support the wounded and compensate the families of the dead, is just one contributor to Russia’s increasingly precarious economy. Interest rates have hit 23 per cent with inflation at 9 per cent, driven by an unsustainable war economy badly damaged by global sanctions. The Russian financial system may not be on the verge of collapse, but no matter how much the Kremlin talks up its prospects, long-term economic stagnation seems inevitable even if the conflict ends in 2025.
Further afield, the war has severely damaged Russian credibility in the Middle East. Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 kept Assad in power. But the scaling back of his forces there to stoke the meat grinder in Ukraine together with the withdrawal in 2023 of the Wagner mercenary force – another casualty of the war – meant he was unable to save the dictator at the end of last year. Whether or not Moscow retains its bases in Syria, its reputation as a tough and dependable ally compared to the vacillating West will have been badly ruptured. Added to that, Russia’s weakness in Syria has inflicted damage, perhaps irreparable, on its chief regional accomplice and arms supplier, Iran. If Syria becomes a support base for jihadists set on terrorism inside Russia – a distinct possibility – it could be disastrous.
Contrary to Putin’s dream of resurrecting a Russian empire, he has risked turning the country into a dependency of the Chinese. Western sanctions have already made Russia more reliant on China for economic support and commerce than ever before. As Moscow’s economic situation worsens, the trade inequity will only deepen. Russia also depends on the Chinese supply of dual-use technology that is essential for its war production and North Korea would not have sent 10,000 troops to help fight Putin’s war without a green light from Xi Jinping. The conditions are being set for Moscow’s subordination to Beijing.
As 2025 begins, pessimism about Ukraine’s fate hangs in the air and the stench of appeasement on the wind. I find myself confused as to why, for it should be clear that the conflict has so far been an ignominious failure for President Vladimir Putin.
Unable to achieve the objective of subjugating his far smaller neighbour, he has instead inflicted enormous suffering on his own country and devastated its economy while undermining Russian prestige and strategic influence around the world.
Lest we forget that what was planned as a three-day “special operation” has turned into a three-year nightmare. Russia has made only limited territorial gains and has been incapable of capturing even the whole of Donetsk Oblast in the east. Last year’s grand offensive to establish a buffer zone at Kharkiv to protect Russian territory only seized a few kilometres along the border. Missile attacks aimed at plunging Ukraine into near-constant cold and darkness have clearly failed.
Meanwhile Putin has lost control of parts of Kursk Oblast to Ukrainian forces in the first invasion of Russian territory since the Second World War, failing to retake it despite enlisting North Korea as an ally in the conflict. Putin’s much-vaunted air defences have proven unable to halt Ukrainian strikes on airfields, oil depots and ammunition warehouses inside Russia. Even the capital, Moscow, has been penetrated by locally-produced Ukrainian explosive drones. The Russian navy has been humiliated, losing control of the Black Sea and unable to strangle Ukraine’s grain exports. Upwards of 15 of its ships have been sunk by sea drones with many more damaged and the remainder of the fleet forced to retreat from the Crimean peninsula and the shores of Ukraine.
The human toll from Putin’s sclerotic campaign has also been immense. Ukraine estimates that Russian forces sustained 427,000 casualties in 2024 alone. The Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank, assesses that during the same period Russia seized 4,168 square kilometres; that means each square kilometre captured has cost more than 100 casualties.
The financial outlay on those casualties, with 6 per cent of the entire federal budget promised to support the wounded and compensate the families of the dead, is just one contributor to Russia’s increasingly precarious economy. Interest rates have hit 23 per cent with inflation at 9 per cent, driven by an unsustainable war economy badly damaged by global sanctions. The Russian financial system may not be on the verge of collapse, but no matter how much the Kremlin talks up its prospects, long-term economic stagnation seems inevitable even if the conflict ends in 2025.
Further afield, the war has severely damaged Russian credibility in the Middle East. Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 kept Assad in power. But the scaling back of his forces there to stoke the meat grinder in Ukraine together with the withdrawal in 2023 of the Wagner mercenary force – another casualty of the war – meant he was unable to save the dictator at the end of last year. Whether or not Moscow retains its bases in Syria, its reputation as a tough and dependable ally compared to the vacillating West will have been badly ruptured. Added to that, Russia’s weakness in Syria has inflicted damage, perhaps irreparable, on its chief regional accomplice and arms supplier, Iran. If Syria becomes a support base for jihadists set on terrorism inside Russia – a distinct possibility – it could be disastrous.
Contrary to Putin’s dream of resurrecting a Russian empire, he has risked turning the country into a dependency of the Chinese. Western sanctions have already made Russia more reliant on China for economic support and commerce than ever before. As Moscow’s economic situation worsens, the trade inequity will only deepen. Russia also depends on the Chinese supply of dual-use technology that is essential for its war production and North Korea would not have sent 10,000 troops to help fight Putin’s war without a green light from Xi Jinping. The conditions are being set for Moscow’s subordination to Beijing.