It has become a cliché to observe that the world as we have known it has gone, never to return. Yet for all the anxiety about what comes next – geopolitical competition, a heightened risk of war, disruptions to patterns of trade – few say the obvious. The old way of doing things was failing, caused many millions of our fellow citizens to suffer, and hastened the age of crisis in which we now find ourselves.
The double liberalism that dominated Western political systems has reached the depths of its undeniable failure.
Our open borders have undermined the coherence of whole countries, destroying social trust, solidarity and shared identity, and with those things support for progressive ideas like the welfare state. Our open economies have been exploited by mercantilist powers like China, which run huge trade surpluses that cause corresponding trade deficits, debt and the destruction of our productive capacity.
So total is the failure of liberalism one might ask if recovery is even possible. The radical diversity of our society and the loss of shared norms of behaviour has contributed to the low-respect, high-crime culture of fear in our cities. Millions of working age people live on health-related benefits, with over £60 billion a year spent on incapacity and disability payments. We are trapped by our trade deficit, high spending and record stocks of public debt, and our desperation to prop up the value of Sterling using whatever means we can – regardless of the long-term consequences.
The reality of the situation is more desperate than many admit. But recovery is possible, for the simple reason that the alternative – social and economic decline, and with it domination by other powers – is unthinkable.
While the passive and the pessimistic protest about what cannot be done, we need leaders to adopt a different maxim: that whatever is in the national interest must be done.
This will require the total abandonment of the liberal consensus that brought us to this point, and the complete reversal of the luxury policies that appeared affordable during the later stages of liberalism and globalisation.
That model involved not only the open borders and economies that caused so much harm, but a whole structure of international and national governance. The world trading system that has been played by Beijing, which talked of international free trade while doing everything it could to subvert it. The dependence of different countries and regions on the US for their defence, which caused allied leaders to believe in the mythology of a rules-based order and international law, when anybody with eyes could see that this moral cloak covered the naked pursuit of American interests and hard American power.
As manufacturing production and the bulk of world trade was surrendered to China, and following these things the vast flows of capital that enabled the mass subsidy of newer technologies – aided of course by industrial-scale theft of intellectual property – rapid economic growth has allowed Beijing to challenge US power. The risk of confrontation and war with China is why America is having its strategic clear-out – first from the Middle East and now from Europe – and why instability in different regions of the world will now remain a fact of life.
All this followed the hubris of leaders convinced by the old – and disproved – assumptions of ideological liberalism. These held that liberal values are universal; the rest of the world wants to become more like the West; more trade and migration makes war impossible; cultural, institutional and historical contexts matter little; and trade liberalisation leads inexorably to open societies and democratic politics.
Delusions like these on the world stage were matched by those at home, because the late model of liberalism and globalisation made possible – and actively promoted – luxury policies that made no sense on their own terms.
But now, around the world the ideological adherence to free trade and its associated theories is starting to weaken. Mass immigration and asymmetric multiculturalism – which seeks to protect minority cultures but not our own – are challenged by mainstream political parties. Defence spending is rising, and in Britain aid spending has been cut twice, first by Rishi Sunak and now by Keir Starmer.
This would have been unthinkable several years ago. But other absurdities remain. The political leaders who now demand a patriotic defence policy, and who will expect the public to bear the cost of higher defence spending – through tax rises or spending restraint elsewhere – are the same politicians who for years undermined the shared stories, institutions and cultural norms that make us patriotic. The anti-meritocratic DEI cult goes on. From the welfare system to post-18 education and training, expensive policy failures continue, as leaders fill unnecessary gaps in the labour market with immigration.
Above all, there is net zero. Decarbonisation in one country – or more accurately one continent – is only possible in a globalised economy. Britain has managed to reduce its carbon emissions at least in significant part by shedding its domestic industries and importing goods instead. This is obviously a pointless exercise, as global emissions increase when goods are manufactured in countries with dirtier energy sources and poorer environmental standards, and when the goods must be transported around the world.
The reality of decarbonisation – that as long as the policy runs faster than technology allows, and other countries do not follow our lead – is that it means deindustrialisation, with all the consequences that follow. The country is less resilient to shocks, supply chains are stretched and we are exposed to instability in other parts of the world.
Our trade deficit is greater, and we make bad decisions – from selling strategically important companies to increasing public and private debt – to compensate. Our underlying weaknesses – from low investment to terrible regional imbalances in the economy – all get worse.
With the old model of liberalism and globalisation these weaknesses were real but well-concealed. Now that model is gone the policies that cause them will be exposed as luxuries we never could afford, and certainly not now. The sooner we wake up, the less painful the transition to reality will be.
It has become a cliché to observe that the world as we have known it has gone, never to return. Yet for all the anxiety about what comes next – geopolitical competition, a heightened risk of war, disruptions to patterns of trade – few say the obvious. The old way of doing things was failing, caused many millions of our fellow citizens to suffer, and hastened the age of crisis in which we now find ourselves.
The double liberalism that dominated Western political systems has reached the depths of its undeniable failure.
Our open borders have undermined the coherence of whole countries, destroying social trust, solidarity and shared identity, and with those things support for progressive ideas like the welfare state. Our open economies have been exploited by mercantilist powers like China, which run huge trade surpluses that cause corresponding trade deficits, debt and the destruction of our productive capacity.
So total is the failure of liberalism one might ask if recovery is even possible. The radical diversity of our society and the loss of shared norms of behaviour has contributed to the low-respect, high-crime culture of fear in our cities. Millions of working age people live on health-related benefits, with over £60 billion a year spent on incapacity and disability payments. We are trapped by our trade deficit, high spending and record stocks of public debt, and our desperation to prop up the value of Sterling using whatever means we can – regardless of the long-term consequences.
The reality of the situation is more desperate than many admit. But recovery is possible, for the simple reason that the alternative – social and economic decline, and with it domination by other powers – is unthinkable.
While the passive and the pessimistic protest about what cannot be done, we need leaders to adopt a different maxim: that whatever is in the national interest must be done.
This will require the total abandonment of the liberal consensus that brought us to this point, and the complete reversal of the luxury policies that appeared affordable during the later stages of liberalism and globalisation.
That model involved not only the open borders and economies that caused so much harm, but a whole structure of international and national governance. The world trading system that has been played by Beijing, which talked of international free trade while doing everything it could to subvert it. The dependence of different countries and regions on the US for their defence, which caused allied leaders to believe in the mythology of a rules-based order and international law, when anybody with eyes could see that this moral cloak covered the naked pursuit of American interests and hard American power.
As manufacturing production and the bulk of world trade was surrendered to China, and following these things the vast flows of capital that enabled the mass subsidy of newer technologies – aided of course by industrial-scale theft of intellectual property – rapid economic growth has allowed Beijing to challenge US power. The risk of confrontation and war with China is why America is having its strategic clear-out – first from the Middle East and now from Europe – and why instability in different regions of the world will now remain a fact of life.
All this followed the hubris of leaders convinced by the old – and disproved – assumptions of ideological liberalism. These held that liberal values are universal; the rest of the world wants to become more like the West; more trade and migration makes war impossible; cultural, institutional and historical contexts matter little; and trade liberalisation leads inexorably to open societies and democratic politics.
Delusions like these on the world stage were matched by those at home, because the late model of liberalism and globalisation made possible – and actively promoted – luxury policies that made no sense on their own terms.
But now, around the world the ideological adherence to free trade and its associated theories is starting to weaken. Mass immigration and asymmetric multiculturalism – which seeks to protect minority cultures but not our own – are challenged by mainstream political parties. Defence spending is rising, and in Britain aid spending has been cut twice, first by Rishi Sunak and now by Keir Starmer.
This would have been unthinkable several years ago. But other absurdities remain. The political leaders who now demand a patriotic defence policy, and who will expect the public to bear the cost of higher defence spending – through tax rises or spending restraint elsewhere – are the same politicians who for years undermined the shared stories, institutions and cultural norms that make us patriotic. The anti-meritocratic DEI cult goes on. From the welfare system to post-18 education and training, expensive policy failures continue, as leaders fill unnecessary gaps in the labour market with immigration.
Above all, there is net zero. Decarbonisation in one country – or more accurately one continent – is only possible in a globalised economy. Britain has managed to reduce its carbon emissions at least in significant part by shedding its domestic industries and importing goods instead. This is obviously a pointless exercise, as global emissions increase when goods are manufactured in countries with dirtier energy sources and poorer environmental standards, and when the goods must be transported around the world.
The reality of decarbonisation – that as long as the policy runs faster than technology allows, and other countries do not follow our lead – is that it means deindustrialisation, with all the consequences that follow. The country is less resilient to shocks, supply chains are stretched and we are exposed to instability in other parts of the world.
Our trade deficit is greater, and we make bad decisions – from selling strategically important companies to increasing public and private debt – to compensate. Our underlying weaknesses – from low investment to terrible regional imbalances in the economy – all get worse.
With the old model of liberalism and globalisation these weaknesses were real but well-concealed. Now that model is gone the policies that cause them will be exposed as luxuries we never could afford, and certainly not now. The sooner we wake up, the less painful the transition to reality will be.