There is a panoramic window in the ambassador’s office in Washington: a perfect point at which to stand and think. To the left is Massachusetts Avenue, humming with traffic; to the right the rolling lawns of the Residence, where JFK’s children would occasionally play; and straight ahead, downtown Washington.
It is impossible to take in this view without wondering what is going on within the walls of those great buildings of the American state, the White House and the Capitol: what plots are being hatched, what decisions taken, will we be consulted or taken for granted?
These doubts must be all the greater with the arrival of an administration which seems intent on tearing down the pillars on which American foreign policy has been built for the past eight decades. So, quite a challenge for the newly arrived British ambassador, Lord Mandelson: arguably greater than has been faced by any British ambassador in recent history. How should he approach it?
The remit for any British ambassador is straightforward: to protect British interests and advance British objectives. Mandleson will find there are a hundred worthy ways of occupying his time, and a thousand people worth meeting. But prioritisation is essential; and there are currently two issues which override the rest. The administration’s actions on tariffs threaten to damage the UK economy. And the emerging US policy on Ukraine threatens to reward Putin for his invasion, and put the security of the European continent at risk.
Tariffs are Trump’s preferred instrument of coercion, and China, the EU, Canada and Mexico are in the firing line. As is the UK: we are faced with 25 per cent tariffs on our exports to the US of steel and aluminium, starting on 4 March. Can we escape? We have a credible case.
We, unlike, say, Germany, are in broad balance with the US in trade flows and though we sell the US some steel, it’s mostly specialist stuff that can’t be bought elsewhere. But even if we win this argument, we will suffer collateral damage if there are US/China and US/EU trade wars. Most economists reckon these will reduce trade volumes, increase the costs of imports for everyone, and push up inflation and interest rates. So some damage to the British economy may be unavoidable: but it would be a real coup for our ambassador if he can minimise the harm.
These economic risks play straight into the challenge that all European governments now face on defence. The American protective umbrella over Europe is being folded away. European governments are going to have to step up and spend more – at a moment when already anaemic economic performance may be hit by trade wars.
There is, however, an option for the UK, if the Government is prepared to go a little beyond the current plans for the reset with Europe. New research by the Frontier Economics think tank, sponsored by Best for Britain, suggests that the UK could boost growth by between 1.7 per cent and 2.2 per cent just through deeper regulatory alignment with the EU, without breaching the government’s Brexit red lines. What are they waiting for?
As for Ukraine, Trump’s unilateral announcement that he is starting talks with Putin about ending the war has both caught Europe cold and lit a fire under US/Europe relations. European concerns cover both processes – will they and Ukraine be at the table – and substance – is Trump really contemplating a deal which amounts to Russian victory and Ukrainian capitulation?
Providing no seat for the Europeans in US-run peace negotiations is far from unprecedented: we are never at the table for US-led talks between Israel and the Palestinians and weren’t active participants in the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian war. But with the threat Putin poses to a number of EU and NATO states, this situation is clearly different. Excluding the Ukrainians from talks about ending a war on their territory also makes no sense: they have to be there.
It is the substance, however, which matters most. Recent comments by US officials and the US President himself suggest they favour a realpolitik outcome allowing Russia both to keep the territory it has captured and exercise a veto over Ukraine’s sovereign right to determine its future. If this were the outcome, it would reward the invaders and send a signal to strongman leaders everywhere that they are free to grab territory from weaker neighbours.
Europe has some leverage here: we can accept or reject the deal; we can lift or maintain sanctions against Russia; we can offer or refuse to provide security guarantees. So the Americans ought to want to bring us along (though in Trump World, normal rules may not apply). In which context Keir Starmer has grabbed a leading role, with his imminent visit to the White House and his bold offer of a British contribution to a deterrence force. Peter Mandleson will play a leading role in preparing this encounter and advising the Prime Minister on how to maximise the positives: his first big test.
Lord Darroch is the former British Ambassador to the US and former National Security Advisor
There is a panoramic window in the ambassador’s office in Washington: a perfect point at which to stand and think. To the left is Massachusetts Avenue, humming with traffic; to the right the rolling lawns of the Residence, where JFK’s children would occasionally play; and straight ahead, downtown Washington.
It is impossible to take in this view without wondering what is going on within the walls of those great buildings of the American state, the White House and the Capitol: what plots are being hatched, what decisions taken, will we be consulted or taken for granted?
These doubts must be all the greater with the arrival of an administration which seems intent on tearing down the pillars on which American foreign policy has been built for the past eight decades. So, quite a challenge for the newly arrived British ambassador, Lord Mandelson: arguably greater than has been faced by any British ambassador in recent history. How should he approach it?
The remit for any British ambassador is straightforward: to protect British interests and advance British objectives. Mandleson will find there are a hundred worthy ways of occupying his time, and a thousand people worth meeting. But prioritisation is essential; and there are currently two issues which override the rest. The administration’s actions on tariffs threaten to damage the UK economy. And the emerging US policy on Ukraine threatens to reward Putin for his invasion, and put the security of the European continent at risk.
Tariffs are Trump’s preferred instrument of coercion, and China, the EU, Canada and Mexico are in the firing line. As is the UK: we are faced with 25 per cent tariffs on our exports to the US of steel and aluminium, starting on 4 March. Can we escape? We have a credible case.
We, unlike, say, Germany, are in broad balance with the US in trade flows and though we sell the US some steel, it’s mostly specialist stuff that can’t be bought elsewhere. But even if we win this argument, we will suffer collateral damage if there are US/China and US/EU trade wars. Most economists reckon these will reduce trade volumes, increase the costs of imports for everyone, and push up inflation and interest rates. So some damage to the British economy may be unavoidable: but it would be a real coup for our ambassador if he can minimise the harm.
These economic risks play straight into the challenge that all European governments now face on defence. The American protective umbrella over Europe is being folded away. European governments are going to have to step up and spend more – at a moment when already anaemic economic performance may be hit by trade wars.
There is, however, an option for the UK, if the Government is prepared to go a little beyond the current plans for the reset with Europe. New research by the Frontier Economics think tank, sponsored by Best for Britain, suggests that the UK could boost growth by between 1.7 per cent and 2.2 per cent just through deeper regulatory alignment with the EU, without breaching the government’s Brexit red lines. What are they waiting for?
As for Ukraine, Trump’s unilateral announcement that he is starting talks with Putin about ending the war has both caught Europe cold and lit a fire under US/Europe relations. European concerns cover both processes – will they and Ukraine be at the table – and substance – is Trump really contemplating a deal which amounts to Russian victory and Ukrainian capitulation?
Providing no seat for the Europeans in US-run peace negotiations is far from unprecedented: we are never at the table for US-led talks between Israel and the Palestinians and weren’t active participants in the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian war. But with the threat Putin poses to a number of EU and NATO states, this situation is clearly different. Excluding the Ukrainians from talks about ending a war on their territory also makes no sense: they have to be there.
It is the substance, however, which matters most. Recent comments by US officials and the US President himself suggest they favour a realpolitik outcome allowing Russia both to keep the territory it has captured and exercise a veto over Ukraine’s sovereign right to determine its future. If this were the outcome, it would reward the invaders and send a signal to strongman leaders everywhere that they are free to grab territory from weaker neighbours.
Europe has some leverage here: we can accept or reject the deal; we can lift or maintain sanctions against Russia; we can offer or refuse to provide security guarantees. So the Americans ought to want to bring us along (though in Trump World, normal rules may not apply). In which context Keir Starmer has grabbed a leading role, with his imminent visit to the White House and his bold offer of a British contribution to a deterrence force. Peter Mandleson will play a leading role in preparing this encounter and advising the Prime Minister on how to maximise the positives: his first big test.
Lord Darroch is the former British Ambassador to the US and former National Security Advisor