The situation with Venezuela has been brewing for some time but with boats allegedly carrying drugs now subject to trial-by-missile and Maduro’s jets buzzing US destroyers, it shows all the signs of escalating further. Or as far as a mismatch of this magnitude is able to, at least.
Perhaps the start of this latest crescendo was in February this year when the US president terminated Venezuela’s Temporary Protected Status and ramped up sanctions. President Maduro, not unsurprisingly, immediately reached out to Russia for support.
Then in August, Trump signed a directive authorising the use of force against Latin American cartels and framing Venezuela as a narco-state hub for fentanyl. There has also been a pretty remarkable deployment of US naval force into the area, starting with three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. This increase led to questions about whether or not this was a precursor to a “blockade” of some sort. The destroyers were followed by a Wasp-class big deck amphibious assault ship and two amphibious transport docks – what the US calls an “amphibious ready group”. These ships are the mobile base for the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit – 2,500 US Marines with all their amazing toys: tiltrotors, stealth jumpjets, hovercraft, swimming armour and the rest. Then to top things off a Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser and a nuclear powered attack submarine arrived on the scene. By this point people were not talking “blockade” but “invasion”.
Trump’s Venezuela task group counts 140,200 tons of ships. That’s more than Britain’s one and only Carrier Strike Group, which is in the Indo-Pacific just now. In fact, the USN has deployed about half of the Royal Navy’s cumulative warship and attack submarine tonnage – just for Venezuela.
We’ve now seen an event that may have ratcheted the tension to new levels. A small vessel, allegedly operated by Venezuelan drug cartel “Tren de Aragua” with 11 suspected gang members onboard, was destroyed by an air-to-surface missile – most likely from an MQ-9 “Reaper” drone.
The debate on the legality of this was not long coming, with various lawyers predominantly saying, “I think we just witnessed a war crime” and the vice-president of the USA – a graduate of Yale Law School – saying, “I don’t give a s--t”. Trump and his people believe that having designated Tren de Aragua as terrorists, they can be killed on the president’s orders: as Osama bin Laden was on the orders of then president Obama, or as General Qasem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps was during Trump’s first term.
I have a couple of thoughts on the engagement, having operated against drug smugglers in those parts back in the day. First, I don’t think that boat had the legs to make it to the mainland US. More likely it was bound for an island in the Caribbean or planning a transfer to another boat. This muddies the waters.
Second, I’ve never seen a drug smuggling boat like this with 11 people onboard. Six is the most I’ve ever seen, and that was a larger boat – and two of those were… umm… on our side. Speed is everything in that game. This boat was overweight and, in the clip where they were engaged at least, only doing about 20 knots. This is unusual. The boats we chased were so fast – 60 plus knots – we had to send our helicopter to chase them down. The helicopter would carry a Royal Marine sniper who would shoot out their engines with a heavy rifle so that we could catch them in the ship.
Third, on the two occasions I did counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, US intelligence was not always right as to who was a smuggler and who wasn’t. In fact, we preferred working with the Dutch out of Curaçao who were faster and more accurate. I’m not saying US intelligence in this case was wrong, just saying that they don’t have a God’s eye picture at all times.
Finally, we also considered this kind of interdiction a law enforcement activity, not counter-terrorism or combat. We would have a US Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) embarked to carry out the actual arrests (we didn’t use British people as doing this part of the job could mean a lot of time spent in court in the US). The chase and the sniping were clearly military activities but then the LEDET would board the boat and cuff the smugglers. The idea of setting out to kill the bad guys was never even discussed and is a change that has surprised most of us familiar with how these operations are conducted. Those in favour of this change in attitude may say “this is what we voted for”. In terms of deterrence it’s hard to argue with, no matter how many difficulties you have with the legality – or how many times you ask “Where does this shift in policy end up?”
Both sides have their aims. The US wants to choke some of the drug pipelines fuelling its horrifying opioid problem which is killing more than 100,000 Americans every year. Trump projects toughness, eyeing domestic gains by labelling Venezuela a narco-threat.
Maduro for his part just wants regime survival. Venezuela is in rickety condition. Oddly, its oil – arguably its main legitimate business – can only be sold easily to America, which has refineries set up to deal with its “sour” sulphurous crude. But a lot of money can be made selling other things to America, and Trump’s allegations that Venezuela is now a “narco-state” are perfectly credible.
“What’s next” is less clear, to me at least. There is certainly room to escalate further. Venezuela could increase grey-zone activities such as harassment of tankers, undersea sabotage, use of drones, GPS jamming etc. They have a stock of mines and even suggesting these are in use can impact shipping and insurance rates.
One thing is for sure, the Venezuelans should stop buzzing the US destroyers in their F-16 fighter jets. This is a bad idea. It achieves very little and it would be the easiest thing in the world for the US Navy to destroy one in self-defence, particularly now that they have new and permissive rules of engagement. It’s an incredibly foolish move to fly a plane anywhere in line of sight of an Arleigh Burke that might be willing to take a shot at you. One of the things I have quite admired about the US Navy over the years – just from a purely military perspective, as a missile man myself – is that they generally don’t need much encouragement in this regard.
But as an older and wiser head these days, I’d say there’s already quite enough trouble in the world today. It’s to be hoped that Trump and Maduro can resolve their differences – or at any rate, rub along somehow – without getting any more people killed.
The situation with Venezuela has been brewing for some time but with boats allegedly carrying drugs now subject to trial-by-missile and Maduro’s jets buzzing US destroyers, it shows all the signs of escalating further. Or as far as a mismatch of this magnitude is able to, at least.
Perhaps the start of this latest crescendo was in February this year when the US president terminated Venezuela’s Temporary Protected Status and ramped up sanctions. President Maduro, not unsurprisingly, immediately reached out to Russia for support.
Then in August, Trump signed a directive authorising the use of force against Latin American cartels and framing Venezuela as a narco-state hub for fentanyl. There has also been a pretty remarkable deployment of US naval force into the area, starting with three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. This increase led to questions about whether or not this was a precursor to a “blockade” of some sort. The destroyers were followed by a Wasp-class big deck amphibious assault ship and two amphibious transport docks – what the US calls an “amphibious ready group”. These ships are the mobile base for the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit – 2,500 US Marines with all their amazing toys: tiltrotors, stealth jumpjets, hovercraft, swimming armour and the rest. Then to top things off a Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser and a nuclear powered attack submarine arrived on the scene. By this point people were not talking “blockade” but “invasion”.
Trump’s Venezuela task group counts 140,200 tons of ships. That’s more than Britain’s one and only Carrier Strike Group, which is in the Indo-Pacific just now. In fact, the USN has deployed about half of the Royal Navy’s cumulative warship and attack submarine tonnage – just for Venezuela.
We’ve now seen an event that may have ratcheted the tension to new levels. A small vessel, allegedly operated by Venezuelan drug cartel “Tren de Aragua” with 11 suspected gang members onboard, was destroyed by an air-to-surface missile – most likely from an MQ-9 “Reaper” drone.
The debate on the legality of this was not long coming, with various lawyers predominantly saying, “I think we just witnessed a war crime” and the vice-president of the USA – a graduate of Yale Law School – saying, “I don’t give a s--t”. Trump and his people believe that having designated Tren de Aragua as terrorists, they can be killed on the president’s orders: as Osama bin Laden was on the orders of then president Obama, or as General Qasem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps was during Trump’s first term.
I have a couple of thoughts on the engagement, having operated against drug smugglers in those parts back in the day. First, I don’t think that boat had the legs to make it to the mainland US. More likely it was bound for an island in the Caribbean or planning a transfer to another boat. This muddies the waters.
Second, I’ve never seen a drug smuggling boat like this with 11 people onboard. Six is the most I’ve ever seen, and that was a larger boat – and two of those were… umm… on our side. Speed is everything in that game. This boat was overweight and, in the clip where they were engaged at least, only doing about 20 knots. This is unusual. The boats we chased were so fast – 60 plus knots – we had to send our helicopter to chase them down. The helicopter would carry a Royal Marine sniper who would shoot out their engines with a heavy rifle so that we could catch them in the ship.
Third, on the two occasions I did counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, US intelligence was not always right as to who was a smuggler and who wasn’t. In fact, we preferred working with the Dutch out of Curaçao who were faster and more accurate. I’m not saying US intelligence in this case was wrong, just saying that they don’t have a God’s eye picture at all times.
Finally, we also considered this kind of interdiction a law enforcement activity, not counter-terrorism or combat. We would have a US Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) embarked to carry out the actual arrests (we didn’t use British people as doing this part of the job could mean a lot of time spent in court in the US). The chase and the sniping were clearly military activities but then the LEDET would board the boat and cuff the smugglers. The idea of setting out to kill the bad guys was never even discussed and is a change that has surprised most of us familiar with how these operations are conducted. Those in favour of this change in attitude may say “this is what we voted for”. In terms of deterrence it’s hard to argue with, no matter how many difficulties you have with the legality – or how many times you ask “Where does this shift in policy end up?”
Both sides have their aims. The US wants to choke some of the drug pipelines fuelling its horrifying opioid problem which is killing more than 100,000 Americans every year. Trump projects toughness, eyeing domestic gains by labelling Venezuela a narco-threat.
Maduro for his part just wants regime survival. Venezuela is in rickety condition. Oddly, its oil – arguably its main legitimate business – can only be sold easily to America, which has refineries set up to deal with its “sour” sulphurous crude. But a lot of money can be made selling other things to America, and Trump’s allegations that Venezuela is now a “narco-state” are perfectly credible.
“What’s next” is less clear, to me at least. There is certainly room to escalate further. Venezuela could increase grey-zone activities such as harassment of tankers, undersea sabotage, use of drones, GPS jamming etc. They have a stock of mines and even suggesting these are in use can impact shipping and insurance rates.
One thing is for sure, the Venezuelans should stop buzzing the US destroyers in their F-16 fighter jets. This is a bad idea. It achieves very little and it would be the easiest thing in the world for the US Navy to destroy one in self-defence, particularly now that they have new and permissive rules of engagement. It’s an incredibly foolish move to fly a plane anywhere in line of sight of an Arleigh Burke that might be willing to take a shot at you. One of the things I have quite admired about the US Navy over the years – just from a purely military perspective, as a missile man myself – is that they generally don’t need much encouragement in this regard.
But as an older and wiser head these days, I’d say there’s already quite enough trouble in the world today. It’s to be hoped that Trump and Maduro can resolve their differences – or at any rate, rub along somehow – without getting any more people killed.