After days of sending mixed signals, president Donald Trump authorised large-scale military strikes on Iran’s Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan nuclear facilities. The strikes have potentially dealt crippling damage to Iran’s nuclear program and leave the Middle East in a position of grave uncertainty.
Trump has framed the attacks as an isolated military action aimed at compelling Iran to the bargaining table, but a harsh response from Tehran could instigate a broader regional war.
Since Israel embarked on Operation Rising Lion to demolish Iran’s nuclear program on June 13, I have engaged with numerous experts and sources in Tehran who are familiar with Iran’s security policy thinking. These discussions revealed Iran’s shock and outrage at Israel and at America actions, but also a steely resolve that made regime change in Iran and the long-term mitigation of the Iranian threat highly uncertain prospects.
Although supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have sounded the alarm for decades about a potential war with Israel, there was a collective mood of surprise in Tehran at the timing and scale of Israel’s offensive actions.
Iran’s active participation in nuclear negotiations with America was regarded as a factor that would likely stall Israeli attacks on Iranian military facilities.
A similar mood of surprise surrounded overnight strikes. There was quiet optimism in Tehran that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or even Russian president Vladimir Putin would convince Trump of the destabilising consequences of a large-scale military attack.
Now that the worst-case scenario has unfolded, Iran is scrambling to coordinate an effective retaliatory response. The efficacy of Iran’s retaliation is limited by a dearth of external support. Although the Iranian military aided Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was little hope from Iranian experts I spoke to that the Kremlin would come to its aid. I heard conspiracies about how Putin will not help Iran because he is in thrall to the Russian-Jewish diaspora community in Israel.
This means that Iran’s response will likely be asymmetric and incremental. Despite bellicose rhetoric from Hezbollah secretary general Naim Qassem and senior leadership figures from Yemen’s Houthi group, Iran is hesitant about mobilising its proxy militias against the US. While a reported strike on American Ain al-Asad base in western Iraq last week showcased Iran’s ability to target U.S. military personnel, Tehran’s preferred strategy is to retaliate asymmetrically against Israel.
Given Israel’s economic prosperity and perceived low tolerance for casualties, Iran believes that it can coerce Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into standing down.
Iran’s belief that time is on its side is inextricably linked with historical memory. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Iranian forces faced down Iraqi chemical weapons attacks and clandestine American support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s military arsenal. These memories are being invoked by Iran’s hardliners and state media to create a pro-regime patriotic rally.
Due to the efficacy of Iranian state messaging and the collective sense of outrage against Israel and the West, the Iranian people are unlikely to foment a large-scale revolution against the regime. This does not mean that regime change in Iran is a complete fantasy.
The failure of Khamenei’s proxy militia and nuclear deterrence security strategies could convince dissenting hardliners within the IRGC to seize power through a coup d’etat. This scenario, which is being widely discussed in Tehran, could create a less predictable Iran that is determined to plug gaps in its conventional military arsenal and rebuild what remains of its uranium enrichment program.
This risk should be on the forefront of the minds of cheerleaders for Khamenei’s overthrow in the US, Israel and Europe. While America and Israel have taken major steps towards derailing Iran’s short-term threat potential, long-term risks persist. Further military escalations against Iran need to be carefully calibrated as they could unwittingly lead to a trade-off of short-term wins for long-term insecurity.
After days of sending mixed signals, president Donald Trump authorised large-scale military strikes on Iran’s Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan nuclear facilities. The strikes have potentially dealt crippling damage to Iran’s nuclear program and leave the Middle East in a position of grave uncertainty.
Trump has framed the attacks as an isolated military action aimed at compelling Iran to the bargaining table, but a harsh response from Tehran could instigate a broader regional war.
Since Israel embarked on Operation Rising Lion to demolish Iran’s nuclear program on June 13, I have engaged with numerous experts and sources in Tehran who are familiar with Iran’s security policy thinking. These discussions revealed Iran’s shock and outrage at Israel and at America actions, but also a steely resolve that made regime change in Iran and the long-term mitigation of the Iranian threat highly uncertain prospects.
Although supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have sounded the alarm for decades about a potential war with Israel, there was a collective mood of surprise in Tehran at the timing and scale of Israel’s offensive actions.
Iran’s active participation in nuclear negotiations with America was regarded as a factor that would likely stall Israeli attacks on Iranian military facilities.
A similar mood of surprise surrounded overnight strikes. There was quiet optimism in Tehran that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or even Russian president Vladimir Putin would convince Trump of the destabilising consequences of a large-scale military attack.
Now that the worst-case scenario has unfolded, Iran is scrambling to coordinate an effective retaliatory response. The efficacy of Iran’s retaliation is limited by a dearth of external support. Although the Iranian military aided Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was little hope from Iranian experts I spoke to that the Kremlin would come to its aid. I heard conspiracies about how Putin will not help Iran because he is in thrall to the Russian-Jewish diaspora community in Israel.
This means that Iran’s response will likely be asymmetric and incremental. Despite bellicose rhetoric from Hezbollah secretary general Naim Qassem and senior leadership figures from Yemen’s Houthi group, Iran is hesitant about mobilising its proxy militias against the US. While a reported strike on American Ain al-Asad base in western Iraq last week showcased Iran’s ability to target U.S. military personnel, Tehran’s preferred strategy is to retaliate asymmetrically against Israel.
Given Israel’s economic prosperity and perceived low tolerance for casualties, Iran believes that it can coerce Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into standing down.
Iran’s belief that time is on its side is inextricably linked with historical memory. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Iranian forces faced down Iraqi chemical weapons attacks and clandestine American support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s military arsenal. These memories are being invoked by Iran’s hardliners and state media to create a pro-regime patriotic rally.
Due to the efficacy of Iranian state messaging and the collective sense of outrage against Israel and the West, the Iranian people are unlikely to foment a large-scale revolution against the regime. This does not mean that regime change in Iran is a complete fantasy.
The failure of Khamenei’s proxy militia and nuclear deterrence security strategies could convince dissenting hardliners within the IRGC to seize power through a coup d’etat. This scenario, which is being widely discussed in Tehran, could create a less predictable Iran that is determined to plug gaps in its conventional military arsenal and rebuild what remains of its uranium enrichment program.
This risk should be on the forefront of the minds of cheerleaders for Khamenei’s overthrow in the US, Israel and Europe. While America and Israel have taken major steps towards derailing Iran’s short-term threat potential, long-term risks persist. Further military escalations against Iran need to be carefully calibrated as they could unwittingly lead to a trade-off of short-term wins for long-term insecurity.