India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states. This simple fact has cast a long and often ominous shadow over South Asia since the late 1990s, when both countries formally declared their nuclear capabilities. The fear, then as now, is not just that these weapons exist, but that in a moment of crisis or miscalculation, one side might be tempted to use them. And once that line is crossed, escalation control becomes very hard to manage.
So far, despite multiple flashpoints – Kargil, Mumbai, Balakot – the nuclear weapons of both nations have remained, thankfully, in their silos, bunkers, and bomb bays. And while we should never be complacent, there’s a good and comparatively recent reason to believe that the risk of nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan is less today than in the past.
That reason is quietly gliding beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean, in the form of India’s ballistic missile submarines. The first one went operational in 2016.
Nuclear powered submarines carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles – “bombers” in the Royal Navy, “boomers” in the US or SSBNs (Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear) – can stay hidden underwater for months at a time. If needed, they can launch nuclear missiles at a moment’s notice.
The key detail here is “hidden.” Unlike land-based missiles, which sit in known locations (however well-defended), or aircraft-carried weapons that can be tracked and potentially intercepted – and which cannot stay airborne for very long – an SSBN is essentially undetectable once it leaves port. Stealth is its superpower, and that makes all the difference.
When a country only has land-based or air-launched nuclear weapons, its deterrent is inherently vulnerable. An adversary might be tempted to launch a disarming first strike, to destroy all known nuclear launch sites in one go and hugely reduce or even completely prevent any retaliation. It’s a terrifying logic, but it’s there. If you believe the other side might attack first, the temptation is to pre-empt them. The huge nuclear arsenals of the Cold War sprang from this idea: both the US and the Soviets sought to maintain so many nukes that the other side could never eliminate them all in one go.
SSBNs changed all that. Once nuclear-powered submarines dive they become all but impossible to track, and they can stay down for months. That means any attacker who strikes against a nation with SSBNs on patrol, no matter how effective the first strike, knows with absolute certainty that retaliation is inevitable nonetheless. In nuclear deterrence terms, this is known as assured second-strike capability. In plain English: you hit us, we will hit you back, hard.
This is precisely why the presence of Indian SSBNs is quietly stabilising. For Pakistan, the knowledge that India now has a nuclear-armed submarine essentially closes the door on any notion of a successful first strike. There is no disarming India now. Assuming one of India’s two SSBNs is currently at sea, it can fire if India is attacked. Pakistan is very unlikely to make a nuclear first strike. The certainty of retaliation is too great, and the risks too catastrophic.
For India, too, possessing a survivable second-strike capability reduces the pressure to act preemptively in a crisis. There is no need to “use them or lose them” when you know that even if your land-based arsenal is destroyed, your submarines will get the job done. The temptation to strike first, which is the most dangerous impulse in any nuclear standoff, is dramatically reduced. India, too, is unlikely to make a first strike: it has no need to.
If neither nation is likely to strike first, neither is likely to strike.
The presence of India’s SSBNs, then, is a very positive thing.
India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states. This simple fact has cast a long and often ominous shadow over South Asia since the late 1990s, when both countries formally declared their nuclear capabilities. The fear, then as now, is not just that these weapons exist, but that in a moment of crisis or miscalculation, one side might be tempted to use them. And once that line is crossed, escalation control becomes very hard to manage.
So far, despite multiple flashpoints – Kargil, Mumbai, Balakot – the nuclear weapons of both nations have remained, thankfully, in their silos, bunkers, and bomb bays. And while we should never be complacent, there’s a good and comparatively recent reason to believe that the risk of nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan is less today than in the past.
That reason is quietly gliding beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean, in the form of India’s ballistic missile submarines. The first one went operational in 2016.
Nuclear powered submarines carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles – “bombers” in the Royal Navy, “boomers” in the US or SSBNs (Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear) – can stay hidden underwater for months at a time. If needed, they can launch nuclear missiles at a moment’s notice.
The key detail here is “hidden.” Unlike land-based missiles, which sit in known locations (however well-defended), or aircraft-carried weapons that can be tracked and potentially intercepted – and which cannot stay airborne for very long – an SSBN is essentially undetectable once it leaves port. Stealth is its superpower, and that makes all the difference.
When a country only has land-based or air-launched nuclear weapons, its deterrent is inherently vulnerable. An adversary might be tempted to launch a disarming first strike, to destroy all known nuclear launch sites in one go and hugely reduce or even completely prevent any retaliation. It’s a terrifying logic, but it’s there. If you believe the other side might attack first, the temptation is to pre-empt them. The huge nuclear arsenals of the Cold War sprang from this idea: both the US and the Soviets sought to maintain so many nukes that the other side could never eliminate them all in one go.
SSBNs changed all that. Once nuclear-powered submarines dive they become all but impossible to track, and they can stay down for months. That means any attacker who strikes against a nation with SSBNs on patrol, no matter how effective the first strike, knows with absolute certainty that retaliation is inevitable nonetheless. In nuclear deterrence terms, this is known as assured second-strike capability. In plain English: you hit us, we will hit you back, hard.
This is precisely why the presence of Indian SSBNs is quietly stabilising. For Pakistan, the knowledge that India now has a nuclear-armed submarine essentially closes the door on any notion of a successful first strike. There is no disarming India now. Assuming one of India’s two SSBNs is currently at sea, it can fire if India is attacked. Pakistan is very unlikely to make a nuclear first strike. The certainty of retaliation is too great, and the risks too catastrophic.
For India, too, possessing a survivable second-strike capability reduces the pressure to act preemptively in a crisis. There is no need to “use them or lose them” when you know that even if your land-based arsenal is destroyed, your submarines will get the job done. The temptation to strike first, which is the most dangerous impulse in any nuclear standoff, is dramatically reduced. India, too, is unlikely to make a first strike: it has no need to.
If neither nation is likely to strike first, neither is likely to strike.
The presence of India’s SSBNs, then, is a very positive thing.