Keir Starmer’s Government, in its desperation for growth, has decided to turn a blind eye to the scale of the threat to the UK and other democracies from the growing power of China.
As successive ministers from the Chancellor downward have rushed to China to beg for investment, it has become apparent that they have lost all sense of national security.
But still the Government seems to have failed to have understood the need to protect our critical national infrastructure.
In the middle of August, with the House of Parliament in recess, Defra officials were briefing that the Secretary of State, Steve Reid, was minded to take Thames Water into a Special Administration Regime (SAR). That would to all intents and purposes mean that he was nationalising Thames Water. Whilst this would offer a way to deal with the nearly £17bn debt which has been loaded onto the company, it would of course leave taxpayers liable. That is why he previously denied that he was planning to do any such thing.
Things then got more complicated. Journalists were told a few days later that it was highly unlikely that the Department would keep the company in its SAR for any time at all, preferring to offload it onto a private bidder. That was the signal for CKI, a Hong Kong based company, to immediately make it clear that they would be interested in bidding for Thames Water if the Government sold it on.
The Government should not consider CKI, whatever the final decision on Thames. After all, Thames Water is a part of our critical national infrastructure. For if CKI were allowed to take control of Thames Water, it would mean that one Chinese Company, now subject to the Chinese Communist Party government’s National Security and National Intelligence Laws, would own huge swathes of our critical national infrastructure.
It is worth reminding ourselves that China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law (NIL) imposes various intelligence-sharing requirements on all organisations and companies in China to “support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence efforts”, including through data sharing with China’s intelligence services.
Frighteningly CKI already owns UK Power Networks, the UK’s largest electricity distribution network serving 8.3 million homes and businesses in London, the South East and East of England. It also owns Northumbrian Water which supplies water to 2.7 million people in the North East and South of England, and Northern Gas Networks, one of the eight major gas distribution networks in the UK, delivering gas to 2.9 million homes and businesses. Also in CKI’s portfolio is Wales and West Gas Networks, another of the UK’s major gas distribution networks, serving 2.5 million households in Wales and the South West of England, and Seabank Power, which owns and operates Seabank Power Station near Bristol. Other acquisitions include Phoenix Energy, Northern Ireland’s main gas distribution network, UU Solar which owns some 70 smaller renewable generation projects, and 32 onshore wind farms previously owned by Aviva Investors.
On top of that, there is the Vodafone-Three merger. CKI will own 49 per cent of the new company following the Vodafone and Three merger.
The truth is that there is no such thing as a truly private company in China as the Chinese government has ultimate control. Victor Li Tzar-kuoi, Chairman and Executive Director of CKI, serves as a member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of the People’s Republic of China (CPPCC). He is a Chinese Communist Party adviser, not a normal businessman.
The government must defend our critical national infrastructure against malign actors and the threat of countries such as China. CKI must not bet permitted to acquire Thames Water, and its already extensive British infrastructure holdings must be reconsidered.
Keir Starmer’s Government, in its desperation for growth, has decided to turn a blind eye to the scale of the threat to the UK and other democracies from the growing power of China.
As successive ministers from the Chancellor downward have rushed to China to beg for investment, it has become apparent that they have lost all sense of national security.
But still the Government seems to have failed to have understood the need to protect our critical national infrastructure.
In the middle of August, with the House of Parliament in recess, Defra officials were briefing that the Secretary of State, Steve Reid, was minded to take Thames Water into a Special Administration Regime (SAR). That would to all intents and purposes mean that he was nationalising Thames Water. Whilst this would offer a way to deal with the nearly £17bn debt which has been loaded onto the company, it would of course leave taxpayers liable. That is why he previously denied that he was planning to do any such thing.
Things then got more complicated. Journalists were told a few days later that it was highly unlikely that the Department would keep the company in its SAR for any time at all, preferring to offload it onto a private bidder. That was the signal for CKI, a Hong Kong based company, to immediately make it clear that they would be interested in bidding for Thames Water if the Government sold it on.
The Government should not consider CKI, whatever the final decision on Thames. After all, Thames Water is a part of our critical national infrastructure. For if CKI were allowed to take control of Thames Water, it would mean that one Chinese Company, now subject to the Chinese Communist Party government’s National Security and National Intelligence Laws, would own huge swathes of our critical national infrastructure.
It is worth reminding ourselves that China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law (NIL) imposes various intelligence-sharing requirements on all organisations and companies in China to “support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence efforts”, including through data sharing with China’s intelligence services.
Frighteningly CKI already owns UK Power Networks, the UK’s largest electricity distribution network serving 8.3 million homes and businesses in London, the South East and East of England. It also owns Northumbrian Water which supplies water to 2.7 million people in the North East and South of England, and Northern Gas Networks, one of the eight major gas distribution networks in the UK, delivering gas to 2.9 million homes and businesses. Also in CKI’s portfolio is Wales and West Gas Networks, another of the UK’s major gas distribution networks, serving 2.5 million households in Wales and the South West of England, and Seabank Power, which owns and operates Seabank Power Station near Bristol. Other acquisitions include Phoenix Energy, Northern Ireland’s main gas distribution network, UU Solar which owns some 70 smaller renewable generation projects, and 32 onshore wind farms previously owned by Aviva Investors.
On top of that, there is the Vodafone-Three merger. CKI will own 49 per cent of the new company following the Vodafone and Three merger.
The truth is that there is no such thing as a truly private company in China as the Chinese government has ultimate control. Victor Li Tzar-kuoi, Chairman and Executive Director of CKI, serves as a member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of the People’s Republic of China (CPPCC). He is a Chinese Communist Party adviser, not a normal businessman.
The government must defend our critical national infrastructure against malign actors and the threat of countries such as China. CKI must not bet permitted to acquire Thames Water, and its already extensive British infrastructure holdings must be reconsidered.