Grave dangers lurk in the unseemly, ill-advised rush toward negotiations to resolve Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. The most obvious risks stem from Donald Trump’s u-turn in America’s position, conceding even before talks begin that Ukraine will not regain all its territory, not join Nato, and not receive US or Nato security guarantees.
But two other dangerous ideas, wrongly but commonly taken for granted in Russia, the West, and Ukraine itself, are also perilous. The first is that, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, we will see an accompanying interim ceasefire along the current battlefield front lines. Second is that as-yet-unspecified “peacekeepers” will deploy for purposes as-yet-unspecified, other than the diaphanous, undefined notion of “keeping the peace.”
Those supporting Ukraine and Western security interests (Trump not currently numbered among them) must slow down. Hasty, piecemeal steps can have dramatic long-term consequences unforeseen by any of the parties. Even if made only ad interim, they can assume a life of their own, creating dangers for the unwary and opportunities for the malign. In the political chaos now enveloping the West, unleashed by Trump’s affection for Vladimir Putin and Europe’s ensuing panic, Ukraine faces extreme danger. We can be certain that Russia is plotting its course with great stealth and precision. Ukraine must do the same.
Consider the two prevailing assumptions of ceasefire-plus-negotiations and peacekeepers. While coupling the opening of negotiations with a ceasefire is not unusual, neither is it graven in stone the two must go together. Whether a ceasefire is advisable in the context of negotiations is its own question, to be answered by the facts and circumstances confronting the combatant parties. Moscow will make its own assessment, but from Kyiv’s perspective, agreeing to a ceasefire carries major, perhaps permanently disabling, risks.
Some argue a ceasefire is required to avoid ongoing combat impeding the talks, and because of the devastation already caused. But positive results are not invariably guaranteed by the joinder. Ukraine advocates would do well to consider the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy during the Chinese Civil War and the overlapping fighting of World War II. During this time, talks between the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling party continued, much to the Communists’ advantage because they kept their own bigger strategic picture always in mind. Chou En-lai described their strategy as “talk, talk, talk; “fight, fight, fight.”
Since Ukraine is the aggrieved party, there is no merit in conceding, even temporarily, that Russia may of right hold any Ukrainian territory. Rejecting a ceasefire during negotiations means front lines will remain contested, thereby preventing formation of a readily discernible line for partition, perhaps permanent, of Ukraine. This approach will necessarily require real European resolve to continue military assistance required for Kyiv to continue fighting, even as US support likely diminishes or even disappears.
A ceasefire is directly related to the question of peacekeepers, whether from Nato, the UN, or an ad hoc coalition.
“Peacekeeping” has so much allure that Westerners now talking about it have not defined, publicly at least, either the precise mission, or what the peacekeepers’ rules of engagement will be. These are potentially fatal omissions, not just for the peacekeepers themselves, but for Ukraine.
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations, such as along the Golan Heights; between Israel and Lebanon; or in Cyprus, attempt to separate the combatants and deter reigniting the underlying conflict. The history of these and other UN peacekeeping deployments demonstrates the risks to Ukraine. The UN in Cyprus has simply frozen the island’s partition between its own government and a Turkish puppet regime. In Lebanon, the UN has never restrained terrorists like Hezbollah or prevented either side from crossing the border at will. On the Golan Heights, Israel has essentially taken control of it all, for good and sufficient reasons to protect its civilian population. The rules of engagement for the peacekeepers also matter. In the UN operations just noted, the rules permit peacekeepers to use force only in their own self-defence. This is the default position for almost all UN peace deployments since their inception.
The alternative is rules of engagement allowing peacekeepers to use force in aid of their mission, i.e., to keep the peace, meaning using force against any party that violates the ceasefire. Are European countries now considering troop contributions, including the UK, prepared for such rules of engagement, with their attendant risks of actual fighting and casualties? Or are they only considering passive observers, who preside over a disengagement of forces and report violations, but little more.
The “observer” peacekeeping model is definitely not in Ukraine’s interest. A ceasefire along existing front lines is bad enough, but deploying peacekeepers will almost certainly freeze those lines, risking Ukraine’s permanent partition, with roughly 20 per cent now under Russian control. Is this what Ukraine and its friends really contemplate? I hope not.
John Bolton served as the United States National Security Advisor
Grave dangers lurk in the unseemly, ill-advised rush toward negotiations to resolve Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. The most obvious risks stem from Donald Trump’s u-turn in America’s position, conceding even before talks begin that Ukraine will not regain all its territory, not join Nato, and not receive US or Nato security guarantees.
But two other dangerous ideas, wrongly but commonly taken for granted in Russia, the West, and Ukraine itself, are also perilous. The first is that, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, we will see an accompanying interim ceasefire along the current battlefield front lines. Second is that as-yet-unspecified “peacekeepers” will deploy for purposes as-yet-unspecified, other than the diaphanous, undefined notion of “keeping the peace.”
Those supporting Ukraine and Western security interests (Trump not currently numbered among them) must slow down. Hasty, piecemeal steps can have dramatic long-term consequences unforeseen by any of the parties. Even if made only ad interim, they can assume a life of their own, creating dangers for the unwary and opportunities for the malign. In the political chaos now enveloping the West, unleashed by Trump’s affection for Vladimir Putin and Europe’s ensuing panic, Ukraine faces extreme danger. We can be certain that Russia is plotting its course with great stealth and precision. Ukraine must do the same.
Consider the two prevailing assumptions of ceasefire-plus-negotiations and peacekeepers. While coupling the opening of negotiations with a ceasefire is not unusual, neither is it graven in stone the two must go together. Whether a ceasefire is advisable in the context of negotiations is its own question, to be answered by the facts and circumstances confronting the combatant parties. Moscow will make its own assessment, but from Kyiv’s perspective, agreeing to a ceasefire carries major, perhaps permanently disabling, risks.
Some argue a ceasefire is required to avoid ongoing combat impeding the talks, and because of the devastation already caused. But positive results are not invariably guaranteed by the joinder. Ukraine advocates would do well to consider the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy during the Chinese Civil War and the overlapping fighting of World War II. During this time, talks between the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling party continued, much to the Communists’ advantage because they kept their own bigger strategic picture always in mind. Chou En-lai described their strategy as “talk, talk, talk; “fight, fight, fight.”
Since Ukraine is the aggrieved party, there is no merit in conceding, even temporarily, that Russia may of right hold any Ukrainian territory. Rejecting a ceasefire during negotiations means front lines will remain contested, thereby preventing formation of a readily discernible line for partition, perhaps permanent, of Ukraine. This approach will necessarily require real European resolve to continue military assistance required for Kyiv to continue fighting, even as US support likely diminishes or even disappears.
A ceasefire is directly related to the question of peacekeepers, whether from Nato, the UN, or an ad hoc coalition.
“Peacekeeping” has so much allure that Westerners now talking about it have not defined, publicly at least, either the precise mission, or what the peacekeepers’ rules of engagement will be. These are potentially fatal omissions, not just for the peacekeepers themselves, but for Ukraine.
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations, such as along the Golan Heights; between Israel and Lebanon; or in Cyprus, attempt to separate the combatants and deter reigniting the underlying conflict. The history of these and other UN peacekeeping deployments demonstrates the risks to Ukraine. The UN in Cyprus has simply frozen the island’s partition between its own government and a Turkish puppet regime. In Lebanon, the UN has never restrained terrorists like Hezbollah or prevented either side from crossing the border at will. On the Golan Heights, Israel has essentially taken control of it all, for good and sufficient reasons to protect its civilian population. The rules of engagement for the peacekeepers also matter. In the UN operations just noted, the rules permit peacekeepers to use force only in their own self-defence. This is the default position for almost all UN peace deployments since their inception.
The alternative is rules of engagement allowing peacekeepers to use force in aid of their mission, i.e., to keep the peace, meaning using force against any party that violates the ceasefire. Are European countries now considering troop contributions, including the UK, prepared for such rules of engagement, with their attendant risks of actual fighting and casualties? Or are they only considering passive observers, who preside over a disengagement of forces and report violations, but little more.
The “observer” peacekeeping model is definitely not in Ukraine’s interest. A ceasefire along existing front lines is bad enough, but deploying peacekeepers will almost certainly freeze those lines, risking Ukraine’s permanent partition, with roughly 20 per cent now under Russian control. Is this what Ukraine and its friends really contemplate? I hope not.
John Bolton served as the United States National Security Advisor