If the recent history of European military cooperation is anything to go by, Moscow has little to fear from the proposed deployment of a motley collection of European troops to safeguard Ukraine’s security.
In their desperate efforts to curry favour with US president Donald Trump, various European leaders have mooted the idea of sending some, as yet undefined, military contingent to keep the peace in the event of a lasting ceasefire being implemented between Kyiv and Moscow.
Sir Keir Starmer’s attempts to apply a sticking plaster to the edifice of Britain’s crumbling Armed Forces on the eve of his visit to Washington, by diverting funds from the foreign aid budget, was clearly designed to give him a veneer of credibility before his meeting with Trump.
Having pledged UK support for any future military operation to guarantee Ukraine’s security, he needs to reassure the sceptical Trump administration that our Armed Forces still retain the ability to conduct such a role. French president Emmanuel Macron is similarly keen on the idea of dispatching a European force to Ukraine, telling Trump this week that he was working with Starmer to send troops to the region.
“Not to go to the front line, not to go in confrontation, but to be in some locations, being defined by the treaty, as a presence to maintain this peace and our collective credibility,” the French leader told Fox News.
Several European countries have expressed reservations about the Starmer/Macron peace initiative, not least their vagueness about the role such a force would fulfil.
Of equal concern should be the dismal record of Europe’s military powers of working effectively together on major security challenges – as was evident the last time the European powers contributed to a major overseas military operation, in Afghanistan.
At its height, the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan, set up in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks to bring some semblance of stability to the war-torn nation, comprised significant contributions from all the main European powers.
The total number of British forces eventually reached around 10,000, in support of the US-led operation. Germany sent 5,000 troops, Italy nearly 4,000 while the 4,000-strong French contingent included large numbers of special forces.
The total Nato forces operating in Afghanistan – which is roughly the same size as Ukraine – reached a peak number of around 130,000. But the ability of the different forces – especially the Europeans – to work together to achieve the same policy objectives was virtually non-existent.
From the outset, the Italians were hampered by constraints imposed by the their country’s government, which prevented them from participating in the battle against the Taliban-led insurgency, while the German group was so risk averse it rarely ventured out of its heavily defended base in the northern district around Mazar-i-Sharif. The French, meanwhile, fulfilled a peripheral role until their then president Nicolas Sarkozy unilaterally ended their involvement, thereby precipitating the collapse of the entire mission.
Is there any evidence that the Europeans are better equipped now for a Ukraine mission?
With no guarantees that the Trump administration will authorise US involvement in such an operation, the onus would be on the Europeans to provide their own command and logistics infrastructure, something that is badly lacking given their pre-Trump disinclination to take their defence responsibilities seriously.
While Nato has made significant efforts in recent years to improve operational inter-operability between the armies, navies and air forces of the alliance’s European members, it remains questionable whether they could function without the support of the American military.
Concerns about Trump’s long-term commitment to Nato, though, have prompted some to argue in favour of the European Union resurrecting its plans to establish its own defence and security operation to rival the Transatlantic alliance.
If we can no longer rely on Washington to protect our interests, then the EU should take on the role – or so the argument goes.
This is short-sighted. Trump is a challenging ally but that does not mean the EU should turn its back on Nato and establish its own military force.
Trump’s criticism of Europe is based on its failure to take seriously its defence obligations, both in terms of financial contributions and military effectiveness.
If the recent history of European military cooperation is anything to go by, Moscow has little to fear from the proposed deployment of a motley collection of European troops to safeguard Ukraine’s security.
In their desperate efforts to curry favour with US president Donald Trump, various European leaders have mooted the idea of sending some, as yet undefined, military contingent to keep the peace in the event of a lasting ceasefire being implemented between Kyiv and Moscow.
Sir Keir Starmer’s attempts to apply a sticking plaster to the edifice of Britain’s crumbling Armed Forces on the eve of his visit to Washington, by diverting funds from the foreign aid budget, was clearly designed to give him a veneer of credibility before his meeting with Trump.
Having pledged UK support for any future military operation to guarantee Ukraine’s security, he needs to reassure the sceptical Trump administration that our Armed Forces still retain the ability to conduct such a role. French president Emmanuel Macron is similarly keen on the idea of dispatching a European force to Ukraine, telling Trump this week that he was working with Starmer to send troops to the region.
“Not to go to the front line, not to go in confrontation, but to be in some locations, being defined by the treaty, as a presence to maintain this peace and our collective credibility,” the French leader told Fox News.
Several European countries have expressed reservations about the Starmer/Macron peace initiative, not least their vagueness about the role such a force would fulfil.
Of equal concern should be the dismal record of Europe’s military powers of working effectively together on major security challenges – as was evident the last time the European powers contributed to a major overseas military operation, in Afghanistan.
At its height, the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan, set up in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks to bring some semblance of stability to the war-torn nation, comprised significant contributions from all the main European powers.
The total number of British forces eventually reached around 10,000, in support of the US-led operation. Germany sent 5,000 troops, Italy nearly 4,000 while the 4,000-strong French contingent included large numbers of special forces.
The total Nato forces operating in Afghanistan – which is roughly the same size as Ukraine – reached a peak number of around 130,000. But the ability of the different forces – especially the Europeans – to work together to achieve the same policy objectives was virtually non-existent.
From the outset, the Italians were hampered by constraints imposed by the their country’s government, which prevented them from participating in the battle against the Taliban-led insurgency, while the German group was so risk averse it rarely ventured out of its heavily defended base in the northern district around Mazar-i-Sharif. The French, meanwhile, fulfilled a peripheral role until their then president Nicolas Sarkozy unilaterally ended their involvement, thereby precipitating the collapse of the entire mission.
Is there any evidence that the Europeans are better equipped now for a Ukraine mission?
With no guarantees that the Trump administration will authorise US involvement in such an operation, the onus would be on the Europeans to provide their own command and logistics infrastructure, something that is badly lacking given their pre-Trump disinclination to take their defence responsibilities seriously.
While Nato has made significant efforts in recent years to improve operational inter-operability between the armies, navies and air forces of the alliance’s European members, it remains questionable whether they could function without the support of the American military.
Concerns about Trump’s long-term commitment to Nato, though, have prompted some to argue in favour of the European Union resurrecting its plans to establish its own defence and security operation to rival the Transatlantic alliance.
If we can no longer rely on Washington to protect our interests, then the EU should take on the role – or so the argument goes.
This is short-sighted. Trump is a challenging ally but that does not mean the EU should turn its back on Nato and establish its own military force.
Trump’s criticism of Europe is based on its failure to take seriously its defence obligations, both in terms of financial contributions and military effectiveness.