On Monday, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius decided that a German Navy task group (of two ships) returning to Europe from the Indo-Pacific would not run the Houthi missile gauntlet in the southern Red Sea. They will instead go south around the Cape of Good Hope, the southern tip of Africa.
There are many reasons for this decision, some sensible, some questionable, but let’s start with one unavoidable truth – the optics are horrible. A Nato and EU naval task group is unwilling to pass by a terrorist militia: unwilling to confront the risk that unarmed merchant mariners face in those waters every day when they are ordered to go through by their owners. I guarantee the German sailors will be livid about this – they’ll know how it looks, and how easily it could be avoided.
I won’t dwell on the politics of this decision but the Germans have been part of the EU naval task group countering Houthi aggression and reassuring shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea before. Suffice it to say, this decision to avoid the area is not a pro/anti-Israel thing. It will still have been decided at the political level.
Politicians view risks differently to those who are asked to run them and this is not new. Earlier this year, the British foreign office stopped our carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth from deploying to the Red Sea. The Royal Navy would have gladly gone – it’s their job, and back then with a US carrier in the area the risks would have been minimal. Today, fissures are visible between the White House attitude to the Houthi problem and the US Navy’s preferred stance. I know which one I’d back.
There is probably an essay on how the disconnect between the political/diplomatic preference and that of the armed forces actually increases risk, but that’s for another time. For now I’ll summarise it thus: if you care that much about protecting your sailors, fund and resource your navy properly.
This is where we come to the thorny problem of warships which are not designed or equipped for full-on war – an issue faced by most modern navies.
On Monday, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius decided that a German Navy task group (of two ships) returning to Europe from the Indo-Pacific would not run the Houthi missile gauntlet in the southern Red Sea. They will instead go south around the Cape of Good Hope, the southern tip of Africa.
There are many reasons for this decision, some sensible, some questionable, but let’s start with one unavoidable truth – the optics are horrible. A Nato and EU naval task group is unwilling to pass by a terrorist militia: unwilling to confront the risk that unarmed merchant mariners face in those waters every day when they are ordered to go through by their owners. I guarantee the German sailors will be livid about this – they’ll know how it looks, and how easily it could be avoided.
I won’t dwell on the politics of this decision but the Germans have been part of the EU naval task group countering Houthi aggression and reassuring shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea before. Suffice it to say, this decision to avoid the area is not a pro/anti-Israel thing. It will still have been decided at the political level.
Politicians view risks differently to those who are asked to run them and this is not new. Earlier this year, the British foreign office stopped our carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth from deploying to the Red Sea. The Royal Navy would have gladly gone – it’s their job, and back then with a US carrier in the area the risks would have been minimal. Today, fissures are visible between the White House attitude to the Houthi problem and the US Navy’s preferred stance. I know which one I’d back.
There is probably an essay on how the disconnect between the political/diplomatic preference and that of the armed forces actually increases risk, but that’s for another time. For now I’ll summarise it thus: if you care that much about protecting your sailors, fund and resource your navy properly.
This is where we come to the thorny problem of warships which are not designed or equipped for full-on war – an issue faced by most modern navies.