In every corner of the country and around the world a relentless competition is taking place between U.S. counterintelligence services and the intelligence services of foreign powers. The contest isn’t well understood because it takes place beyond the view of most Americans, but its outcome is hugely consequential to America’s future.
Language in the Intelligence Authorization Act recently passed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence would take necessary steps to shore-up American counterintelligence.
Championed by Rep. Rick Crawford (R-Ark.), the counterintelligence portion of the bill is known as the Strategic Enhancement of Counterintelligence and Unifying Reform Efforts, or SECURE Act.
For too long our nation’s technologies have been stolen and our military information compromised by foreign intelligence services that found ways to evade American counterintelligence. These losses feel abstract, but they matter to everyday Americans.
When espionage allows a foreign country to anticipate our military actions, gain access to our trade secrets and obtain our advanced research, it can target service members, compete unfairly with American companies and defeat or outperform our military systems. Espionage threatens the lives of Americans, limits our ability to deter and defeat enemies and undermines our economy.
The defensive failures of American counterintelligence are important but so is the failure to act offensively. One of the most important impacts of language in the Intelligence Authorization Act is to redefine counterintelligence in federal law from something that “protects” to something that also deters, disrupts, investigates and exploits.
The addition of these words sets a clear expectation that protecting American information isn’t enough and pushes the use of counterintelligence to the maximum extent of its capabilities.
Based on the number of high-profile arrests for espionage that appear in the news, Americans might assume that we’re winning the competition against foreign intelligence services.
Army Counterintelligence, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, The Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the FBI are quick to call press conferences after espionage arrests that offer a picture of a counterintelligence system that’s working well.
Espionage cases are complex and the agencies and agents who resolve them deserve the nation’s admiration and gratitude. But that doesn’t change the fact that every high-profile arrest is a success following failure.
An arrest means that counterintelligence has failed to deter and, for a time, to detect the recruitment of an American by a foreign intelligence service. In some cases, it represents a failure of operational imagination, if the arrest neutralizes a threat when other options are available.
One reason counterintelligence services tend to focus on investigation and neutralization is because the U.S. concentrates its counterintelligence services in law enforcement.
This offers advantages but also drawbacks, one of which is the cultural predisposition of police organizations toward arrest and prosecution. This makes perfect sense for organizations built to solve criminal cases. Counterintelligence organizations are built to do more.
Law enforcement prepares for tasks associated with its unique functions. This is useful for police agencies but can be a distraction for counterintelligence organizations whose activities more closely resemble those of intelligence agencies.
There are legitimate reasons for counterintelligence organizations to spend time on police tasks, but it’s important to recognize that no one in Moscow or Beijing cares if American counterintelligence personnel are carrying guns or have police lights on their cars. Many in Russian and Chinese intelligence services, however, care if these personnel are running effective operations.
The SECURE Act wouldn’t separate counterintelligence from law enforcement, but it would restructure the community in useful ways. The creation of a director of counterintelligence with the power to direct the actions of the individual services would help ensure a focus on the more offensive components of counterintelligence alongside investigations.
This ability to direct rather than just recommend and coordinate is a significant change. It can be used to compel cooperation between the various services, closing seams that are exploitable by foreign services who understand our vulnerabilities.
Absent this centralized direction, the individual counterintelligence services prioritize the equities of their organizations when they respond to a threat or undertake offensive activities. This is sometimes effective but not always efficient and sometimes doesn’t work at all.
Counterintelligence can be a powerful force for the national good when its practitioners employ the full range of its capabilities. It can control the perceptions of adversaries, preserve America’s technological advantage, safeguard the intellectual property of American companies and preserve our ability to employ operational surprise.
Achieving these ends requires a cadre of counterintelligence professionals, collaboration among the various services, the rapid adoption of new technologies and an offensive mindset. The SECURE act takes meaningful steps toward these goals, and the nation will benefit if its provisions become law.
Colin Pascal is a retired Army counterintelligence special agent who commanded the U.S. Army Special Investigations Detachment and served as director of operations for the U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity.