When the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Australia recently announced they would recognize Palestine as a state, each government framed the decision as a step toward peace, insisting it was meant to revive the long-stalled two-state solution.
The idea is familiar: If both Israel and Palestine are recognized as sovereign entities, then perhaps the pathway to peaceful coexistence might reopen.
The reactions were predictable. Supporters praised the move as an overdue act of moral courage, a gesture toward Palestinian self-determination. Critics condemned it as a dangerous reward for terrorism, since Hamas rules Gaza and remains designated as a terrorist organization by the very countries extending recognition.
Both sides rehearsed their talking points, debating whether recognition strengthens the cause of peace or undermines it by legitimizing extremists. But whether recognition legitimizes terrorism is almost beside the issue. The deeper question is what recognition actually accomplishes.
Diplomatic recognition carries real consequences. It opens doors to international institutions, treaties and foreign aid. It conveys legitimacy, whether those bestowing it admit it or not.
In this case, recognition is presented as a symbolic gesture to advance peace, but the symbolism only works if Palestinians actually desire the framework being advanced. The problem is that history suggests the opposite.
Hamas was not imposed on the Palestinians. In 2006, Hamas rose to power in elections judged by international observers to be free and fair. Thus, they chose a party that openly rejects Israel’s right to exist and built its identity around confrontation. Decades later, polling still shows significant support for Hamas.
It’s reasonable to suspect the figures are skewed, as few in Gaza could safely admit opposing Hamas. Yet even with that caveat, the reality is plain: Palestinians either support Hamas or tolerate it.
A willingness to embrace extremists is not new. Palestinian leadership has rejected major two-state offers time and again.
In 1947, Arab leaders turned down the United Nations partition plan that would have created Arab and Jewish states. In 2000, Yasser Arafat walked away from the Camp David talks, despite being offered nearly all the territory Palestinians claimed. In 2008, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed an even more generous proposal from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
Polling confirms that this rejectionism runs deeper than the choices of leaders. Today, only about 40 percent of Palestinians say they support a two-state solution. That number climbs to around 60 percent if the question is phrased differently, as support for a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders without explicit mention of Israel.
In other words, Palestinians are fine with having their own recognized state, but they do not approve recognizing Israel alongside them. They want sovereignty, but not coexistence.
This is why recognition may not even work as a gift to Palestinians. By recognizing Palestine within a two-state framework, Western governments are forcing upon Palestinians an outcome they have never accepted.
Those who envision a single state “from the river to the sea” might not see recognition as a step forward, but as diametrically opposed to their aims.
The consequences of this are troubling. Recognition without conditions risks emboldening Hamas, rewarding rejectionism and signaling that terrorism does not disqualify a movement from legitimacy.
And history suggests this pattern is not an accident. Palestinian factions have often embraced extremism.
In 1970, Palestinian militants attempted to overthrow Jordan’s monarchy in the bloody conflict remembered as Black September. In Egypt, Palestinian groups used the country as a staging ground for terrorism until Cairo expelled them. Time after time, Palestinians have chosen confrontation over coexistence.
Yet the paradox runs even deeper. Recognition could actually backfire against Palestinians themselves. By imposing the two-state model, the West is not honoring their wishes but dictating their future.
Rather than empowering them, it risks deepening their disillusionment by sending the message that the international community has decided what they are getting, regardless of what they actually want. For people who have built their political identity around resistance and rejection, this could harden rejectionism further.
The two-state solution has become less about Palestinian aspirations and more about Western self-image. It allows foreign leaders to feel bold and humane without grappling with the messy realities on the ground.
It is easier to imagine that both peoples long for peace than to confront the evidence that at least one side has repeatedly chosen otherwise. In that sense, recognition is less about helping Palestinians and more about helping Western governments reassure themselves.
The recognition of Palestine by Western governments is being sold as an act of moral clarity. But morality that ignores reality is a dangerous illusion. Whether or not recognition legitimizes terrorism is almost irrelevant.
At minimum, recognition should deliver results. Instead, it risks accomplishing little beyond generating applause from sympathetic voters while provoking anger from everyone else.
Scott C. Mallett is a writer and college professor specializing in political and cultural commentary.