When President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet later this month at the APEC summit in South Korea, they should attempt to reach a new Taiwan consensus.
The current “One China” framework has been a stunning success. It has kept the peace in Asia for half a century and is the political bedrock of U.S.-China relations. But it is threatened by a pervasive sense in both Washington and Beijing that its terms are routinely violated. “One China” is trending toward obsolescence, and that eventuality is the likeliest path to war between the U.S. and China.
President Trump said in his inaugural address that his administration’s success would be judged by “the wars we never get into.” Although Xi calls Taiwan reunification an “inevitable requirement” of China’s “great rejuvenation,” his legacy will be judged primarily by his ability to provide better economic outcomes for Chinese on his side of the Strait. Facing the specter of great power war, the two leaders should reopen substantive talks on Taiwan for the first time since 1982. This need not entail American capitulation or abandonment of Taiwan. Instead, it could revitalize the original understanding, keep the peace and protect Taiwan.
“One China” is founded on ambiguity, beginning with the term itself. The U.S. recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, but merely “acknowledges” the People’s Republic of China position that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” The U.S. declares it “has no intention of pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan.’”
The U.S. maintains exclusively “unofficial relations” with Taiwan but still sells it weapons — with the objective to gradually reduce such sales. It promises to maintain the capacity to defend Taiwan but does not commit to doing so. China agrees to “strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question,” but does not foreswear the use of force.
Every pillar of this structure rests on the coexistence of potentially incompatible expectations. Today, reconciling those expectations has become an unmanageable task. China has an overwhelming military capacity to intimidate Taiwan and perhaps also to launch a successful invasion. It conducts increasingly aggressive military exercises near and inside Taiwanese airspace and in 2022 staged a simulated naval and air quarantine.
On Taiwan, President Lai Ching-te has called China a “foreign hostile force” and Taiwan “an independent country.” Meanwhile, U.S. actions often signal support for such statements. In 2023 the U.S. resumed direct military subsidies to Taiwan for the first time since 1979. U.S. officials have admitted to stationing 500 troops on the island and increasingly identify Taiwan’s defense as critical to America’s broader Asia strategy. Diplomatically, Cabinet-level visits to Taiwan and successive House Speakers‘ meeting with Taiwan’s president stretch the definition of an “unofficial” relationship.
These developments undermine the key assurances of “One China” — that China will strive for peaceful reunification and that America will not pursue Taiwan independence.
Today, diplomatic statements about a “One China” consensus sustain more the pretense than the reality of an understanding. That matters because Taiwan cuts to the heart of Chinese national interests. Xi calls it “the core of China’s core interests.” The abrogation of “One China” would destroy the foundation of U.S.-China relations and incentivize escalatory measures that could lead to war.
Even if war were averted, U.S.-China relations would deteriorate to levels of enmity not seen since the Cold War. Agreements on technology, regional security, narcotics and trade issues would be off the table.
Chinese officials regularly ask the U.S. to change its formal non-support for Taiwan independence to “opposition.” Xi is reportedly pushing Trump to adopt this language at their upcoming meeting. He should consider making that change as part of a larger bargain. Trump could also offer to cease freedom of navigation exercises by U.S. military vessels through the Taiwan Strait or permanently withdraw U.S. troops from Taiwan. In return, the U.S. should ask China to renounce the threat or use of force against Taiwan, conditional on Taiwan refraining from declaring independence.
This commitment — or others, such as ending Chinese military exercises in the Strait and incursions of Taiwanese airspace — would reduce the primary source of U.S. strategic mistrust towards China: that China intends to invade Taiwan. A deal would say nothing about America’s willingness to defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion or its commitment to robust, unofficial relations with the Taiwanese government. Xi may not be willing to offer satisfactory concessions. But given how central Taiwan is to China’s foreign policy agenda, U.S. leaders should test the waters.
There are precedents for revising the terms of “One China.” When the third U.S.-China communiqué was signed in 1982, President Reagan interpreted America’s commitment to reduce military support to Taiwan as “conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC,” which was not explicit in the actual agreement.
In 1998, President Clinton broke precedent to declare that the U.S. “does not support” Taiwan independence. He was pilloried for “selling out Taiwan.” But today, that language is a core feature of “One China.”
Similarly, China has expanded the conditions under which it may use force against Taiwan to include “refusal of Taiwan to reach peaceful reunification” and the possibility of peaceful reunification being “completely exhausted.”
The core pillars of “One China” remain sound: U.S. recognition of Beijing as the sole authority in China, mutual aspiration to a peaceful resolution to cross-Strait relations, robust unofficial U.S. ties with Taiwan, and U.S. refusal to commit for or against the defense of Taiwan.
A successful revision would reassure China that its interests in Taiwan are not under threat and America that a Chinese invasion is not on the horizon. That trade would be an excellent basis for a more stable regional order. “One China” as it exists today is past its shelf life, but a renegotiation of terms could save it.
Joshua Henderson is a doctoral student and lead China policy researcher at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Evan Sankey is a Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute focusing on U.S. foreign policy toward China and East Asia.