Last month, OceanGate’s Titanic tourist submersible, Titan, experienced a catastrophic failure.
Several factors, including cost-saving measures, unconventional design choices, and possibly neglecting proper testing and certification, appear to have contributed to this disaster.
According to engineers who spoke to the New York Times last Friday, the sub’s design decisions, which were non-standard, might have been driven by a desire to maximize profitability from wealthy tourists seeking to explore the Titanic’s wreckage.
One such measure involved the rental of a support vessel, the Polar Prince, which was incapable of carrying the Titan on deck.
Consequently, the submersible had to be towed through the ocean for three days from Newfoundland to the crash site.
Arnie Weissman, editor-in-chief of Travel Weekly, who participated in a May expedition to the site, revealed the towing resulted in the submersible being subjected to considerable rough handling.
Weissman’s anticipated dive to the ocean floor was eventually abandoned due to adverse weather conditions.
Contrastingly, traditional submersibles like Alvin embark on their dives from a mothership equipped with custom winches, hangars, and a machine shop, and are carefully lowered into the water by a large crane.
OceanGate did not provide the Times with an explanation regarding whether the Titan might have sustained damage due to the prolonged towing.
Interestingly, Titan deviated from industry standards in several aspects.
With dimensions of 9 feet in width and 8 feet in height, its pill-shaped hull, likely to accommodate more passengers who paid a hefty $250,000 each, differed significantly from the typical spherical hull better suited for deep-sea voyages.
Furthermore, unlike most submersibles built from titanium, Titan’s central cylinder was composed of carbon fiber, attached to titanium hemispheres.
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Experts caution against such construction due to the distinct materials’ varying pressure responses, leading to potential seal breakage under intense water pressure.
Retired forensic metallurgist Tim Foecke speculated that changes to the hull could have contributed to the submersible’s failure.
He emphasized that larger hulls require more robust construction to withstand the same pressure as smaller vessels.
In addition to these design issues, concerns arose regarding OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush’s decision to bypass standard testing and inspections.
He argued that acquiring a certification for Titan would hinder innovation.
When interviewed for a documentary, Rush famously said, “You are remembered for the rules you break, and I’ve broken some rules to make this. The carbon fiber and titanium — there’s a rule you don’t do that. Well, I did.”
Rush envisioned the vessel as an instrument for deep-sea mining — a contentious practice of procuring minerals from the seafloor.
He admitted in a 2017 interview that using the sub to view the Titanic’s wreckage was to validate his vessel’s design.
However, Kedar Kirane, a mechanical engineer specialized in fiber-reinforced composites, emphasized that testing and certification would be paramount when constructing a submersible. “Safety is at stake,” he cautioned.
The consequences of these risky decisions came to a head on June 18 when the Titan imploded during its dive to the renowned ocean liner’s wreckage.
The tragedy claimed the lives of Rush, British billionaire Hamish Harding, French Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood, and his young son, Sulaiman Dawood.
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