IN MARCH 2021 the British government published a sweeping review of foreign, defence, development and security policy dubbed the “Integrated Review”. The world was becoming more competitive and fragmented, it warned. Just how much so it could not have guessed. That summer Kabul fell to the Taliban. Then, a few months later, Russia invaded Ukraine. And Sino-American relations appear to be in freefall. The government has accordingly given the review a spritz.

The new report tackles two of the criticisms levelled against the original. One was that it had a Europe-shaped hole. At the time, Boris Johnson, then prime minister, was waging diplomatic trench warfare with the European Union. Rishi Sunak, the current prime minister, has achieved an armistice by signing the “Windsor framework”, a deal over Northern Ireland, and soothing relations with France, notably through a summit with Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, on March 10th. Britain will even host a meeting of the European Political Community, a forum invented by Mr Macron, next year.

The second gripe was that Mr Johnson’s “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific region was boosterish folly, not least after Russian tanks had rolled into Ukraine. The review declares the tilt a success, largely thanks to non-military instruments such as trade and diplomacy. The policy also looks more substantial than it once did. In December Japan signed up to an Anglo-Italian initiative to build a next-generation warplane, a project known as “GCAP”, and on March 13th it emerged that Britain would co-design a nuclear submarine with Australia as part of the AUKUS pact, a three-way deal announced by America, Australia and Britain 18 months ago. On top of that, Britain is also on the cusp of being accepted as a member of the CPTPP, a big Asian trade deal.

In fact, the review, led by John Bew, a professor brought into Downing Street by Mr Johnson and kept on since, deftly weaves together these two strands of British foreign policy. “The prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are inextricably linked,” it argues. It points to growing co-operation between European and Asian powers, including not just GCAP and AUKUS but also a promise to establish a “permanent” maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific with France. It also emphasises China’s “epoch-defining challenge” to the world order, and promises to double funding for “China capabilities”, such as language skills in government.

The document’s tone is sober, often gloomy. “The transition into a multipolar, fragmented and contested world has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated,” it acknowledges. “The risk of escalation is greater than at any time in decades.” China and Russia, growing closer, are among the authoritarian powers working “to undermine the international system or remake it in their image”. Protecting that system, it warns, requires co-operation not just with Western liberal democracies, but all sorts of “middle-ground” powers—think Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—who reject the idea of joining either an American or Chinese bloc.

The report avoids bombastic talk of Britain as a superpower. The phrase “Global Britain”, a favoured slogan under Mr Johnson, has been exiled. But it recognises British strengths, notably in science and technology. Mr Sunak promises to spend £20bn ($24bn) per year by 2024-25 on research and development, a one-third increase on the current level. Priorities include artificial intelligence, semiconductors, telecommunications and engineering biology. A new government-industry task force will focus on bolstering British capability in AI “foundation models”, similar to ChatGPT.

As with the first review, the biggest question is whether Britain has the resources to realise the vision. The ambition to co-ordinate the various levers of British power, from offensive cyber capabilities to sanctions, “is a terrific goal,” says one official who was closely involved in the last review, “but is there yet a properly integrated machinery—and human capital—to do all this?”

Defence spending is a particular bone of contention. On March 13th, two days ahead of the budget, the British government said it would give an additional £5bn to the Ministry of Defence over the next two years. All of that will be absorbed by nuclear weapons, submarines and the replenishment of munition stockpiles run low by the war in Ukraine. Moreover, instead of pledging to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence, as military chiefs had wanted, the review says that this is only an “aspiration…as fiscal and economic circumstances allow”.

If the core defence budget were indeed to rise to 2.5% over a decade, that would mean a 40% rise in spending with tax rises to pay for it, says Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank. ”The government has left this tricky dilemma to its successor,” he suggests. In opinion polls, the opposition Labour Party holds a commanding lead of more than 20 points over Mr Sunak’s Conservatives and elections are due by January 2025.

Despite harsh public criticism of the government’s failings over foreign and defence policy, Labour is aligned with the official Ukraine policy, supportive of schemes like GCAP and AUKUS and similarly sceptical of China. It would preserve much of this strategic vision. Even so, John Healey, Labour’s shadow defence secretary, says that he would hold a fresh review in his first year in office. Events will surely intervene. ■