MIGHT THE long-awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive have begun? President Volodymyr Zelensky said on May 11th that it was not yet under way. But there have also been bullish statements by Ukrainian commanders about ongoing, if limited, battlefield successes; and mostly unconfirmed reports by Russian military bloggers of Ukrainian advances. These latter include: the possible encirclement of Russian forces in Bakhmut; Ukrainian armoured groups closing in on nearby Soledar; an attack on Mayorsk to the south of Bakhmut; and a Ukrainian advance in the direction of Belgorod, a Russian city. There have also been accounts of renewed Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian logistics hubs behind the lines.

Some of this may just be the result of growing Russian jitters, although the worsening situation of the Wagner group, a Russian mercenary force, in Bakhmut is confirmed by several sources—not least by Wagner’s boss, the increasingly hysterical Yevgeny Prigozhin, who said on May 11th that the situation developing on his forces’ flanks was “the worst of all possible scenarios”.

The latest Ukrainian push has focused on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut itself. The renewed fighting, which began on May 6th, has already seen Ukraine retake several square kilometres of territory, making it the most significant gain since seven months ago (though so far very far from what happened then, when large tracts of Kherson province were retaken). Serhiy Cherevaty, a spokesman for Ukraine’s eastern command, said Ukraine had identified a weak point in the Russian defence line held by soldiers from the 72nd brigade.

On May 12th the Russian defence ministry indirectly admitted to a major reversal on Bakhmut’s northern flank: its forces had withdrawn to what it called a “more favourable” frontier near the Berkhivka reservoir, some 3km east of previous positions. A source in Ukrainian military intelligence suggested the situation on the southern flank was even more perilous: Russian troops were in danger of encirclement near the village of Ivanivske, on Bakhmut’s western outskirts, he said. Consolidation of those positions would ask serious questions of the Russian military command, pulling on reserves earmarked for other tasks.

The reality is always likely to be obscured both by the normal fog of war and by Ukrainian attempts to keep the Russians guessing. In the preliminary stages of any offensive, commanders on the ground conducting probing operations across many different sections of a nearly 1,000km-long frontline will also be encouraged to use their initiative. When they find a gate that is open, they will go through it.

One possibility is to look out for increased activity around either Zaporizhia or, though less easy to manage because it will involve crossing the Dnieper river, Kherson. However, the idea of large formations of armoured vehicles gathering for a single massive attack may never materialise. A series of limited pushes, like the current one around Bakhmut, may be more the pattern to expect.

Another important factor is that the Ukrainians may not yet be ready to begin full-scale co-ordinated operations. Although it seems that most of the new kit donated by Western allies is now in theatre (even if Mr Zelensky has said that Ukraine is waiting for more to arrive), such is its diversity that it may not yet be fully integrated. Only when commanders know that point has been reached will they feel ready to go.

One key element in Ukraine’s offensive that is perhaps not ready for prime time is the Anglo-French Storm Shadow, an air-launched cruise missile that Britain’s defence secretary, Ben Wallace, announced on May 11th had been donated to Ukraine. In his statement, Mr Wallace was deliberately vague about when the missiles had been sent or how many they would be getting. But it is a highly significant step nonetheless.

The Ukrainians have been asking for longer-range systems to hit Russian logistics and command hubs since the end of last year when, in response to the initial success of the American HIMARS multiple launch rocket system, the Russians started moving them beyond the 70-80km range of the version given to Ukraine. Those pleas have fallen on deaf ears in Washington, where there is as yet no willingness to supply Ukraine with the ATACMS system, which has a 300km range. Now, just as Britain’s announcement to send Challenger 2s succeeded in prompting allies, including America, to overcome their objections to giving Ukraine main battle tanks, so too are there hopes that supplying Storm Shadow could have a similar galvanising effect. The export version of the Storm Shadow has a range of around 250km.

Another question is how many missiles Ukraine will be getting. The stockpile of Britain’s Royal Air Force is probably around 900, so a reasonable bet might be between 5% and 10% of that. Mr Wallace says that whatever the number he is providing, the Ukrainians will have enough for their needs.

Whatever the number, no one knows yet how effective the missiles will be. If they reach their targets, the answer is very. The Storm Shadow has been designed to pierce and destroy hardened bunkers by using a dual-charge that consists of a penetrator to blast a hole in a structure and then a powerful warhead to explode deep inside the target. It could prove devastating against not just fuel and ammunition stores, but bridges at entry points to Crimea, and airfields on the peninsula.

But what the war has so far demonstrated is that subsonic cruise missiles have proved vulnerable to interception by ground-based air defence. Nobody knows how Storm Shadow will fare against Russia’s formidable S-400 surface-to-air missile. What is clear is that Storm Shadow gives Ukraine a capability it did not have previously. It is a capability which, in terms of prosecuting a successful offensive, might well be worth waiting for. ■