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The rhetoric of European leaders in response to Vice President J.D. Vance’s statements at the Munich Security Conference has been a mix of genuine fear and false bravado. They are terrified about the prospect of the U.S. rethinking its lopsided trade relationship with Europe and abandoning its commitment to provide for Europe’s defense. At the same time, they have flirted with treating the U.S. as just another nation, as if Europe has the economic heft and military potential to assert itself as an autonomous geopolitical power center. The Trump administration’s response to this alleged confidence has been clear: Go ahead and try.
After all, the 47th president’s first several weeks in office have showcased the effective use of tariffs as statecraft, with Trump getting concessions from Mexico and Canada on fentanyl and border security. Next up on the docket is a reported 10 percent levy on all exports coming from the European Union. This coincides with the EU’s commitment to ramp up sanctions against Russia later this month. Aluminum, fertilizer, and a number of other products will now be restricted, along with a host of additional sanctions on Russia’s shadow oil tanker fleet. The likely effect will be to raise prices even higher as agricultural costs increase and European industry is further strangled amid efforts to keep Russian energy out.
Europe appears to be at the crossroads of practical reality and ideological principle. The commitment of the political class to punish Russia for invading Ukraine no matter the cost is being rejected at the ballot box as populist parties win elections across the continent. In reaction to the rising tide of populism, the EU leadership is mulling a mechanism for outright rejecting election results they deem illegitimate. The blacklisting of certain populist parties in order to bar them from participating in governing coalitions is sure to further inflame political tensions. Vance, in his Munich speech, drew attention to this exact issue.
But in reality, it is the Trump administration’s America First agenda that can restore some balance to the European continent. This may sound like a paradox to those at the Munich conference who were so incensed about Vance’s chastisement of their liberal internationalist orthodoxy—a chastisement that equally applies to the U.S. ruling class as well, as evidenced by the recent revelations into the deep rot at USAID. Prioritizing the U.S. national interest by ensuring fair trading practices and more reciprocal relationships with European countries will not only serve America well, but will also help to strengthen the U.S. geopolitical position in Europe and the world more broadly.
One vital part of bringing about this new balance of power is Trump’s commitment to expand energy production, which will be key to closing the almost $130 billion trade deficit with the EU. Crude oil remains the top U.S. export to the EU at about $43 billion/year, but it will be in the area of the more expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG)—our third largest export to Europe, at about $21 billion/year—that the United States can best press its advantage.
Despite the sanctions put in place since the start of the war in February 2022, Europe hasn’t actually stopped importing Russian energy. The drop in Russian pipeline gas deliveries from about 40 percent of the EU’s gas imports to only about eight percent in 2023 distorts the state of Moscow’s energy relationship with the continent, as Europe replaced Russian pipeline gas with Russian LNG. In 2024, EU countries purchased a record amount of Russian LNG, putting Moscow in the number two spot for European imports of the product throughout most of the year (at times being edged out by the collective countries of the Middle East), with America in first place.
Still, the Europeans would prefer to buy from the U.S. When EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen called Donald Trump to congratulate him on his electoral victory, the two reportedly discussed the issue of increasing American LNG imports to Europe to further box out Moscow. Europe has already added close to 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) of regasification capacity for shipments of LNG since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine back in 2022, bringing the continent's total LNG regasification capacity to around 375 bcm, with certain estimates projecting an increase to 410 bcm by 2030. As such, there is already significant infrastructure available for LNG import capacity across the continent that America can use to increase its relative market share of the product in Europe.
There is certainly reason to believe that this is a realistic goal. The new sanctions tranche against Russia notably avoids touching LNG. Despite European grandstanding against Moscow, the extremely high energy prices that resulted from sanctions on Russia have already created political upheaval throughout the entire EU. It is no coincidence that this effect is most pronounced in those nations that are—or rather were—heavily reliant on the plentiful supply of cheap Russian energy. The Alternativ für Deutschland, a right-populist party in Germany, is likely to see its best results yet in elections later this month, thanks largely to the effects of the current government’s attempts to economically isolate Moscow. Austria saw historic wins for populist anti-war parties, as did the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Romania elected a populist figure committed to moderating Bucharest’s support for Ukraine before the nation’s top constitutional court annulled the election results in an unprecedented ruling. Moldova is increasingly at risk of political upheaval due to the war and its effects.
Most significantly, Slovakia and Hungary have taken strong stands against Brussels. The expiration on January 1 of a deal that allowed Russian energy giant Gazprom to send about 15 bcm of pipeline gas per year through Ukraine to several European countries has seriously exacerbated the relation of these two countries with EU leadership. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s December 2024 trip to the Kremlin was intended to address this question of gas imports. Fico’s country is eager for some type of deal to be reached, as it receives transit fees for Russian gas being piped through its territory to other European locations. Hungary has also been outspoken on the issue, and only agreed to the renewal of sanctions against Russia on January 31—the last day possible—after the European Commission promised ongoing discussions with Kiev on the issue of oil and gas transit.
Increased U.S. supply due to Trump’s policies will drive down the cost of American energy, making its products more competitive against Russian alternatives through simple market forces. Trump should also seek to use tariffs to goad Europeans into buying even more U.S. LNG. At the same time, allowing Russian gas to pass through Ukraine toward the aforementioned countries would further buttress the U.S. relationship with Eastern and Central Europe. Assuaging the economic pain that has resulted from Brussels’s ill-advised policies will help Washington build goodwill with this region. The U.S. would also be well-positioned to secure commitments from countries in the region to diversify their energy resources in favor of American oil and gas exports, providing additional leverage for the U.S. in negotiating with the broader EU block while reducing Russian influence.
Such an arrangement would allow for Ukraine to begin collecting some of the $1 billion a year in transit fees that it is currently forgoing due to the lack of pipeline gas passing through its territory. If U.S. financial aid dries up, Kiev will be eager to regain access to that revenue flow (although Europe itself might be an obstacle in that regard). Eventual peace negotiations might see a deal for even higher transit fees to be collected by Ukraine, which could help recovery after the war.
This would also make sense from a geopolitical perspective, since it would help to temporarily slow down the flow of Russian energy to China. In the first eight months of 2024, China imported 20.8 bcm of Russian gas, more than the 15 bcm that Europe aimed to get in the entire year 2025. Reducing the flow of Russian gas to Europe provides a strong incentive for Russia to accelerate development of gas pipelines to China, including the Power of Siberia II, which all together provide capacity for about 100 bcm annually.
Moscow’s turn to China may now be irreversible, but it is still in the U.S. interest to obstruct China’s access to cheap and reliable Russian energy for as long as possible. The White House should use all means at its disposal to form a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. A concession allowing for countries like Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria to at least temporarily continue receiving cheap Russian gas may also placate them long enough to ink additional deals and build additional infrastructure where necessary for receiving energy from the United States.
The outrage of European leaders over Vance’s comments in Munich was misplaced, as the VP’s words should instead have been treated as a friendly heads-up that the U.S. can no longer subsidize Europe. At the end of the day, European and transatlantic unity is predicated on the ability of partners to deliver mutual economic benefits. If that prospect is ever significantly diminished due to the policy choices of the EU’s supranational structures—which is not unthinkable given the commitment to left-wing social policy, deindustrialization, unrealistic climate goals, and mass migration—then that unity will be under serious threat. The problems that currently plague continental solidarity will surely multiply as the European political class grows increasingly brazen in its efforts to censor and ban populist political parties that speak to the concerns of tens of millions of voters.
That is exactly what Vance warned of: “If you’re running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you. Nor for that matter is there anything that you can do for the American people who elected me, and elected Donald Trump.” Whether or not that warning is heeded, the United States must continue to build the groundwork for stronger bilateral relationships that are mutually beneficial. And if the political tide continues to turn populist in Europe, then all the better for the White House and the country it leads.
Trump has proven his acumen at using tariffs as a tool of statecraft vis-à-vis America’s neighbors, and he could achieve similar if not even better results with European countries. Though Washington is a friend of Europe, Trump does not owe it any altruistic treatment and is right to not let the American taxpayer be taken advantage of. It is time to demand a more reciprocal relationship based on the existing balance of power. This will not only be in the long-term interest of the U.S. but will also encourage the countries of Europe to begin acting like more responsible trading partners as well as more sensible geopolitical actors.