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The Russia-Ukraine war drags on, having grown more dangerous after European governments removed limits on the use of weapons provided to Kiev. Instead of trying to promote peace through more intense involvement in the conflict, President Donald Trump should wind down Washington’s role, turning responsibility for aiding Ukraine over to the Europeans.
Of course, the combatants should end the war. Most importantly, Russia should not have committed flagrant aggression by invading its neighbor. However, Ukraine should not have tempted fate by pursuing NATO membership and a U.S. alliance. Nor should Washington and its allies have engaged in reckless expansion by pushing the transatlantic alliance to Russia’s border and intervening in Ukrainian politics.
Kiev is a sovereign state and entitled to act as it wishes, but it is stuck in a bad neighborhood and cannot escape the ill attention of its larger power next door. Trusting in Western protection was a deadly mistake. Instead, a modest mix of prudence and deference could have avoided the ongoing conflict which has ravaged Ukraine.
Unfortunately, brutal combat has only driven the parties further apart, with both determined to achieve victory. Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft writes, “It is not just that several of the positions on both sides are completely mutually incompatible; they suggest that at present neither side is in fact interested in an early peace.”
Absent a Russian collapse—always possible, but at present very unlikely—Kiev has no way to achieve its understandable desire to retake all of its territory, including that lost a decade ago. And the Putin government’s demands, for as yet unconquered territory along with significant military and political concessions, are likely to be met only if Ukraine is conclusively defeated. Moscow continues to make modest territorial gains on the battlefield, but at a terrible cost. Although Ukraine, with a smaller military and population, is under intense strain, allied support has so far sustained Kiev’s fight.
The foreign policy “Blob,” as former Obama official Ben Rhodes termed it, overwhelmingly favors continued U.S. backing for Ukraine. Policymakers are understandably sympathetic to Ukraine but have turned America into an unofficial belligerent. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, admitted that “Putin clearly sees this as a proxy war by NATO, and frankly, in a way, it is.”
Not just “in a way.” The U.S. and Europeans have provided Kiev with abundant weapons and materiel used to kill thousands of Russian military personnel. Back when U.S. officials were less discreet, they even admitted to turning the country into a CIA outpost and helping kill Russian generals and sink Russian ships.
With less publicity, U.S. and European governments have deployed personnel in Ukraine, many as de facto combatants guiding their governments’ high-tech weapons—which Kiev is now allowed to target deep inside Russia. In essence, the U.S. military has acted as a cobelligerent. Reported the New York Times: “Side by side in Wiesbaden’s mission command center, American and Ukrainian officers planned Kiev’s counteroffensives. A vast American intelligence-collection effort both guided big-picture battle strategy and funneled precise targeting information down to Ukrainian soldiers in the field. One European intelligence chief recalled being taken aback to learn how deeply enmeshed his N.A.T.O. counterparts had become in Ukrainian operations. ‘They are part of the kill chain now,’ he said.”
Fearful over Moscow’s likely reaction to lethal aid, the Biden administration attempted to calibrate its assistance. However, the fig leaf separating proxy and direct combat continues to shrink. Last week’s drone attack on Russia’s strategic bomber force escalated the conflict. Ukraine obviously is entitled to strike hard against the invader. However, targeting weapons that act as one leg of Moscow’s strategic triad significantly raises the stakes. Especially since Russia left its planes undefended and lined up on runways as a result of the START nuclear treaty, which encouraged storing planes in the open to ease surveillance and enforcement.
Moscow likely suspects, frankly with good reason, that the U.S. at least knew of the planned Ukrainian strike, and probably aided its execution. Trump may have phoned Putin to assure the latter that the U.S. was not involved in Kiev’s latest operation, but such claims are likely to lose their force over time. Perhaps because the destruction was less than originally advertised, the Kremlin so far has responded with more of the same, heavy drone and missile attacks on several cities. Analysts speculate that Moscow might be planning additional strikes, though its potential for conventional escalation might be limited.
Of course, Ukraine advocates typically dismiss the likelihood of Russian retaliation, viewing Putin as a paper tiger. After all, he has not responded to the abundant allied aid heretofore provided to Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, Zelensky pushes this line: “The whole naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has crumbled these days.”
What looks to Westerners like weakness may be cold calculation. The Russian leader has typically—at least other than when he decided to attack Ukraine—been a rational, even cautious, actor. Most importantly, he believes that he is winning. Hence, it would be reckless to invite formal NATO and, more important, U.S. entry into the conflict. If Putin believed that Russia was losing, or if he was again embarrassed by a significant Ukrainian strike, he might decide that he had to do more than launch the usual drones and missiles at the usual targets. Indeed, Kellogg admitted that “the risk levels are going way up.” He worried that “any time you attack the [nuclear] triad, it’s not so much the damage you do on the triad itself, like the delivery vehicles, the bombers, but it’s the psychological impact you have.” At some point Moscow might respond to a particularly serious or embarrassing attack by targeting allied aid supplies and facilities, testing the Trump administration’s commitment to Europe’s defense.
The war is a tragedy and Ukraine is a victim, but that is not a sufficient cause for America to risk a conflict with a major nuclear power. Especially since Ukraine matters far more to Russia, which relies on its nuclear weapons to cover its substantial conventional gap with the U.S. and NATO. Ukraine, which has been ruled by St. Petersburg or Moscow during most of America’s existence, has never been a security concern for Washington. There is no reason to make it one now. Indeed, this is why NATO failed to keep its 2008 commitment to induct Kiev. No member was prepared to go to war on its behalf.
The U.S. has another important reason to want the conflict to end. Russia has lost its status as a global superpower but retains substantial influence abroad. Indeed, it has demonstrated the ability to undermine American policies around the world. Washington wants Moscow to leave Latin America, including Cuba and Venezuela, to the U.S. The Trump administration also seeks Russia’s assistance in negotiating a new nuclear agreement with Iran. And Trump wants to deter Moscow from equipping America’s enemies. Today the administration can only watch as Russia underwrites North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and his military. Particularly worrisome is the possibility of the Kremlin providing Kim with technical assistance to improve his nuclear weapons and produce more accurate missiles to target the American homeland.
Finally, Trump recognizes that the U.S. should stop pressing Moscow and Beijing together. Historically, Russia viewed itself as a European power. Despite China and Russia’s professed friendship, their governments do not trust one another. Today, antipathy toward their common adversary, if not enemy, overrides their differences. Separating them won’t be easy, but restoring the West as an economic and political option would at least encourage Russia to limit cooperation with China in areas of greatest allied concern. And Western ties could further expand over time.
Indeed, Trump should offer the possibility of improved relations as an inducement for Moscow to moderate its demands against Ukraine. Although Russia appears to be winning on the battlefield, the cost continues to be high. Military success might prove more elusive in the future. For instance, some analyses indicate that Moscow is using up its older tank stockpile faster than it is producing new ones, which could significantly hamper military operations within the next year or two. Many Russians are weary if not disaffected and desire peace. If Putin was able to achieve his essential security ends and eliminate Western sanctions, he might choose to end the conflict.
Ukraine also has good reason to settle. Kiev will find it ever harder to carry the burden of the war. With a smaller population and many people having fled the country, it faces a manpower crunch. Moreover, Ukraine may find waning European support as people tire of the war’s costs and elect more populist governments. Indeed, even in Ukraine, popular sentiment has been shifting towards a negotiated settlement. The Zelensky government might decide that an ugly compromise peace is necessary to ultimately preserve national sovereignty and allow economic recovery.
The Trump administration should continue to push Ukraine and Russia to seriously negotiate. Warns Lieven: “as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.” Lieven advises against “walking away” from the diplomatic process, on grounds that only the U.S. can prod both Russia and Ukraine into making peace. However, given Washington’s past support for Kiev, the former will never be seen by the Kremlin as an unbiased moderator. While the U.S. should continue to encourage peace, its first priority should be to ensure that America no longer risks being dragged into a major conventional and possible nuclear conflict. That requires disengaging from the ongoing fight.