American strength comes from a clear separation of powers and roles. Government secures liberty and writes neutral rules. Free people build and compete. Government is in effect the referee for business. But when the referee buys a team jersey, every call looks compromised. That is why Washington taking a ten percent equity stake in Intel is the wrong model for our country, even if it is sold as national security.

This is not theoretical. The White House has announced that the United States now owns about 10% of Intel converting previously promised CHIPS Act support into stock and warrants. Intel’s own releases and market coverage describe an $8.9 billion purchase of roughly 433 million new shares for a 9.9% position, plus a five-year warrant tied to control of the foundry unit. Subsequent reporting added that Intel has already received billions in cash under the arrangement. The president framed it as paying “nothing” and securing an asset worth about $11 billion. Even friendly analyses admit this is a rare step that moves America toward state-style industrial policy and an unusual expansion of public ownership.

I support rebuilding domestic chipmaking. I want secure supply chains, strong fabs, and real competition with China. I also believe ends do not justify means. Owning a slice of a regulated company hardwires a conflict of interest into the system. The same sovereign that sets export rules, runs defense procurements, writes tax policy, and enforces antitrust now has a direct financial stake in one of the firms affected by those decisions. Even if every official acts in good faith, the signal to rivals and investors is obvious. Washington picked a winner. Intel itself warned shareholders that a federal stake could complicate foreign sales and strategic options, and tech policy outlets detailed additional risks of government on the cap table.

Supporters say this is no different than crisis rescues. History says otherwise. In 2009, the government took about 61% of General Motors during bankruptcy and later exited. With AIG, Treasury’s stake rose to roughly 92% at its peak before being unwound. During the pandemic, airline support included warrants that the Treasury later auctioned — temporary tools, not permanent ownership.

The Intel deal is different. It plants a flag in peacetime and normalizes federal equity in a strategic firm. It also sits on top of the prior CHIPS framework that already offered massive support without ownership. Under the prior approach, Commerce proposed up to $8.5 billion in direct funding plus loans and a 25% credit for Intel projects, without Washington as a shareholder. That was the right side of the line.

There are practical, constitutional, and moral problems with state ownership.

Practically, it distorts every downstream decision. Can Commerce fairly tighten export controls that might hurt Intel revenue? Can the Pentagon run vendor-neutral chip procurements when one bidder is a federal asset? Will antitrust pursue a merger that benefits a company the state partly owns with the same courage it shows toward rivals? Even if everyone is upright, the perception of favoritism is inescapable, and markets run on trust. Investors are already warning that this move inaugurates a politicized industrial policy era

Constitutionally, the federal government is one of limited, enumerated powers. The charter authorizes spending for the common defense and general welfare. It does not envision a permanent sovereign investor that picks corporate winners and then regulates competitors. Ownership reshapes the incentives of the state itself and undermines due process in spirit if not in letter. Citizens should have confidence that the handwriting rules and awarding contracts are not also protecting its own portfolio.

Morally, this is the very ends-justify-the-means thinking conservatives are supposed to resist. We do not save free enterprise by nationalizing pieces of it. We preserve it by setting clear rules, encouraging competition, protecting property rights, and letting private capital take risk and reward. Once the state has a financial interest, it will tilt the table. That is human nature, which is why our founders separated powers and restrained government.

Some argue this is only a passive stake with no board seat, so there is nothing to worry about. Read the fine print. Reports describe a five-year warrant for another five percent if Intel surrenders majority control of its foundry business and a complex web of conditions that gives Washington leverage even without a board seat. Intel’s investor communications flag international and commercial risks of having the U.S. government on the cap table.

There is a better path that serves security without state ownership. Streamline permits so fabs can be built on time. Restore affordable, reliable energy so power-hungry plants can operate here. Keep the investment tax credit in place for domestic semiconductor capital spending. Use open, competitive defense and federal procurement to seed demand for U.S.-made chips. If Congress wants to offer support, make it transparent and time-limited, with clawbacks for missed milestones, not equity that entangles the sovereign.

Congress should now step in. Require full public disclosure of the legal instrument that created this position, mandate a clear divestiture timeline, and prohibit agencies from steering contracts where the United States holds an ownership interest, absent a narrowly tailored, congressionally-approved waiver. Sunlight and separation are the cure.

This is not a personal attack on President Trump. I agree with the goal to build here and win here. We simply disagree on the method. The United States does not need to become a shareholder state to secure its future. Keep referees off the field. Let Intel compete on the strength of its products and leadership, supported by clear rules that treat every player the same. That is how a free nation stays strong without compromising the principles that made it strong in the first place.