Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced plans this week to move up to $50 billion of the Pentagon’s budget from “low-impact and low-priority programs” to ones that align with President Trump’s defense strategy — an excellent first step to get the department ready for the threats America faces from China and other adversaries.
But not even cutting every last DEI program and burdensome administrative process will yield anywhere close to $50 billion.
The only way to find that kind of money is to cut weapons programs that no longer meet America’s needs. And the first item on the chopping block should be the Long-Range Standoff missile, which will cost at least $16 billion over the next 10 years.
The LRSO is a nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile intended to be carried by bombers like the B-52, the B-2 and the B-21. The US nuclear arsenal includes a triad of air, land, and sea weapons, and the LRSO is part of the air component.
But we may no longer need air-based nuclear weapons at all.
The bedrock of our nuclear arsenal is the land-based arm of the triad, including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
They would deliver a massive retaliatory blow if we detect an inbound Chinese or Russian first strike, making ICBMs the backbone of the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy that has for decades prevented nuclear war.
We also still need the sea-based leg of the triad, which consists of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. No surprise attack could take out these subs, so they guarantee a devastating retaliation even if the enemy somehow destroys our ICBMs.
The sea leg provides what the Pentagon calls second-strike survivability.
So what does the air leg of the triad, including bombers with LRSOs, add to our defense?
Not much.
Even the air leg’s most charitable supporters say its role is to “complement land- and sea-based nuclear forces” and provide a “highly visible means to signal US intent.” Bombers are also different, boosters say, because of their “ability to be recalled.”
Let’s take these justifications individually.
First, the Trump administration’s urgent order to focus on top defense priorities means the Pentagon can’t afford weapons that only provide a “complementary” capability.
Second, there are plenty of ways to “signal” our intent, including bombers carrying conventional weapons, aircraft carriers and subs with SLBMS.
As a commander, I was told numerous times in my career to move nuclear-capable bombers around the strategic chessboard to “affect the adversary” — usually Kim Jong Il in North Korea.
But I never saw a measurable response to the nuclear-bomber “signal,” and I suspect crazy does not respond to subtle shifts.
Finally, in today’s environment, a bomber’s ability to be recalled may be an outright liability, as spoofing and jamming of communication systems reaches new heights.
Who would know who is really initiating that recall? Slim Pickens didn’t get the word in “Dr. Strangelove,” and that was 60 years ago.
Scrapping the LRSO would generate significant savings: The Congressional Budget Office estimated about $16 billion in development and procurement costs would be avoided over the next 10 years — even if the price of the missile never increases. If it did, there would be even greater savings.
Additionally, nixing the missile would save the Air Force hundreds of millions a year on maintenance and modernization of LRSOs, weapons storage (LRSOs are not kept in the outdoor shed) and crew training.
The opportunity for savings is even greater if the Air Force also gets rid of another component of the triad’s air leg, the gravity-dropped nuclear bomb.
The money saved should not leave the Air Force’s accounts, but should immediately be put to use building and modernizing the Air Force we need to fight China and Russia — transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, conventional munitions and, most importantly, as many B-21s as we can get our hands on.
Those bombers would help us fight and win a conventional campaign against China and Russia. And the better the odds of winning, the better the odds no one attacks us in the first place.
A last warning: Even if Trump and Hegseth get rid of every low-impact, low-priority program in the Pentagon, we still need to spend much more on defense.
The current US defense budget consumes 3% of America’s gross domestic product, nearly the lowest level since the 1930s.
Congress has plans to add up to $150 billion over the next 10 years. But to get defense spending up to 3.4% of GDP — the level at which Trump left it at the end of his first term — we’ll need to add at least $30 to 40 billion more each year to Congress’ planned outlay.
Killing the LRSO is just the first step toward the president’s goal of “peace through strength.”
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.