The Mets completed deals last offseason to keep Edwin Diaz, Jeff McNeil and Brandon Nimmo for the near future. That they failed to reach a similar accord with their most popular player, Pete Alonso — at a time when owner Steve Cohen was in a spending frenzy — screams that the sides were nowhere near common ground. 

The parties remain publicly committed to Alonso as a Met for life. But is that public-relations spin, especially by the team? Because an unsigned Alonso better fits what the Mets are now prioritizing and selling: a step back in playoff odds in 2024, but contention, followed by a deeper talent pool up and down the organization facilitating serial contention beginning in 2025-26. 

For that strategy, Alonso not being signed long-term would make him easier to trade this offseason or at the 2024 deadline if the Mets fail to contend again. And whether Alonso stays or goes, nothing would preclude the Mets from signing him in free agency after the 2024 season. These are not the Wilpon Mets, after all. 

The Mets could basically challenge Alonso to find a suitor willing to pay what they have, to date, refused. If he does, Cohen could match or exceed that because, well, he is Steve Cohen. 

Cohen also could walk away with just a compensation pick and allay fans’ despair by pointing out: 1) if the organization were told it would get just the six years it will have gotten out of Alonso by the end of 2024 as a second-round pick and nothing more, they would have signed up for it; 2) history suggests those six years will be the best years of Alonso’s career; 3) the Mets do not have a seventh year of team control over Alonso because the Wilpon and Brodie Van Wagenen Mets of 2019 did the right thing ethically by beginning him in the majors, but the wrong thing strategically by refusing to keep him down long enough to delay his free agency. 

There also is a hybrid strategy in which the Mets, as the Yankees did with Aaron Judge, could make one final long-term effort before the star’s walk year. Judge rejected the Yankees’ eight-year, $230.5 million offer — the $17 million they were offering in arbitration plus a seven-year, $213.5 million extension. Judge bet on himself, set the AL home run record and cashed in at nine years and $360 million. 

I think Judge is actually intrinsic to the Alonso conversation. We have not had a public airing of why Alonso is not signed long term — the Mets won’t talk about it, and Alonso rep Adam Karon said, “I have a policy of not commenting on contractual matters.” 

But, again, an otherwise aggressive Cohen did not extend his fan base’s most beloved player. What could have created such an unbridgeable delta? All extension talks revolve strongly around positional value, age, control years until free agency, comparisons to like players, and the player’s meaning to the franchise, owner and fan base. It is probable that even the Cohen Mets view first base as having a real financial ceiling. 

Why? As more cold, calculating analytics-leaning baseball operations have taken control, first base is seen as having less value than, say, shortstop, third base or center field; that the position is more easily filled and a less athletic person there will age poorly, as best exemplified by the plummet of Albert Pujols and Miguel Cabrera after signing the largest first-base deals ever. 

In fact, the eight-year, $248 million extension Cabrera signed with the Tigers in 2014 (it went into effect in 2016) remains the record for total given a first baseman and annual average value ($31 million). 

Though MLB revenues have climbed from roughly $9 billion annually then to more than $11 billion now, there has not been another $200 million-plus contract given to a first baseman since. The highest annual value is the $27 million Freddie Freeman received on a six-year, $162 million free-agent deal with the Dodgers — and even that was discounted down to $25.8 million toward the luxury tax with deferrals. 

The largest total deal and extension for a first baseman since the Cabrera pact is the eight-year, $168 million that the Braves agreed to with Matt Olson after trading for him as Freeman’s replacement. Olson had two control years until free agency. The largest annual value for an extension is the $26 million that the Cardinals agreed to on a five-year, $130 million pact with Paul Goldschmidt in 2019, which began in 2020. As will be the case with Alonso this offseason, Goldschmidt was entering his walk year. 

Freeman and Goldschmidt both had their contracts begin in their age-32 season. Alonso would play his first free-agent season at 30 in 2025. But Freeman and Goldschmidt are not prototypical first basemen. They are athletic (Freeman in his age-33 season is 16-for-17 in steals, Goldschmidt is 28-for-30 for his ages 33-35 seasons). They are better all-around players than Alonso. Both have been MVPs. 

I suspect, though, that Alonso’s camp doesn’t want to limit him to first base comparisons. They want to compare him to Judge: homegrown, New York proven, beloved by the fans. Plus, power pays. Alonso had a MLB-best 181 homers since his 2019 debut. Olson was second (163), then Judge (158). 

Alonso might not be a top athlete, but he isn’t Jason Giambi or Frank Thomas. He doesn’t ignore defense. He lost weight to be more agile this year and, though awkward, has made himself representative defensively. Plus, he is tough and durable. 

Beyond Judge, I would suspect the Alonso camp would note his statistical similarity to Rafael Devers at the offseason moment when Devers signed his 10-year, $313.5 million extension with Boston. Big differences: Devers is lefty (which is more valuable), will be 27 when the extension begins in 2024 and plays third base. Also the Mets would note that Alonso’s career stats look a lot like those of Olson prior to his signing with the Braves. 

Alonso camp’s likely counter: Olson had no extra value to the Braves, as an acquired player. As for Devers, by the time he is 30 he is likely to be a first baseman or DH; he was signed to hit and Alonso’s OPS-plus is superior to Devers. From 30 onward, Devers is set to receive $224 million over seven years. Could Alonso be seeking his final arbitration salary for next year at 29 (let’s guesstimate it at $23 million), then seven years at $224 million for a combined eight at $256 million, which would top Cabrera overall and in annual value ($32 million)? 

Devers had leverage because the Red Sox were taking so much heat to retain a homegrown start after they did not retain Mookie Betts and Xander Bogaerts. After the Mets dealt Max Scherzer and Justin Verlander, could Alonso gain leverage by suggesting Cohen is losing the fan base? 

Or would Cohen laugh at that kind of leverage? The Cardinals (Pujols) and Braves (Freeman) moved on from the faces of their franchises after championship seasons, and the organizations continued to thrive. 

Cohen is trying to create the kind of machines that can lose those kinds of players and keep going. He can note that Alonso is a start, but when Pujols, Cabrera and Freeman were paid they were obvious Hall of Famers. He could note just how badly deals went when owners overheated to retain, on long-term deals, first basemen such as Cabrera, Chris Davis and Ryan Howard. 

You can see why the gap exists: Two parties see the same negotiation so differently. Will they ever find a way to close the gap and forge a long-term union?