The International Atomic Energy Agency just pulled back a veil from Iran’s secretive nuclear plans. And what was revealed is as disturbing as it is unsurprising.

The IAEA last week released a long-awaited comprehensive report on Iran’s violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The report details Tehran’s failure to comply with a nearly eight-year IAEA investigation into the regime’s illicit nuclear-weapons work.

It also shows an elaborate Iranian coverup that continues today.

When the IAEA’s Board of Governors meets next week, the United States (along with the United Kingdom, France and Germany) plans to seek a resolution finding Iran in formal non-compliance with the NPT — one step away from a referral to the UN Security Council.

That is simply not enough. The West must immediately trigger the process of restoring suspended UN sanctions on Iran.

The IAEA report includes new findings about Tehran’s undeclared activities and use of nuclear material at four sites: Lavisan-Shian, Marivan, Turquz-Abad and Varamin.

Even though the sites haven’t been in operation for some time, the regulatory body found man-made uranium particles and pieced together evidence that nuclear-weapons experiments and tests had been carried out in violation of safeguards — without the IAEA’s knowledge.

The IAEA mentions Iran’s preparation of pilot and production-scale facilities — the former for learning how to build atomic bombs; the latter for churning out a larger nuclear arsenal.

Iran was even preparing a “cold test” of a nuclear weapon (a type of simulation with unenriched uranium), one of the last steps before it could certify its weapons functioned as desired.

The IAEA says Iran provided unsatisfactory explanations about its activities, delayed timely access to sites, carried out sophisticated sanitization efforts and even stole confidential IAEA documents.

Iran refuses to disclose its construction of new nuclear facilities, raising concern about the existence of additional secret nuclear-weapons sites.

While the IAEA has a mandate to ensure all nuclear material and activities are devoted to peaceful uses, it says it can’t determine whether missing nuclear material in Iran “has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of safeguards.”

Troublingly, the IAEA underscores, “The fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60 percent remains a matter of serious concern.”

A separate IAEA report drawn from recent agency inspections at Iran’s nuclear sites indicates Iran has enough 60% highly enriched uranium to fuel roughly 10 nuclear weapons, and enough for 11 more with further enrichment of Iran’s low-enriched uranium stocks.

(It’s actually a short step from any level of enrichment to the 90% needed for a bomb).

There are other signs Iran’s nuclear-weapons activities are continuing apace.

Aided by recent nuclear-weapons work by Iranian scientists, Iran would likely require around six months to produce a so-called “crude” nuclear device (i.e., one with minimal testing) — and thus potentially evade detection until near the end of this timeline.

The West hasn’t a moment to lose.

The United States and its allies should follow through with their planned IAEA censure resolution — but they must also refer Tehran’s case to the UNSC for the “snapback” of suspended multilateral sanctions before their expiration on Oct. 18.

Those sanctions, suspended by the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and UN Resolution 2231, bar Iran from enriching uranium and prohibit nuclear, missile and military trade with the regime — key legal restrictions worth saving.

With or without the IAEA’s referral, the Security Council can take up to 30 days to vote to fully reimpose UN sanctions. Yet in October, Russia takes the council’s helm. 

So the West must seek that vote before Sept. 1 to avoid leaving the scheduling to Russia. 

Once it’s on the table, Moscow and Beijing can’t use their council vetoes to block the move.

The IAEA has done its job and delivered a robust report.

The West must now act to ensure Iran does not escape accountability for its decades of nonproliferation violations.

And then figure out what else they’re going to do stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Twitter: @StrickerNonpro.