The trade problem that America faces today is not new. It is rooted in what economists call the Triffin trilemma—also known as the Triffin dilemma or Triffin paradox—named after Belgian-American economist Robert Triffin. This principle highlights a fundamental contradiction: a national currency such as the US dollar cannot simultaneously serve as both a stable domestic currency and the world’s primary reserve currency without generating trade imbalances.
The current US policy of imposing exorbitant tariffs on nearly all its trading partners is no solution to this problem. Such measures do more harm than good. Tariffs raise the cost of imported goods, which leads to higher prices for consumers and increased input costs for producers that rely on global supply chains. This erodes purchasing power and reduces productivity. Moreover, trade partners retaliate with their own tariffs, triggering trade wars that hurt exporters, escalate tensions, and disrupt global commerce. Instead of revitalizing manufacturing, tariffs lead to misallocated resources and cronyist protection of inefficient industries, prolonging structural weaknesses rather than addressing their root causes.
America’s persistent trade deficit is a natural consequence of an overvalued dollar. This overvaluation, in turn, stems from global demand for the US currency. Being the issuer of the world’s dominant reserve currency is both a blessing and a burden. On the one hand, it allows the US to import more than it exports without immediate financial constraint. Foreign debt—denominated in dollars—is less of a concern when the rest of the world is eager to hold these dollars.
Another temporary benefit of this arrangement is that it makes financing the US budget deficit easier. Foreign holders of dollar reserves typically invest in US Treasury securities, helping fund federal deficits. This process has continued—albeit with interruptions—since the establishment of the post-World War II Bretton Woods system.
In practical terms, the US can acquire goods from around the world merely by issuing new money. However, this method leads to “twin deficits”: the government budget deficit and the current account deficit. Over time, these recurring flows become massive debt stocks, in the form of public debt and foreign liabilities.
President Trump now faces the challenge that these debt mountains may be reaching critical limits. Confidence in the dollar is beginning to erode. As of May 2025, US federal debt stands at $36.2 trillion and is rising rapidly. Public debt has exceeded 120 percent of GDP, with roughly one-third held by foreign entities. With non-discretionary spending increasing and the economy showing signs of stagnation or contraction, both public and foreign debt are poised to rise further. By the end of 2024, the US net international investment position (NIIP) stood at negative $26.2 trillion.
The concerns of the US presidency include the problem that persistent trade deficits entail strategic vulnerability. As imports consistently exceed exports, domestic production becomes less competitive, leading to factory closures, job losses, and the offshoring of entire industries. In this way, the persistent US trade deficit has hollowed out the nation’s manufacturing base. This erosion is not just an economic concern but a national security risk. A strong manufacturing sector is essential for innovation, employment, and resilience—particularly in times of global disruption or geopolitical conflict. When critical supply chains—such as those for semiconductors, medical equipment, or defense components—are located abroad, the US becomes critically dependent on foreign producers.
In November 2024, Stephen Miran, then-incoming Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, published A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System—often referred to as the “Mar-a-Lago Accord.” This unofficial white paper laid out the administration’s vision for addressing America’s precarious economic position.
Miran identified the dollar’s overvaluation as a key factor in the decline of American manufacturing—a development that he argued threatens national security. Reserve assets function as a form of global money supply, but the demand for US dollars is increasingly disconnected from America’s trade balance. As the relative size of the US economy shrinks, the tension becomes more acute. The US is caught in the Triffin trilemma. Miran insinuates that higher tariffs would reduce America’s trade deficit and revitalize the nation’s manufacturing sector. Yet trade management is not the answer. The core issue lies in the nature of a fiat currency system dominated by governments and central banks.
The Triffin trilemma was first articulated in the 1960s during debates over the Bretton Woods system. Triffin exposed the fundamental tension between domestic monetary stability and global liquidity provision. Under Bretton Woods, the US had to maintain dollar convertibility into gold at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce while also supplying the world with dollar reserves. For global trade and liquidity to expand, the US needed to run persistent balance-of-payments deficits. But these deficits would eventually undermine confidence in the dollar’s convertibility.
Triffin warned that the US could not guarantee both convertibility and sufficient global liquidity. If it continued to issue dollars, it would lose gold reserves; if it stopped, the world would face reserve shortages and deflation. This contradiction contributed directly to the collapse of Bretton Woods. In 1971, President Nixon suspended gold convertibility, marking the start of the fiat currency era and floating exchange rates.
Yet also under Bretton Woods II, the dilemma persists. The US dollar remains the dominant global reserve currency, used in trade invoicing, foreign exchange reserves, and international finance. Continued global demand for dollars means that the US must run external deficits to provide liquidity. But these persistent deficits raise questions about debt sustainability and systemic risk.
The heart of the dilemma remains: no national currency can indefinitely bear the dual role of domestic monetary anchor and global reserve without running into contradictions. Triffin himself proposed empowering the International Monetary Fund to issue Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a supranational reserve asset to reduce dependence on the dollar. Others have suggested a multipolar reserve system including the euro, Chinese renminbi, or a basket of national currencies. More recently, the rise of digital currencies and blockchain-based systems has revived interest in creating decentralized, algorithmic alternatives to national fiat money.
From the perspective of Austrian economics, however, these proposals are insufficient. The global monetary system should not rest on fiat currencies or central bank discretion. Instead, money should emerge through voluntary market interactions. A sound money system would discipline government spending by preventing the monetization of deficits. It would provide a reliable store of value and unit of account—vital for rational economic calculation and coordination.
In an Austrian framework, the ideal system is one of free banking and currency competition. Private banks would issue notes redeemable in commodities such as gold, competing for customers based on solvency and prudence. Central banks, by contrast, distort interest rates, misallocate resources, and fuel boom-bust cycles through discretionary policy.
A truly depoliticized monetary system would abolish central banks and phase out fiat currencies. Interest rates would be determined by market forces—through the interplay of savings and investment—rather than by bureaucratic decree. This would lead to better intertemporal resource allocation, consistent with Austrian capital theory.
Ultimately, the Triffin trilemma underscores a crucial truth: a national currency cannot indefinitely serve global functions without systemic instability. Substituting the US dollar with another national currency—be it the Chinese renminbi or the euro—would only recreate the same contradiction. The real solution lies in removing money from politics entirely.
Surprisingly, such a reform is more achievable than it seems. The key step is to repeal legal tender laws that force citizens to accept state-issued currency. By allowing individuals the legal freedom to use and issue alternative private currencies, governments could unleash a wave of monetary innovation and competition. This would align the incentives of currency issuers with the preferences of users—promoting stability, transparency, and trust in the monetary system.