In the wake of 9/11, many assumed that Islamic suicide terrorism was simply the product of religious fanaticism. Yet Robert Pape’s pioneering research showed otherwise. Drawing on the first comprehensive dataset of suicide attacks worldwide, he demonstrated that the central driver is not theology but strategy: resistance to foreign military occupation. Such attacks are deliberate campaigns of coercion, meant to compel democracies to withdraw forces from what attackers perceive as their homeland.

Osama bin Laden framed his appeals in precisely these terms. He rallied support not with abstract denunciations of Western decadence but by pointing to tangible political grievances—1) stationing its forces in Saudi Arabia; 2) destroying Iraq with punitive economic sanctions; 3) occupying Iraq under the guise of fighting terrorism; 4) supporting Israel in its war against the Palestinians; 5) killing Muslims around the world; 6) condoning international atrocities against Muslims; 7) propping up corrupt Muslim governments; 8) exploiting Muslim oil. Recruitment thrived on these tangible outrages. While bin Laden and affiliates certainly were Islamic fundamentalists, hoping to create an Islamic caliphate, this strategy did not draw recruits as much as did speaking to issues of foreign occupation. Whether one believes bin Laden’s words were sincere or not, the consistency of his stated objectives makes it difficult to dismiss them out of hand—a question that brings us directly to the issue of taqiyya.

What indicates that bin Laden was telling the truth about his motives and strategies in facilitating suicide terrorism? What about his Muslim constituency? It has been reported that a supermajority of them, while they often disagreed with his methods, did resonate with the political grievances he mentioned. How do we know that this is their real concern rather than an ulterior motive?

A common objection, relevant here, goes: “You know that Muslims can’t be trusted. Their religion tells them that they can lie to the infidel to further their cause.” What is usually being referred to is a superficial understanding of the Muslim concept of taqiyya—an often misunderstood concept that has to do with the ethical issue of whether lying is ever permissible under certain circumstances. The idea is often presented—whether people use the word or not—as the concept that Muslims in the US and elsewhere are just pretending to be peaceful, but secretly preparing for the implementation of sharia law. Thus, whatever they say, they cannot be believed.

Along the same lines, Dave Smith was asked in a debate, “Who do you trust more, Osama bin Laden or Benjamin Netanyahu?”

There are several points to be made here. Trust is unnecessary; context, evidence, and actions are key. Keep in mind that—from the 1970s to the present—the US government has engaged in a policy of funding and arming Muslims, even extremist terrorists and terrorist-affiliated groups in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, arguably US foreign policy has been too trusting and short-sighted in this regard and to our detriment. The double standard is that Muslims, even extremists and terrorists, can be trusted when the US foreign policy establishment wants to use them for further interventionism, yet they are never to be trusted when their statements may be used to question the wisdom of such interventions.

Further, part of the strategy and point of suicide terror is to gain attention to issues and provoke a response, therefore, when those who perpetrate such attacks plan to die, it is reasonable to assume that the motivations they express are true. Even apart from that, however, what if someone found a trove of private letters from Osama bin Laden and others, never intended for public eyes? Would that be important evidence? Any reasonable person would answer in the affirmative. In fact, such evidence was found in October 2001. In “Al Qaeda’s Scorecard: A Progress Report for On Al Qaeda’s Objectives,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (p. 515), Max Abrams writes,

Not only have Al Qaeda’s public statements accurately represented its intentions, but its leaders have emphasized these foreign policy goals in private. This suggests that Al Qaeda’s opposition to U.S. foreign policies is not invented for international consumption. Al Qaeda operatives captured in Afghanistan testified in 2002 and 2003 that their leaders had personally told them that the purpose of the jihad was to end U.S. support for Israel and the occupation of the Persian Gulf. In October 2001 a trove of letters allegedly written by bin Laden was seized by Scotland Yard during an investigation of his supporters in Britain. The objectives listed in the letters are indistinguishable from those contained in his public statements: to drive out American forces from the Gulf; to deter the United States from supporting international conflicts that kill Muslims; to stop the United States from interfering in local politics, particularly in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; and to end U.S. support for Israel. The identity of the author remains a subject of debate. But even if another Al Qaeda leader was posing as bin Laden, the letters reveal that Al Qaeda operatives were believed to be motivated by these foreign policy goals. (emphasis added)

Clearly, were such evidence to support ulterior motives, it would be trumpeted as proof of taqiyya—lying to further another objective—but the evidence demonstrates consistency of private and public objectives. Any claim that this evidence too is just well-hidden, strategical taqiyya would be special pleading to ignore certain evidence that confronts a paradigm to which one has a prior commitment. In an ironic twist, to claim that the evidence in question is also lying to promote a hidden ulterior agenda would be to engage in intellectual dishonesty because of a commitment to another agenda rather than the truth.

Polling data has also shown almost universal—95 percent—agreement among Muslim publics in majority-Muslim countries, surveyed across several countries that they agree that US forces should promptly exit the Persian Gulf. Therefore, al Qaeda’s public statements, private communications, and polling data from the countries in question all support the goal of ending US foreign occupation. With that in mind, the US government had a dismal record regarding Middle East foreign policy during the 1990s, ignored key evidence, and even supported and trained related groups who would perpetrate 9/11. All this was to the detriment of the security of the American people who were told that more foreign intervention would make them safe.