Most analysts looking at an Indo-Pacific war with China focus on kinds and numbers of weapons. To be sure, having enough effective warfighting systems, air, sea, and ground forces is the endgame. However, if all that capability is sitting in warehouses and distribution centers in the US, it is not helping. Before and during a conflict, moving replenishment supplies of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems, ammunitions, and combat vehicles to the fight will be an immense challenge. The task will require rapid air mobility – and that means airlift and aerial refueling aircraft.
The vastness of the Pacific Ocean means that air mobility must contend with the straight-line distance from the US East Coast to Guam, a major logistics hub of 8,000 miles. From the West Coast, the mileage is 6,000 miles. Air refueling would allow C-17 Globemaster III’s and C-5M Super Galaxies to fly non-stop, but that would demand a significant number of KC-135 and KC-46 tankers. Keep in mind the air refueling aircraft must meet an equally large demand for aerial refueling fighters and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance aircraft supporting front-line forces.
Data accumulated from several field exercises reveal that, depending on the condition of the runways and existing airport infrastructure, it could take 500 to 1,000 air cargo missions just to put US air mobility ground equipment with personnel, Tanker Airlift Control Elements (command and control for air mobility ground operations), and infrastructure in place. That’s before any ground forces and fighter sustainment missions are flown. That’s just getting the Air Mobility Command into position to handle the thousands of flights bringing logistics support to warfighters in the field. Then the question becomes, does Air Mobility Command have enough capability to do the job? It’s going to get a little complicated, but bear with me.
Airlift capability is measured in terms of “millions of ton-miles” per day, often abbreviated as MTM/D. Ton-miles are calculated by taking the weight of the cargo moved in tons and multiplying that number times the distance traveled in miles. For example, the C-17 can carry a maximum payload of 170,000 pounds or 85 tons. So, let’s say the C-17 travels 10,000 miles in one day; that mission would contribute 850,000 ton-miles, or 0.85 million ton-miles. The contribution of the other airlift aircraft (C-5M Super Galaxy and C-130 Hercules), commercial cargo aircraft support, as well as seaborne cargo ships, is calculated the same way.
For this article, MTM/D will be a way to explain relative capabilities – what’s needed versus what’s available. In 2005, the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) completed a Mobility Requirements Study. “The study concluded the minimum strategic airlift requirement at 54.5-million-ton miles per day by active, reserve component, and commercial airliners in the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet. Today’s capability lies between 45 and 46 million ton-miles per day,” USTRANSCOM estimated. Since 2005, Air Mobility Command has increased its fleet of C-17s to 222 and can field 52 C-5Ms. This additional capability has closed the gap to the 54.5 MTM/D objective identified in 2005. The 54.5 MTM/D was based on a generic threat across the globe using a peak surge capacity. It did not consider the potential of a conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. Current estimates of that requirement range from 110-130 MTM/D, or a capability gap of between 55.5 MTM/D and 75.5 MTM/D. The US Department of War is not going to double its air mobility capability any time soon, so what’s the solution?
Then there is the dimension of air mobility aircraft flying into contested airspace. Throughout the most recent conflicts where air mobility was key to success, the US retained complete air dominance. In an Indo-Pacific conflict, that would not be the case. “China has invested heavily in developing and employing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) weapons in the Indo-Pacific. The purpose of A2/AD weapons is to deny, by air and sea, the deployment of forces that would threaten China in a conflict,” a US Army publication, Logistics in the Indo-Pacific: the Theater for a Conflict over Taiwan, observed. Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China has not hesitated to demonstrate it’s warfighting prowess. “China has used its Navy to project nearly uncontested power within its own backyard, recently making inroads beyond its usual patrol inside the first chain of islands between south Japan and the South China Sea,” the Daily Caller explained.
The near-term solution is to use the current capability as effectively and efficiently as possible. To that end, modernization programs are underway to enhance air mobility and meet the challenge. The US War Department is looking at a Next-Generation Airlift Program (NGAL). The NGAL is largely aspirational regarding any near-term air mobility gap and is envisioned as a replacement program for C-5Ms and C-17s, exploring Blended Wing-Body designs and adding stealth capability. According to testimony before Congress, US Air Force senior executives explained NGAL was “the first step in the recapitalization of the heavily used Strategic Airlift Fleet, which consists of the C-17A and the C-5M.” Unfortunately, the timeframe for fielding the NGAL program is the 2040s.
The vastness of the Indo-Pacific region and the tyranny of distance it represents is a daunting challenge. Combine that geography with inadequate air mobility capability and a formidable Chinese A2/AD opposing force, and the deployment and sustainment of ground and air forces from the US becomes a limiting factor in the US and its allies achieving victory in an Indo-Pacific conflict with China. The US War Department must find a solution quickly.
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