Israeli and American policymakers began crafting detailed plans for postwar Gaza immediately after Hamas’s October 7 massacres. These plans shared the flawed assumption that following an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation Hamas would no longer control Gaza’s territory. However, Washington is currently pressuring Israel to wrap up its ground offensive by early January. Since the IDF cannot even fully dislodge Hamas from northern Gaza before that deadline, Jerusalem’s best-case scenario now entails confining Hamas’s remit to southern Gaza while designating its north a closed military zone.
Already on October 8, Chuck Freilich, an Israeli former deputy national security adviser, published an article addressing “what happens on the day after we topple Hamas.” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant outlined Israel’s war objectives before the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on October 20. Destroying Hamas’s military infrastructure constituted his strategy’s “first phase.” White House spokesperson John Kirby soon thereafter raised the possibility of multinational peacekeepers policing a post-Hamas Gaza.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken articulated the Biden administration’s postwar goals during a November 8 press conference. They include: “No use of Gaza as a platform for terrorism or other violent attacks. No reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict ends. No attempt to blockade or besiege Gaza. No reduction in the territory of Gaza.”
Yet, alarmed by mounting Palestinian civilian casualties, Washington started pressing Israel in December to transition from its high-intensity ground offensive to surgical strikes targeting Hamas leaders. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan warned Prime Minister Netanyahu during a December 14 meeting that the transition must occur “in a matter of weeks, not months.” Thanks to Hamas’s well-provisioned tunnel network, the IDF cannot even clear northern Gaza by then, thereby rendering every Biden administration goal unfeasible.
Wadi Gaza separates the Gaza Strip’s now mostly depopulated northern third from its south. Since Wadi Gaza’s topography precludes tunnel construction and urbanization, the IDF easily secured it during the ground invasion’s early days, effectively besieging northern Gaza. Anticipating this strategy, Hamas launched delaying operations in northern Gaza while moving most of its fighters and leaders south.
The heavy bombing necessary to destroy southern Gaza’s tunnels would take months and cause far more civilian casualties than Washington could stomach. Because the IDF relies almost exclusively on American equipment, Jerusalem must heed US demands to wind down its ground offensive. Consequently, Israel cannot fulfill the Biden administration’s goal of preventing Gaza from remaining a platform for terrorism. Accordingly, despite administration misgivings, impeding Hamas’s rearmament requires blockading southern Gaza.
Israel’s best-case scenario, therefore, involves declaring northern Gaza a closed military zone and transforming Wadi Gaza into an impenetrable armistice line. This would enable Israel to starve out Hamas’s residual subterranean fighters in northern Gaza, preventing at least that territory from remaining a platform for terrorism. It would likewise forestall a largely intact Hamas from reestablishing a presence there under the guise of civilian resettlement. Thus, Hamas’s continued governance of southern Gaza compels Israel to reoccupy its north, reducing the Strip’s territory.
Defense Minister Gallant inexplicably stated during a December 18 joint press conference with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “In every area where we achieve our mission, we will be able to transition gradually to the next phase and start working on bringing back [the] local population. That means that it can be achieved, maybe, sooner in the north, rather than in the south.” Fighting has destroyed over two-thirds of northern Gaza’s buildings. That makes it uninhabitable for civilians, but an ideal terrorist haven. Authorizing civilian resettlement would merely facilitate Hamas recolonizing the rubble.
One cannot call Gaza’s partition an Israeli victory, but it still confers some benefits. Israel avoids responsibility for governing 2.3 million insurgent-prone Palestinians along with shouldering reconstruction costs. It averts Gaza’s political unification with the West Bank, a prerequisite for implementing the suicidal two-state solution. Lastly, Hamas’s post-October 7 popularity boost might evaporate once Palestinians internalize the massacres’ long-term cost.
Micah Levinson is a professor of political science and senior fellow at GlobalSecurity.org.