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Will President Donald Trump revive his “Maximum Pressure” campaign against the Islamic regime in Iran, or greenlight an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities? Or might his “America First” foreign policy prompt a retreat from the Middle East, thus reducing direct confrontation with Iran? While analysts speculate about Trump’s next move, less attention has been paid to the Islamic Republic’s own plans. Discussions within the regime’s leadership suggest they fully expect Trump to restore sanctions on the regime. Yet, they are divided on how to respond. Some advocate standing firm, despite crises at home, but others urge a shift toward negotiation to avert the coming storm. Neither path is easy, and each carries its own risks for the Islamic Republic.

During his first term, President Trump withdrew the United States from Iran’s nuclear agreement, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and imposed a “Maximum Pressure” campaign that severely weakened Iran’s economy, hoping to compel the regime to agree to a “longer and stronger” nuclear deal. This goal was not achieved, largely because Trump’s term ended, and his successor President Biden relaxed the pressure, releasing tens of billions of dollars to the regime in hopes of luring it back to the nuclear agreement. Had Trump won re-election in 2020 and continued applying intense economic pressure for four more years, it is likely Iran would have been forced into a serious and comprehensive negotiation. This time around, it is not entirely clear what Trump’s plan is, as he holds his cards close to his chest, leaving only time to reveal his intentions. But recent observations suggest that President Trump may be less interested in escalating pressure on the regime and more inclined to resolve the nuclear crisis through diplomacy. For example, the United States refrained from criticizing Iran’s human rights record at the 48th Session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UNHRC, and Michael DiMino (associated with a foreign policy movement that believes confronting Iran is not worthwhile) was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. Both actions could indicate a shift in Trump’s approach to Iran.

Within Tehran, the regime’s leadership remains deeply divided on how to deal with Trump. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his hardline faction label Trump the “killer of Qassem Soleimani” and have declared negotiations with Soleimani’s “killer” to be forbidden. Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei’s representative at the hardline newspaper Kayhan, also favors standing firm. The IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper also opposes talks, labeling those who advocate diplomacy as “Trump’s representatives in Iran.” Nevertheless, Khamenei’s aide Ali Larijani has stated that the Islamic Republic is ready to engage in nuclear negotiations with the new US administration and potentially reach a “new agreement.” Larijani’s statement may signal a tactical change in Khamenei’s stance.

Proponents of dialogue in Tehran recognize that the regime faces multiple crises, particularly a worsening economy, and believe diplomacy with President Trump might both alleviate these problems and reduces the risk of war. In an interview with NBC, President Masoud Pezzekian said that Iran is prepared for dialogue with the United States. Mohammad Javad Zarif, currently serving as Vice President for Strategy, published an article in Foreign Affairs emphasizing “constructive cooperation with the West” and a readiness to “manage tension with the United States,” including through talks on Iran’s nuclear program. Ali Abdolalizadeh, who headed Pezzekian’s election campaign and serves as the president’s representative for the maritime economy, has likewise raised the prospect of direct negotiations with Trump as part of a “new foreign policy.”

While it is clear there is a significant divide in Tehran between advocates of negotiations and their opponents, those willing to talk limit the scope primarily to the nuclear issue. Even there, the regime’s ideal outcome diverges sharply from the “new agreement” President Trump proposed during his first term. The regime’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi has indicated it will negotiate only if the original JCPOA remains the foundation of any future deal, with extended deadlines in Tehran’s favor and permission to operate advanced centrifuges. This would likely be unacceptable to President Trump, otherwise, his opposition to the JCPOA would make little sense.

Another reason the regime’s position should be unacceptable to President Trump is that Iran’s missile program is an integral component of its nuclear weapons program, designed to carry nuclear warheads, and therefore cannot be excluded from any negotiations. Following the signing of the JCPOA, the regime expanded its missile program, producing and testing various types of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is also developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which pose a grave security risk to the United States. Therefore, even if President Trump plans to address the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program must be included in those negotiations.

It is likely that the regime will resist including its ballistic missile program in any negotiations, but this should by no means be acceptable to the Trump administration. Notably, the regime is in no position to impose its will or exert meaningful leverage, given its growing domestic weaknesses and waning regional influence. Its regional influence has been curtailed by blows to its proxy network, its air defenses have been degraded by Israeli strikes, and it faces multiple crises at home. This combination of setbacks calls for intensified pressure on the regime rather than bringing it to the negotiating table.

Yet, the nuclear program and ballistic missiles are not the only threat posed by the Iranian regime. President Trump should also address its support for terrorism if he hopes to ensure lasting peace and security in the region. Although the regime’s proxies have been weakened, it will likely try to rebuild them if left unchecked and if financial sanctions are lifted. Ayatollah Khamenei recently reaffirmed his determination to “continue supporting the “Axis of Resistance” in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere to continue their fight against Israel, the US strategic ally. IRGC commanders, and Esmail Qaani, head of the IRGC-Quds Force, echoed Khamenei sentiments, emphasizing that the Islamic Republic will rebuild and strengthen its weakened proxies.

Examining the discourse in Tehran reveals that expecting to resolve issues with the Islamic Republic through diplomacy is overly optimistic. The regime will not agree to any talks that might lead to ending its nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missile program. Even if it decides to negotiate on the nuclear issue, its preferred outcome diverges sharply from the agreement President Trump envisions. By insisting on a diplomatic resolution, President Trump risks allowing Tehran to buy time for a nuclear breakout without facing the maximum-pressure sanctions.

Farhad Rezaei is a senior fellow at the Philos Project.