• Geopolitics
• China

June 26, 2025, 11:12 AM View Comments ()

Beijing is trying to work out its position following the U.S. attack on Iran and the resulting, if tenuous, cease-fire between Israel and Iran. A longer conflict will inevitably spill over and might even drag in major powers beyond the United States. So how does the conflict affect China’s interests? Would Beijing prefer to see it escalate further, or, as its official statements suggest, does it truly want tensions to cool down and a cease-fire to take hold?

Answering this requires a two-pronged analysis, one that considers both China’s Middle East strategy and its broader strategic rivalry with the United States.

At first glance, the Israel-Iran conflict seems to have little to do with China. But it has the potential to disrupt China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), impact its energy security, and even affect the U.S.-China rivalry—meaning China has real stakes in the outcome.

China’s Middle East strategy is centered primarily on ensuring energy security, since China imports heavily from the Gulf states and Iran. Second comes its economic interests in the region—namely the implementation of BRI projects—and finally its political cooperation with Arab countries and Iran. That cooperation ultimately serves the first two goals. If China did not rely so heavily on Middle Eastern oil and had no need to offload its excess industrial capacity to the region, it would have far less motivation to maintain close ties with Middle Eastern states or to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Although China has ramped up purchases of Russian crude following the war in Ukraine, the bulk of its oil reserves still comes from the Middle East. If the cease-fire breaks down and the conflict expands, Chinese BRI projects in the Middle East will inevitably be affected.

Over the past decade, the BRI has made considerable progress in the Middle East, outpacing most other regions. A war-induced slowdown—or even a forced halt—of cooperation would directly hurt China’s exports and its overall economy. If Iran were ever to follow through on its threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the resulting economic turmoil would severely impact China’s oil imports and economic recovery.

However, this scenario might not be Beijing’s worst-case outcome. China is most afraid of the toppling of Iran’s theocratic regime under joint U.S.-Israeli military pressure. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly urged the Iranian people to rise up against their government following the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. U.S. President Donald Trump has also hinted at regime change. If that ever happened, China’s decades-long investment and engagement in Iran might be wiped out, and it would confirm Beijing’s own long-term fears of U.S.-inspired rebellion.

Beijing’s current alignment with Iran has also alienated Israel. A new Iranian government supported by the United States and Israel would likely sideline China—at least initially—which would be a major blow to China’s standing not only in Iran but across the Middle East.

From the standpoint of China’s Middle East strategy, then, Beijing does not want this war to escalate, particularly not into a full-blown regional conflict. China’s calls for a cease-fire and regional stability, and its condemnation of the U.S. strikes on Iran, are not just about moral high ground; they reflect genuine concern.

Yet the Israel-Iran conflict also plays into the broader U.S.-China competition. And in some cases, this may trump China’s regional strategy. If a worsening conflict benefits Beijing’s efforts to counter U.S. influence, even at the cost of short-term economic pain, then Beijing may in fact be inclined to tolerate or even support limited escalation, much as the United States backs Israel. Scholars such as John Mearsheimer have argued that Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear sites—and the U.S. intervention in support of Israel—ultimately benefit China at America’s expense.

In a recent interview, Mearsheimer criticized both Israel and the Trump administration for fueling the crisis. He argued that the United States faces a greater strategic threat from China and should be concentrating its resources in East Asia rather than squandering them in the Persian Gulf.

Washington had planned to redeploy naval and air assets from the Gulf to East Asia, but Israel’s escalation sent a Nimitz-class carrier and bombers back to the Gulf instead. A broader regional war would force the United States to pull even more military assets from East Asia, depleting ammunition stockpiles and undermining its deterrence posture against China. In Mearsheimer’s view, developments in the Middle East are clearly not in America’s interest.

From a U.S. perspective, this logic is sound. If escalation drags out the conflict, it could bog down U.S. forces and reduce their presence in East Asia. That would weaken the U.S. ability to sustain long-term competition with China.

But what harms the United States does not automatically benefit China. For Mearsheimer’s logic to hold, escalation must stop short of regime change in Iran and preserve Iran’s capacity to sustain a prolonged military struggle. If the Iranian regime falls, it’s unclear whether the new government would remain a formidable adversary to the United States. If the regime survives, it’s equally uncertain whether Trump would commit long-term military resources to continued confrontation.

From Beijing’s perspective, if further Iran-Israel conflict is to serve as a “second Afghanistan” that distracts the United States, Iran must retain its military resilience. That may require military assistance—either directly or via third parties such as Pakistan—or support for Iran’s domestic defense industry. While overt military support from Beijing is unlikely, quiet assistance to strengthen Iran’s self-sufficiency is plausible.

In short, to relieve U.S. strategic pressure in East Asia, Beijing may indeed find it advantageous for the Israel-Iran conflict to escalate—to a limited degree. But only so long as Iran does not shut down the Strait of Hormuz or collapse internally. If escalation begins, it is hard to predict where it will stop. Beijing’s position is inherently conflicted and its calls for a cease-fire at least somewhat sincere.

So far, Beijing has made this stance on the war clear. During the recent China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the issue with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, criticizing Israel’s military actions for triggering heightened regional tensions.

Xi also discussed the conflict with Russian President Vladimir Putin, urging both sides—especially Israel—to de-escalate and return to diplomatic channels. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has spoken with both his Iranian and Israeli counterparts, as well as with other Middle Eastern foreign ministers, sharply criticizing Israel and telling Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar that Israel’s attack on Iran violated international law. Beijing also strongly condemned the U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

Beijing’s messaging has been unambiguous: It stands with Iran diplomatically, denounces Israel and the United States, and calls for restraint to avoid broader regional instability. Yet, at the same time, it seeks to prevent total war and encourages a return to diplomacy.

While some in China might secretly desire escalation, Beijing’s consistent emphasis on peace—especially in light of the potential damage to the BRI and Chinese oil security—suggests that, at least for now, Beijing does not want to see the conflict spin out of control.