It’s Debatable: The Stimson Center’s Emma Ashford and the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig debate pressing issues for policymakers.
Matt Kroenig: Hi Emma! Happy New Year!
Emma Ashford: Happy New Year to you, too, Matt. Excited for another peaceful, tranquil year?
MK: Ha! With major wars in Europe and the Middle East, my fond hope is for a more peaceful 2025. And I think there is at least some chance that things will settle down.
In fact, I thought that would be a good topic for this week’s column—our first of the year. What are your predictions for 2025?
EA: I’ve given up predicting. I started college during the Iraq War, graduated during the global financial crisis, and my kids were born during the COVID-19 pandemic. I’ve just come to accept that my adult life is apparently going to be surrounded by utter chaos.
I’m sure there are plenty of things we won’t see coming in 2025; who would have predicted the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria at the start of 2024, for example? But you’re right that 2025 does seem to offer some prospect of resolution—or at least changes—in some of the big conflicts we’re already watching, like Gaza or Ukraine.
Donald Trump hasn’t even taken office yet, but things are already moving on the Ukraine peace talks front.
MK: Well, you are right that there were some big surprises in the past. The biggest for me in 2024 was the smashing of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. I certainly would not have predicted that Assad, Hamas, and Hezbollah would all be decimated by Jan. 1, 2025. There are probably some other surprises in store for us this year.
Let’s start with Ukraine as you suggested. We have a new U.S. president taking office on Jan. 20 who has vowed to end the war in Ukraine. Many like to point out the limits of American power, but it is remarkable the degree to which the U.S. president can still set the global agenda. Just a few weeks ago, the conventional wisdom, following Joe Biden’s guidance, was that the West would fight the war in Ukraine “as long as it takes.” Now, it is taken for granted that they will seek peace negotiations.
I think there is a reasonable chance that the conflict will wind down this year. The new Trump administration is determined to make it happen, and the Western allies and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have already expressed support for this position. Moreover, both the Russians and the Ukrainians are exhausted from three years of fighting. So, it won’t be easy, but I wouldn’t be surprised if peace in Ukraine is a big story in 2025.
EA: It’s rather surprising to me to hear folks, who have all along argued that Russia will never make peace in Ukraine, saying that peace is just around the corner.
Let me throw in my prediction here: I have been advocating for some time that the West should be seeking peace in Ukraine, but it is not going to be as easy as simply deciding that the time has come. There are a lot of tricky issues to negotiate—Ukraine’s alliance status, Russian assets held in the West, etc. In many ways, territory is the least problematic issue. Even with both sides willing, it will take time to sort through these difficult issues, which is why everyone probably should have started talking earlier.
But I do agree with you that one way or another, I think the war in Ukraine will wind down this year, whether through an armistice or simply through some freezing of the conflict. The war is just becoming too costly to all parties to continue for years.
I’m less sure about what will happen in the Middle East. The conventional wisdom would suggest that Trump will back Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in all that it does. But, honestly, I don’t think the incoming administration wants to be saddled with the impression that they’re supporting the war in Gaza. They might well push the Israelis to wrap things up sooner rather than later.
MK: I think you are right that Trump will push Israel to wrap up the war in Gaza. As he has said, he wants Netanyahu and Israel to “finish what they started” and “get it over with fast.”
I think the bigger question in the Middle East is what happens in Iran. The Islamic Republic is more vulnerable now that it has been since the 1979 revolution. Its Axis of Resistance is gone. We have seen that its missile and drone threat is no match for Israel’s missile defenses. There is little doubt that Trump 2.0 will attempt to resurrect the maximum pressure campaign from Trump 1.0, with tougher sanctions and a credible military option back on the table. I think the big question is: How does Tehran respond?
EA: Are you sure about that? I think a somewhat harder line on Tehran is probably already baked in, but the appointments I’m seeing in Trumpworld do not suggest that they plan a very aggressive Iran strategy. Folks like Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley—the most obvious Iran hawks in the Republican caucus—will not receive posts, and many of the current crop of Trump appointees—like Michael Anton, Pete Hegseth, and Elbridge Colby—are opposed to war with Iran, even if they’re not exactly friendly to Tehran.
If anything, that suggests to me that Trump might be open to dealmaking with Tehran. In fact, he alluded to that possibility a few months back. Could we see a maximum pressure campaign aimed at a diplomatic agreement with Iran?
MK: That is why I think the big question is: How does Tehran respond?
The top national security cabinet picks, including Rubio, Waltz, and Hegseth, have all criticized what they saw as Biden’s weak approach to Iran. Trump has also said that Biden’s prohibiting of Israel’s military attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities was “the craziest thing [he] has ever heard.” So, if Iran’s leaders resist, they will be under tremendous pressure.
But if they are open to negotiation, I could see Trump seizing the opportunity. Getting an agreement that goes further than Barack Obama’s 2015 deal, permanently restricts Iran’s nuclear activities, and does something to reign in Tehran’s terror and missile threat would be a major diplomatic achievement.
EA: Well, both Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian have indicated that they are open to diplomacy on the nuclear question. But we’re fooling ourselves if we think that a better deal than Obama’s is possible, given how much progress Iran has made since Trump withdrew from that deal in 2018.
But would Trump accept a deal that freezes the Iranian program at the latency stage—stopping it short of weaponization—in exchange for some sanctions relief and further diplomacy on the regional security question? I think he might, honestly. It would be a significant diplomatic deal, and it would make him look like a peacemaker. The question is less what Tehran does, I suspect, and more whether some of Trump’s own advisors try to sabotage him again, the way they did during his first term.
I have the same question on Ukraine, and I do think it’s one of the biggest questions about the incoming administration: Is Trump going to get the foreign policy he wants? Or will he once again have to deal with a set of advisors who are trying to subvert his choices?
MK: The transition is much more organized this time, and the initial picks are both qualified and loyal. There is a “team of rivals” aspect, to be sure. Tulsi Gabbard and Marco Rubio don’t agree on everything. So, they will argue it out, and then Trump will get to decide. But at the end of the day (and unlike the so-called “adults in the room” in his first term), I think this team will faithfully carry out Trump’s decisions.
EA: It will certainly be interesting to find out! What about Asia? Will U.S.-China tensions reignite this year? Will Trump finally get his North Korea peace deal? Or will the United States continue to focus on Europe and the Middle East, and fail to pivot to Asia for a fourth successive administration?
MK: The Trump picks we have mentioned see China as the biggest threat, and they will want to prioritize that. At the same time, diplomacy in Europe and the Middle East will suck up a lot of oxygen. Remember how much bandwidth the Iran nuclear negotiations took up in the 2012-2015 timeframe? Now, imagine simultaneous sets of talks on both Ukraine and the Middle East.
EA: There’s also a “too many cooks in the kitchen” problem with some of these crises. Trump has already appointed a special envoy to the Middle East and a senior advisor for Arab and Middle Eastern affairs. Not to mention the secretary of state, who’s usually meant to be the point person in the administration on diplomacy. Oh, and Richard Grenell, who’s the “envoy for special missions,” whatever that is. Will all these folks work together to speak to different constituencies, or will they compete and undermine each other?
MK: Good questions, but I would first like to turn back to your Asia question if I could. I do think there will be a tougher approach on China, especially on trade. Experts I talk to say that big across-the-board tariffs are unlikely out of the gate, but that we should expect to see more targeted tariffs immediately. Trump has been consistent in his beliefs about the efficacy of tariffs since the 1980s, and he has said that tariff is “the most beautiful word in the dictionary.”
Many worry about a shooting war over Taiwan, but I see a trade war with China as much more likely in 2025.
EA: Agreed. Unlike last time, there’s a lot more intellectual scaffolding that has been built around the idea of using tariffs to promote the United States’ industrial capabilities and domestic economy, with magazines, like Compact and American Compass, and various think tanks trying to build an economic agenda around tariffs. I’m not especially persuaded by their logic—I think we risk undermining the global trade system that the United States has nurtured for decades. But anyone interested in the global economy in 2025 should engage seriously with these ideas. FP’s editor in chief Ravi Agrawal did a great interview recently with one of the thinkers in this space, Oren Cass, that’s worth a listen.
It’s also worth noting that China isn’t the only target. Europe is bracing for Trump administration tariffs, too, and planning for retaliatory action. We could see the start of a broader trade war in 2025.
MK: Yes, and there are many other looming issues for 2025 that we might not have space to cover. Like will the latest strain of bird flu become the new COVID-19?
But there is one near-term issue we should address before we wrap up. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter passed away this week at the age of 100. What are your thoughts on his legacy?
EA: End of an era. Carter was the rare president whose post-presidency was as impactful as his time in office. His presidency was chaotic: the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and his shift to emphasize human rights in foreign policy. And, of course, he gave us the Carter Doctrine, which shaped U.S. involvement in the Middle East for the next three decades. But Carter was a one-term president who lost in a landslide to Ronald Reagan, and his advocacy for human rights after he was president is the main reason he is now popular.
What are your thoughts on Carter?
MK: It is a mixed legacy. He was a good human being who loved his country. His initial foreign-policy positions in office were too soft, which I believe contributed to several crises, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Fortunately, after the invasion, he shifted to a tougher approach, and some of his defense investment decisions actually paved the way for the Reagan defense buildup and the end of the Cold War.
Similarly, after leaving office, his Carter Center did good work promoting democracy and human rights. But he was sometimes too meddlesome, interfering in U.S. diplomacy and stepping on his successor’s toes, including by engaging in direct diplomacy with North Korea in 1994 and writing letters to U.S. allies and partners asking them to resist the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Now that Carter is gone, the oldest living U.S. president is the current occupant of the office. Compared to Biden and Trump—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama were just kids when they were elected.
EA: Well, Carter saw a lot of foreign-policy changes in his 100 years, but there’s plenty more to come. I want to wish all our readers a very happy new year, and I hope that 2025 is a more peaceful one. Everywhere except this column, of course.
MK: Yes. We will be ready to do combat every two weeks. See you next time!