Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: The ongoing Israel-Iran conflict tests India’s strategic autonomy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets his Canadian counterpart on the sidelines of the G-7 leaders’ summit, and Pakistan’s Army chief visits the White House.
India’s Middle East Balancing Act
Last week, India declined to sign on to a statement endorsed by fellow members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) condemning Israel’s initial strikes against Iran. New Delhi’s decision underscores the diplomatic difficulties that it will face in navigating a dangerous new conflict in the Middle East.
India is used to balancing ties with rival states during a crisis. For decades, in step with its policy of strategic autonomy, it has sought to maintain friendly relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, Israelis and Palestinians, and the United States and Russia.
On this front, India has faced big tests in recent years, from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to Israel’s war in Gaza. But it has largely passed them with flying colors: New Delhi’s relations with these entities remain warm, even if some are warmer than others.
But the latest test—the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran—will be one of the hardest yet for India. Israel has become one of India’s closest partners, starting with the weapons trade: India is Israel’s biggest arms buyer, and Israel is India’s fourth-largest supplier. This trade saw a whopping 33-fold increase in the last decade.
Commercial cooperation between India and Israel has expanded dramatically, too, covering critical Indian needs. India imports semiconductor chips from Israel and cooperates bilaterally on water-saving agricultural technologies. Indian corporate titan Gautam Adani’s Adani Group operates Israel’s Haifa Port.
The politics and governing styles of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu often align. Indian officials quietly admire and draw inspiration from the Israeli government’s unabashed commitment to using muscular tactics to target adversaries and pursue its security interests. And they appreciate that Israel was one of the few states to fully support India during its recent conflict with Pakistan.
That said, India has major interests in Iran and further afield in the Middle East. It’s true that India drew down energy imports from Iran to avoid the risk of U.S. sanctions, and bilateral trade is modest. But New Delhi is committed to a port development project in Chabahar, Iran, meant to hasten trade and connectivity links to Central Asia.
Additionally, there are nearly 11,000 Indian nationals—many of them students—in Iran. As was the case after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, also once home to significant numbers of Indian students, one of New Delhi’s initial priorities amid the conflict is safely evacuating these students from Iran.
Meanwhile, the broader Middle East is a key source of energy, trade, and investment for India. Several critical partners are located there, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It’s also a key space for multilateral projects that involve India, from the I2U2 quad to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. The region is also home to several million Indian expatriates.
As a result, India’s approach to the Israel-Iran conflict will be similar to the stance that it has taken toward the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, it won’t condemn Israel or its leadership for the attacks against Iran. On the other hand, it will underscore the importance of de-escalating the conflict and of using diplomacy to end it. This week, Modi repeated his mantra in recent years: “This is not an era of war.”
This position acknowledges Israel’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear threat while embracing the endgame sought by neighbors in the Middle East—and presumably Iran itself. As with the war in Ukraine, an end to the Israel-Iran conflict would very much serve India’s interests—given the deleterious economic, strategic, and stability implications of an extended conflict.
However, the stakes of the Israel-Iran conflict are especially high for India because of its geography. The Middle East is arguably the most strategically significant space for New Delhi aside from its own neighborhood—and much closer to home.
Indian officials will need to conduct delicate diplomacy to maintain India’s deep partnership with Israel without jeopardizing relations with Iran and even closer friends elsewhere in the Middle East. India is walking a tightrope that has rarely been so thin.
What We’re Following
South Asia reacts to Israel-Iran conflict. Unsurprisingly, South Asia’s Muslim-majority states—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Pakistan—have strongly condemned Israel’s strikes against Iran. None of these governments have formal ties with Israel, all have friendly ties with Iran, and many have sizable commercial ties in the Middle East, along with an expatriate presence there.
Nepal’s reaction has mirrored India’s, while Sri Lanka is an interesting case. It has relatively close ties to Israel. Though leftist President Anura Kumara Dissanayake hasn’t reacted publicly to the conflict yet, condemnations of Israel from other Sri Lankan political parties and reported injuries to four Sri Lankan nationals in Israel could prompt him to end his silence.
Pakistan is arguably the most directly affected by the Israel-Iran conflict in South Asia. It shares a 565-mile border with Iran. Though Pakistan’s alliance with Saudi Arabia and cross-border violence have constrained cooperation between Islamabad and Tehran, bilateral ties have gained momentum in recent weeks.
A large Pakistani delegation, which included Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir, visited Iran last month to strengthen cooperation on trade and countering cross-border terrorism. Iran’s foreign minister was one of the first global leaders to mediate in the India-Pakistan conflict.
Pakistan’s diplomatic strategy is simple: signal support for Tehran, condemn Israel’s actions, and call for an end to the fighting.
Modi in Canada for G-7. This week, Modi attended the G-7 leaders’ summit in Alberta, Canada—marking the prime minister’s first trip to the country in a decade. Sikh separatists who support the formation of an independent Sikh state known as Khalistan demonstrated against Modi’s visit, including with a protest in Calgary, Alberta.
As South Asia Brief covered last week, Modi’s trip offered an opportunity to help reset the bilateral relationship with Canada, which has been beset by tensions in recent years due to differences between Ottawa and New Delhi over how to deal with pro-Khalistan activists on Canadian soil.
A meeting on Tuesday between Modi and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on the sidelines of the summit resulted in pledges for deeper cooperation. According to a Canadian readout, the two leaders “reaffirmed the importance” of a relationship based in part on a “commitment to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
This language, coupled with recent reports that the two sides will strengthen intelligence cooperation, suggests that Canada’s new government is prepared to partner with India on addressing the Khalistan issue.
Trump meets Pakistan Army chief. Munir, widely seen as Pakistan’s most powerful figure, met U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House on Wednesday. Washington has often hosted Pakistan Army chiefs; Munir last visited in 2023. But it’s unusual for the Army chief to meet with the U.S. president.
It’s also notable that Trump set aside time for Munir in the middle of a serious foreign-policy crisis. He could have various motivations for meeting with Munir, from offering his services as a mediator in the Kashmir dispute to discussing cooperation on cryptocurrency. Trump may have also wanted to gauge Munir’s views about the Israel-Iran conflict and how Pakistan could help.
The meeting won’t go down well in New Delhi. Trump and Modi did speak by phone on Tuesday—for 35 minutes, according to an Indian readout—after Trump’s early departure from the G-7 summit prevented them from meeting in person. During the call, Modi conveyed India’s position on its recent conflict with Pakistan, including a rejection of Trump’s claim that the United States mediated cease-fire talks.
Munir’s meeting with Trump came amid unusual circumstances. There was no formal announcement or confirmation from Pakistan about his visit, and the country’s embassy in Washington was tight-lipped about his meetings.
This secrecy is likely due to the sensitivity of the moment. Munir arrived soon after Israel had launched strikes against Iran and at a moment when many Pakistani Americans have mobilized against the Army chief and in support of his nemesis, jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Under the Radar
On Monday, authorities in the northeastern Afghan province of Badakhshan announced the completion of a new road linking neighboring Panjshir province to the Pakistani city of Chitral, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The road spans 120 miles and is intended to bolster trade ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Though the immediate advantages are economic, there are also potential strategic benefits for Pakistan. For years, the country has sought to strengthen trade and connectivity links with Afghanistan as part of an effort to deepen geoeconomic ties to Central Asia—a region rich in critical minerals, natural gas, and trade possibilities.
Additionally, Pakistan wants to strengthen engagement with Central Asia to counter India, which also seeks to deepen its footprint there. India is disadvantaged by its lack of access to the region via Pakistan—the fastest and most direct route.
Pakistan has already made some headway in its objectives, with plans in place with Uzbekistan to build a transnational railroad project that passes through Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Panjshir-Chitral road brings another boost to Pakistan’s efforts to foster connectivity to its north.
FP’s Most Read This Week
- How the Israel-Iran War Might End by Iselin Brady and Daniel Byman
- Israel Is Going for the Death Blow on Iran by Steven A. Cook
- Israel Can’t Be a Hegemon by Stephen M. Walt
Regional Voices
In the Kathmandu Post, researcher Ajaya Bhadra Khanal argues that democracy is weakening in Nepal. “[S]tate institutions are increasingly being controlled and hollowed out by sinister political actors eager to protect themselves,” he writes. “The only solution left is for the people to mobilise politically.”
In the Indian Express, Shamika Ravi, a member of India’s Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, discusses the economic implications of the recent India-Pakistan conflict. “Some powers would do anything to disrupt the progress and cause social and communal disharmony,” she writes. “The primary safeguard against such nefarious designs would be to modernise and innovate continuously.”
A Daily Star editorial warns that Bangladesh is being hit by a resurgence of both COVID-19 and dengue fever. “Without proper interventions—such as mass awareness campaigns, improved testing and treatment facilities, and aggressive mosquito control drives—we risk repeating the mistakes that made previous outbreaks so deadly,” it argues.