The second Trump administration has begun with a flurry of activity in Latin America. In the first 100 days, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited both Central America and the Caribbean, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made a visit to Panama, and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem visited both South America, Central America, and Mexico. Another visit to the region by Rubio and a trip by Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins are in the works. Some administration officials have characterized their approach as an “Americas First” foreign policy.
The reprioritization of Latin America in the United States’ foreign policy, coupled with the high-level visits by cabinet officials, has placed China on the back foot in the region—at least temporarily. In many ways, Beijing was unprepared for the Trump administration’s considerable focus on the Western Hemisphere and its scrutinizing of countries’ relationships with China. Yet a recent summit offered clues as to how China will respond to U.S. outreach.
For a decade, China has held a triennial summit with CELAC, the 33-member Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Unlike the Organization of American States, CELAC intentionally excludes the United States and Canada and lacks a technical secretariat or permanent headquarters. In other words, it offers China an exclusive venue to engage with Latin America and the Caribbean—including countries that still recognize Taiwan diplomatically—with relatively few institutional barriers. The recently concluded fourth China-CELAC summit provided Beijing a platform for its strategic engagement in the Western Hemisphere going forward.
Curiously, though, despite a revamped U.S. posture in Latin America, China appears to be sticking to a familiar bag of tricks—even as domestic challenges pare back the robustness of its offer.
Addressing the forum’s plenary session, Chinese President Xi Jinping promised $9.2 billion in lending to member states. This was to be denominated in Chinese yuan, with no definite timeline for delivery. While this number may appear substantial, it is less than half of what China promised to lend to the region during the inaugural China-CELAC summit in 2015. Xi indicated a continuing interest in infrastructure, agricultural commodities and food production, energy, and critical minerals, and he also mentioned what China calls “new infrastructure”—telecommunications, artificial intelligence, clean energy, digital economy, 5G mobile networks, and cloud computing.
China’s nonmonetary announcements were aligned with its past offers, too. Xi announced support for a “solidarity” program focused on governance, with an aim to invite 300 leaders annually from the region to China over the next three years to learn about China’s governance model. This work is likely to be carried out by the murky International Liaison Department, a Communist Party institution that seeks to fête mainstream political parties in Latin America—including those from countries that still recognize Taiwan diplomatically. The department has conducted hundreds of exchanges around the world to diffuse information on China’s governance practices.
In recent years, Beijing has signaled a desire to increase competition in areas considered to be traditionally strong U.S. domains, such as security cooperation, disaster relief, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, drug control, combating transnational organized crime, and people-to-people connectivity. Such endeavors have brought the Peoples Liberation Army, Chinese police, and Interior Ministry officials into the region with greater frequency. Latin America represents just 8 percent of global population, but about one-third of global homicides; this violent panorama makes China’s promise of security and stability attractive.
While it is difficult for China to compete with the United States on connectivity to Latin America—the United States has the fourth-largest Spanish-speaking population in the world—Xi announced a continuation of past efforts over the next three years, including funding 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training places in China, and 500 scholarships for Chinese-language teachers under China’s “Bridge to the Future” program.
Chinese officials also continued pushing Latin American and Caribbean countries to adopt—or at least pay lip service to—some of the language associated with the Chinese Communist Party, such as the promotion of a “community of common destiny for mankind.” As was expected, the summit was also full of paeans to sovereignty, autonomy, multilateralism and multipolarity.
In reality, however, China’s messaging in the region has increased in sharpness and tone since the start of the second Trump administration—with government ministries and ambassadors warning, for instance, that there would be consequences if the region cut new trade deals with the United States that sought to compete with China.
If the multilateral summit demonstrated that China is not mixing up its approach, the bilateral space—and advancements therein—have demonstrated why Beijing is reticent to change its offer. In May, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made a state visit to China—his third meeting with Xi in as many years—and Colombian President Gustavo Petro announced his country’s intention to join China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Lula is a frequent face in Beijing. During an earlier visit in 2023, Lula signed dozens of agreements and memorandums of understanding. This trip was no different, with Lula signing more than two dozen agreements and announcing billions in investments as China seeks to displace imports and reduce dependence on U.S. agricultural producers by using Brazilian products such as soybeans.
Xi announced investments in Brazil’s port infrastructure, intended to increase connectivity between the countries, and revived talk on a long-dormant rail project—the Bioceanic Corridor—seeking to connect Brazil’s Atlantic coast with the newly inaugurated, deep-water Chancay Port in Peru, cutting across ecologically sensitive areas in South America. China also intends to deepen its involvement in Brazil’s aerospace industry and announced a five-year currency swap line between the two countries’ central banks.
Meanwhile, Petro’s presence in Beijing and his decision to join the BRI have given China confidence that it can woo the United States’ closest strategic partner in South America—especially since the Trump administration has taken a hard-line stance against Petro’s administration.
Petro’s moves may appear pragmatic, but they also appear to be ideologically motivated—part of a concerted effort to reorient Colombia away from its most important ally, the United States. In 2024, U.S.-Colombia trade totaled nearly $40 billion, while China-Colombia trade totaled around $20 billion.
Given these economic realities, it is unlikely that Colombia will gain much from acceding to the BRI, as the signature initiative is no longer what it once was, and Chinese companies have already bid for infrastructure projects in Colombia. For instance, a Chinese company won the tender to build the rapid transit Metro system in Bogotá after a lack of interest from U.S. companies.
From China’s perspective, though, even accession to a smaller, less influential BRI provides an opportunity to bring the country closer to Beijing’s orbit. Colombia’s plunge into a state of chaos under Petro, whose policies have facilitated the expansion of Colombian armed groups and criminal organizations, damaged the country’s fiscal stability, placed Colombia’s energy security at risk, and driven away foreign investment, in addition to the frequent corruption scandals, have all contributed to a spiraling relationship with the United States.
China is finding ways to take advantage of Petro’s administration in this time of turmoil.
While China inked a number of important deals at the China-CELAC summit, Beijing did not preview any genuinely innovative tools for combating the Trump administration’s “America First” approach to the Western Hemisphere. Rather, Beijing moved quickly to double down on its traditional toolbox. The situation will likely repeat itself at the upcoming BRICS summit, set to take place in Brazil in July, as Beijing seems to feel no urgency to change key elements of the strategy that it feels has produced success in much of the global south.
For most countries of the region, their relationships with China remain delicate endeavors. In response to Beijing’s continued traditional approach, both the Trump administration and regional countries should insist on greater transparency from China in any agreements they sign. The two sides may also wish to coordinate actions to protect their markets against alleged Chinese dumping—that is, flooding their economies with a surplus of cheap goods—and avoid another “China shock.”
At present, several Latin American countries have left critical industries, such as textiles and advanced manufacturing, exposed to Chinese dumping. In April, after the Trump administration imposed tariffs well north of 100 percent on most Chinese products, Beijing still reported export growth of 8 percent globally, and 17 percent in exports to Latin America. Chinese producers are making a concerted effort to unwind inventory wherever tariff rates allow for their products to remain competitive.
The Trump administration should take note that China does not intend to cede the considerable ground that it has gained over the past two decades in Latin America and the Caribbean. China will be aided in this effort most directly by rogue regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Beijing will focus some of its most concerted efforts on leftist governments in Brazil; Colombia; and to a lesser extent, Mexico. Competing effectively in the coming years will involve not only continuing to establish effective red lines, but also drumming up greater private sector engagement, such as the recently announced deal for BlackRock to purchase key port infrastructure in the region. Private sector engagement is especially important for democratically elected governments in countries—such as Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Paraguay—that desire a stronger relationship with the United States.
Upcoming elections in the region likely herald a shifting political panorama, with more pro-U.S., democratic governments joining this group. Lastly, but most importantly, the Trump administration will need to outline the priority areas for U.S. competition with China in Latin America, especially when it comes to the technologies of the future.
The Western Hemisphere will remain a region of increasing geopolitical competition. Many regional powers will likely fall back on their traditional foreign-policy doctrine of nonalignment and attempt to stay out of disputes between giants. As the Trump administration presses forward with its “Americas First” foreign policy, and China pushes back with its familiar tools, however, nonalignment may prove increasingly difficult to maintain.
For the foreseeable future, neither the United States nor China appears ready to develop new elements of a regional strategy—even as China seeks to insert itself into the domestic politics of the region.